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Abstract 
After the Cold War, with the advent of low-interest, “optional”, post-modern warfare, 
regional conflicts and failed states have illuminated the radars in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization member states. For these countries, as the expected need for military force 
relinquished, its actual use increased. Left with a need for improved tools for handling the 
increasing number of international security issues, the strategy of coercive diplomacy has 
never been of more current interest. This thesis seeks to address a lacuna in contemporary 
theorizing about coercive diplomacy, namely the under-theorization of the adversary. 
Through within-case and cross-case analysis of the NATO interventions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo, I attempt to show how both scientists and political decision-makers 
can benefit from a more in-depth analysis of the coerced. 
The thesis takes the theoretical framework developed by Bruce Jentleson and Christopher 
Whytock as a starting point. As a significant step in the right direction, their model of 
coercive diplomacy better accounts for the motivations, interests, and expected reactions of 
the target state. Furthermore, I seek to congruence test the theory’s predictions against the 
historical outcomes of NATO’s coercive diplomatic attempts. The results indicate that the 
framework delivers generally correct predictions, and that further theoretical development in 
this direction is warranted. 
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1 Introduction 
It was a whole month into Operation Allied Force before North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) military leadership finally received clearance to strike Yugoslavian President 
Slobodan Milošević’s villa complex at Dobanovci, Belgrade. So far, the attack had been 
prevented by the Dutch government’s adamant opposition. They reasoned that the villa was 
known to host a painting by Rembrandt, to which General Klaus Naumann (cited in Lambseth 
2001: 36) exasperated: “It isn’t a good Rembrandt”. 
“When the Russians play chess, what does the West play?” Professor Janne Haaland Matlary 
(Minervanett.no) asks rhetorically in a student quarterly. She argues that after 1990, Western 
policy-makers have largely unlearnt the art of strategy. As a typical example of a low-interest 
conflict, Operation Allied Force illustrated how the more traditional, “hard” principles of 
strategy have become replaced by “softer” values and norms. When liberal democracies use 
military might today, they tend to do so in a restricted fashion, where the adversary’s expected 
reaction to pressure is given less priority over other merits. 
1.1 Research Theme 
The international security environment has changed since the end of the Cold War. As the 
West’s military dominance became clear, Western countries have been drawn away from 
traditional, perhaps even existential, wars of major or vital interests, and towards more 
“optional”, low-interest conflicts. Formerly repressed or neglected regional conflict, as well as 
failed states and civil wars demand international attention and involvement. As Western 
societies have grown more risk-averse, they no longer seek to “resolve” or “eliminate” such 
threats, but to “manage risks” through “crisis management”. For these countries, “brute 
force”, in Thomas Schelling’s (1976) terms, has often become outdated, while limited military 
means are the preferred tool. Ironically, while their motivation for using force thus decreased, 
the threshold for its actual use was also lowered. In other words, while the expected necessity 
of using military force turned historically low, its actual use increased proportionally 
(Henriksen 2007: 57-58). Western countries tend to use limited military means in the defense 
of values, norms, and the international order. The use, or threat of use, of such limited force to 
influence the actions of a voluntary actor is known as coercion, and is the primary way in 
which contemporary, liberal democracies use their military might (de Wijk 2005: 11). 
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Coercion includes non-military means as well, with the most notable instruments being 
economic and diplomatic in nature (Henriksen 2007: 58). Furthermore, most coercive 
approaches fall within one or more of five categories; risk, punishment, denial, decapitation, 
or incapacitation. While these will not be assessed systematically here, they remain useful 
concepts to consider when reading the thesis. Next, coercion can be subdivided into coercive 
diplomacy and military coercion (see section 2.1). While the latter strategy is suitable when 
vital interests are involved for either party, the former is preferred when they are not (de Wijk 
2005: 106). Coercive diplomacy, by combining diplomacy with limited force, promises a way 
to manage the numerous, new security issues without having to resort to full-scale war, with 
its high levels of casualties and costs. Furthermore, the strategy is often considered less likely 
to uncontrolledly escalate, or to permanently damage a post-conflict relationship. For these 
reasons, coercive diplomacy has often become a “default” option for Western decision-
makers, especially when political restrictions exclude other alternatives (George 1994: 9-10). 
This is interesting because studies show that more often than not, coercive diplomacy fails to 
produce the desired outcome (Jakobsen 2007: 245). Furthermore, when it fails, it demands 
difficult choices of the coercer (George 2003: xii). As a main tool in contemporary, liberal 
democracies’ foreign policy, and yet so inherently hard to master, coercive diplomacy is 
worth further investigation. 
Whereas Cold War theorizing produced a highly developed literature on deterrence, the study 
of coercive diplomacy is characterized by only a handful of major studies (Jakobsen 2007: 
229-230). According to Rob de Wijk (2005: 15), “[a] credible theory of coercion or coercive 
diplomacy is still lacking”, whereas Adrian Hyde-Price (2004) claims that: “[t]he lack of a 
clear doctrinal basis for crisis response operations involving a combination of diplomacy and 
coercion is evidence of a major lacuna in strategic thinking which is the legacy of the cold 
war”. The area with perhaps the most immediate need for further study could be the 
intellectual conception of the adversary. de Wijk (2005: 20), amongst others, has noted that 
the adversary has often been neglected as a meaningful unit of analysis. According to his 
argument, neither Western intellectuals nor political leaders have sufficiently taken into 
account the opponent’s interests and motivations in coercive interactions. This could stem 
from factors like overconfidence in the West’s superior military situation, or the political need 
to demonize one’s opponent (de Wijk 2005: 107). 
Regardless, a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy requires accounting for the mix of 
motivations, interests, and expected reactions of the adversary. In other words, both the 
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practice of, and theorizing about, coercive diplomacy needs a reintegration with a strategic 
essence, i.e. an interactive element between coercer and coerced. This is what de Wijk (2005: 
16) has called the need for a dynamic approach. While contemporary theories have developed 
sophisticated tools for evaluating the coercer’s strategy, the adversary is often at best 
superficially conceptualized through an asymmetrical balance of motivation, and at worst as 
an inanimate object to be acted upon. Moving beyond this superficial image to address 
underlying causes of motivational asymmetries, it not only becomes possible to analyze the 
coerced’s expected reaction to external pressure, but also to do so with fewer assumptions 
about the adversary. 
A second implication of the trend towards “optional” wars and limited responses entails that 
the smaller the interests at stake, the “more optional”, and the less domestic support, for 
participation. “The security dynamics of the EU, such as those of NATO, concern the offset of 
domestic constraints and interests between the national and international levels. 
Governments need multilateral support and risk/cost-sharing for optional wars…” Matlary 
(2009: 2) writes. Furthermore, coalitional organization enhances multilateral diplomatic 
pressure and legitimacy, without which participation becomes difficult. On the other hand, it 
also entails dangers of lack of leadership, unity, and resolve (George and Simons 1994: 273). 
Nevertheless, it is likely that the world’s security issues will, in the foreseeable future, 
continue to be addressed on a multilateral platform. As the only existing institution with an 
integrated military structure, NATO has often been the organization of choice for Western 
governments’ crisis management (Aybet and Moore 2010: 1). With the Alliance’s recent 
engagement in Libya, and growing concerns over a potentially nuclear Iran, it is clear that 
NATO will remain a primary engine for Western military cooperation. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to better understand the dynamics and the sources of 
successes and failures in NATO’s attempts at using the strategy of coercive diplomacy as a 
crisis management tool. In this thesis it is argued, with theoretical support in the approach 
developed by Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock (2005), that for success in coercive 
diplomacy, it is necessary for the coercer to maintain a balanced and reciprocal strategy with 
clear, precise, and limited goals, while at the same time including a deeper and more realistic 
understanding of the incentives and preferences of the adversary. As demonstrated by more 
established studies, coercive diplomacy is such a complex phenomenon, involving so many 
variables, that sweeping generalizations are not warranted. Instead, it is the task of the 
researcher to find and analyze the most relevant factors, so that situations where the strategy 
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is feasible and recommendable can be identified (George and Simons 1994: 268-269). 
Nevertheless, with a strictly defined universe of research objects, some contingent 
generalizations may be made, allowing some lessons to be learnt for the next time NATO 
decision-makers consider using coercive diplomacy. 
1.2 Research Question 
In view of the research theme suggested above, the thesis’ research question will be 
formulated as follows: 
In the incidents where NATO and its member governments have used the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy as a crisis management tool, how can the variance in the outcomes be explained? 
This formulation implies a two-leveled discussion. On the first and primarily empirical level, 
it entails a disciplined configurative approach, wherein notable cases where the NATO 
governments used coercive diplomacy are examined for heuristic purposes. It will allow us to 
understand and explain the dynamics of NATO’s attempts, and thus bring important 
knowledge about significant historical events. Furthermore, from this examination it should 
be possible to extrapolate what factors were the most important in shaping the outcome. This 
aspect reflects the research theme’s discussion of the importance of coercive diplomacy and 
NATO in contemporary security politics. 
On the second and more theoretical level, the research question implies a discussion and 
evaluation of the most suitable explanation of coercive diplomacy. It asks what theoretical 
approach is most fruitful for analyzing coercive diplomacy in general, and for NATO’s use of 
the strategy more specifically. This entails an evaluation of competing theories of coercive 
diplomacy to determine a theoretical framework for the thesis, as well as a theory testing 
approach for evaluating the chosen theory’s utility in explaining the outcomes of NATO’s 
attempts at coercive diplomacy. This aspect reflects the theme’s preoccupation with the lapse 
in contemporary theorizing on coercive diplomacy, and especially with the under-theorization 
of the coerced. 
Case Selection 
At the time of formulating the research question, the universe of incidents where NATO and 
its member governments had used coercive diplomacy as a crisis management tool was quite 
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small. The range of potential research objects was mainly constituted by two major, historical 
cases, i.e. the NATO interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-1995, and in Kosovo in 
1998-1999. Both have been analyzed in earlier studies, but from different theoretical and 
methodological perspectives. Their historical significance as disciplined configurative cases is 
evident in that they constitute the only two major cases where NATO has used coercive 
diplomacy for crisis management. Additionally, for reasons outlined in section 3.1, in view of 
the thesis’ theoretical framework the two cases can also be considered theory-testing cases, or 
“tough tests”. At least somewhat least-likely cases, the two research objects are located near 
the limits of what the theoretical framework can be expected to account for. Thus the theory’s 
research status will be strengthened if it can adequately explain the variance in the cases’ 
outcomes. For these reasons, both cases are included in the study, thereby enabling a cross-
case research strategy with structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005). By 
further subdividing the two cases into a series of coercive diplomacy exchanges (see section 
3.1), I position my thesis in line with other studies, and add methodologically strengthening, 
within-case components. Finally, by including all significant research objects within a strictly 
defined universe, the cases can be considered to have analytical representivity, and some 
contingent generalizations can be made for a universe of similar potential, future incidents. 
Structure and Organization 
This first chapter has been dedicated to the presentation and discussion of the thesis’ theme 
and research question. The aim of the study has been established, and two cases have been 
selected for a comparative case-study. In the proceeding chapter, some theoretical 
considerations are made. The main concepts are defined, premises and assumptions are 
discussed, and ultimately an evaluation of coercive diplomacy theories determines the most 
fruitful theoretical approach for the thesis. The third chapter deals with the methodological 
framework of the thesis. Here, the case selection process is explained in more detail, and a 
method of comparison is determined. Additionally, the theoretical variables are clarified and 
operationalized, before some remarks on data collection, replicability, validity, reliability, and 
generalizations are made. The fourth and fifth chapters constitute the main case studies of the 
interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, respectively. It should be noted that no new 
empirical data is collected. Rather, existing data is considered in a new perspective. 
Furthermore, these chapters do not include a full, historical overview of the crises, but only 
empirical data relevant to the research question. Thus, some knowledge of the general course 
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of the conflicts is presupposed on behalf of the reader. The final chapter summarizes and 
discusses the findings of the two case studies, evaluates the level of congruence between the 
theoretical framework and the historical outcomes, and discusses the key variables in greater 
depth. Additionally, some considerations are made on causality and mismatching objectives 
and strategies, before the research question is answered. Ultimately, some final remarks are 
made on the study’s strengths and limitations, in light of other studies of coercive diplomacy. 
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2 Theory 
This chapter will deal with the theoretical perspectives that have been developed in the study 
of coercive diplomacy. A main goal of this chapter is to determine which of these approaches 
is best suited for the thesis’ research question. In the first section, relevant terms and concepts 
are presented and defined. Next, section 2.2 shortly discusses a general theory of threats in 
international politics, including some theoretical requirements and common assumptions. 
Thirdly, section 2.3 presents the research status in the area of coercive diplomacy, identifying 
and discussing the main contributions. Finally, this section ends with a presentation of the 
theoretical framework chosen for this thesis. 
2.1 Main Concepts 
There is an inherent paradox in writing academically about strategy. In some sense it is not an 
independent discipline in its own right, rather deriving insights from a series of interrelated 
fields (Baylis and Wirtz 2007: 5-7). Scientific deliberations have posed questions as to where 
the subject area should balance between art and science, between history and theory, between 
military and civil. It is also amongst man’s oldest preoccupations. This section will present 
some of the relevant terms that this ongoing deliberation has included. 
First I will consider the overall concept of strategy. In use nearly on a daily basis, the word’s 
meaning has often been adopted and adapted beyond its traditional, military context. For the 
purpose of this discussion however, a more traditional understanding is assumed. As a starting 
point, strategy can be considered “the theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of 
organized force for political purposes” (Gray, cited in Baylis and Wirtz 2007: 4). 
Nevertheless, this exclusive focus on organized force can be said to downplay other coercive 
measures, such as diplomatic or economic pressure and inducements (Matlary 2012 [personal 
communication]). Furthermore, a central hallmark of strategy is its interactive nature; proper 
strategy should consider the interplay between two or more adversaries. Finally, strategy is 
not restricted to the domain of war, as a threat of force can be suitable also in peace-time 
foreign policy. Indeed, this is the very essence of coercive diplomacy; being able to exert 
pressure without necessarily resorting to physical force. 
It is important to know what can be considered coercive diplomacy, and equally important to 
know what cannot. In the jargon of coercive strategies, the most general term is the generic 
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coercion. It implies both the potential and the actual use of pressure in order to influence the 
actions of a voluntary actor (Freedman 2004: 26). In contrast to full-scale war, coercion is 
marked by limited means and objectives. It will most often occur within an asymmetric 
power-relationship, whereby one actor exercises superior power in order to sway the behavior 
of the other (Morris 2007: 104-105). This mode of using force has been said to be typical of 
contemporary, liberal democracies (de Wijk 2005: 11). With conditional threats, the exercise 
of power changes the target’s behavior through the recipient’s fear of (continued) punishment 
by the coercer’s threat (or limited use) of force, should his demands not be met. Thus also 
limited or demonstrative use of force is considered coercion (Jakobsen 2007: 227-229). de 
Wijk (2005: 14) has pointed out that what is considered limited is highly subjective; while 
NATO used only a fraction of its total available air forces for Operation Allied Force, it is 
likely that the Serbs experienced the air campaign as anything but “limited” in nature. Thus, 
the distinction between coercive and controlling strategies is often unclear in practice, but can 
in theory be made when the use of force becomes so extensive as to deprive the recipient of 
voluntarism. In other words, when the recipient, rather than making a decision based on his 
own interest calculus, makes a decision because all his other options have been eliminated, 
the use of force is controlling and not coercive (de Wijk 2005: 14). Force used in a coercive 
manner is not a component of a larger, military strategy, but of a larger, political-diplomatic 
strategy (George 1994: 10). Coercion can be further subdivided into deterrence and 
compellence. 
On the one hand, a strategy of deterrence is concerned with preserving the status quo (George 
2003: vii). It aims to keep an adversary from initiating undesirable action in the first place, by 
threatening with and/or using force. It promises infliction of additional costs upon the 
adversary, should he choose to act in the undesirable fashion (Skogan 2007: 115). Another 
feature that distinguishes it from compellence is that unlike the latter, deterrence can also be 
based upon a balance of power, rather than an asymmetry. 
On the other hand, there is the strategy of compellence. The originator of the term was 
Schelling, who generally defined it as changing the status quo by making another actor do 
something against his original will (Freedman 2004: 110). Later, this term has been further 
subdivided into two; what is commonly known as coercive diplomacy, and what has 
sometimes been called “blackmail” (Jakobsen 2007: 228). On the one hand, “blackmail” is 
proactive; it involves coercing another actor into initiating actions that change the status quo. 
On the other hand, coercive diplomacy is reactive, undertaken to the purpose of ending and/or 
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reversing undesirable action already initiated by another actor; and so return to the former 
status quo. Recalling the earlier discussion between coercive and controlling strategies, de 
Wijk (2005: 12-14) has introduced an intermediary step between coercive diplomacy and war. 
In coercive diplomacy, the main tools of economic sanctions and threats of force are used to 
back up an essentially diplomatic effort. According to George (1994: 10), signaling, 
bargaining, and negotiations are all typical elements of coercive diplomacy. However, should 
this step fail, the coercer might be compelled towards more directly forceful methods, i.e. into 
military coercion. This strategy places the now potentially large-scale military means as the 
main instruments, while economic tools become less important, and diplomatic channels 
might even be closed. 
Success ultimately hinges upon a sound and appropriate strategy, and coercive diplomacy and 
military coercion requires quite different strategies and approaches (de Wijk 2005: 11-12). 
Generally, coercive strategies can take four, distinct ideal forms, where the first is 
punishment, i.e. inflicting pain on the civilian population, potentially spurring protests and 
riots that can influence or overthrow the adversary’s regime. Next, risk strategies are related 
to punishment, by slowly increasing the adversary’s risk of (increased) civilian and economic 
casualties, incurring a negative cost-benefit analysis. Thirdly, denial strategies are meant to 
counter the opponent’s military strategy and/or hindering him in executing undesirable 
actions. Finally, decapitation directly targets key leadership and central telecommunication 
nodes, aiming at system collapse (Henriksen 2007: 58-59). de Wijk (2005: 13) also introduces 
incapacitation approaches, involving attempts at undermining the state structures of the target. 
Coercive diplomacy, then, typically entails political isolation, inducements, economic 
sanctions and risk strategies, and finally threats of force and punishment approaches. On the 
contrary, military coercion can be predicated upon punishment on a larger scale, denial, 
incapacitation, or decapitation. Furthermore, where coercive diplomacy may succeed due to 
fear of (further) future damage, military coercion has the greatest chance of success when 
force is used massively from the very start (de Wijk 2005: 13). 
To sum up, coercive diplomacy is a reactive strategy of forceful persuasion, involving the 
threat and limited use of force for limited objectives. The strategy attempts to change the 
status quo by influencing the behavior of the adversary, inducing him to end and/or reverse an 
undesirable course of action. The hallmark of coercive diplomacy is using instruments like 
negotiation, diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, inducements, and threats and limited 
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use of force to back up a diplomatic effort at crisis management. This is one of the typical 
ways in which liberal democracies use force today. 
Generally true of all coercion, however, is that it is based on issuing threats for imposing 
one’s own will. A threat is a signal of a conditional intention to inflict harm upon someone 
else (Hovi 2007: 67). The intention is conditional because harm will only be inflicted if the 
recipient does not act as prescribed by the sender. Existing literature on threat-making can 
serve as a way into further theoretical discussions. Therefore, the next section will present a 
short, general theoretical model of threats. 
2.2 A Model of Threats 
This chapter will identify the main theoretical requirements of threats in international politics. 
It will explain when a threat can be considered effective, and what is required to achieve that. 
Furthermore, the underlying assumptions are discussed in light of potential practical 
problems. The work done by Jon Hovi (2007: 66-85) represents a systematic overview of the 
theory of threats, and will form this section’s main reference. Except for where stated 
otherwise, this section reflects Hovi’s work. Hovi has identified four main theoretical 
requirements of threats; relevance, credibility, conditionality, and potency. A threat can be 
considered effective in so far as it is the dominant cause in bringing about a change in an 
actor’s behavior that the actor would otherwise have refrained from. 
In the following discussion, assume two states A and B, where the former wishes to threaten 
the latter to obtain a change of behavior. The first requirement, relevance, requires B to both 
have an incentive to act in a way undesirable to A, and the possibility of complying with A’s 
demands. Next, credibility entails that B must truly believe that A will carry out the 
punishment he promised, should B refuse to comply. This is a calculation where B must take 
into account the incentives of A for effectuating the promised punishment. Thirdly, 
conditionality implies that B must believe that he is spared from the punishment if he should 
choose to comply, and that further threats are ruled out. Finally, a threat’s potency means that 
the punishment must be serious enough that B has more incentive to comply with A than to 
simply take the punishment, thus including both B’s costs of taking the punishment and the 
costs of his compliance. 
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This model of threats rests on a series of assumptions. In practice, even when all the 
theoretical requirements are met, threats can quite often fail to be effective. This can be the 
result of a number of ways in which these underlying assumptions can break. I will shortly 
present the most common causes, which are bounded rationality, lack of unity, evasion 
strategies, and unintended consequences. 
Firstly, the model assumes fully rational actors, for example in their gathering of information 
and calculations of costs and benefits for various options. While this is a common assumption, 
an almost equally common counter-argument says that one cannot assume full rationality, 
especially when these are oppressive regimes or terrorists. Non-rationality can be an 
appealing explanation for explaining complex phenomena. Yet, the search for insight compels 
us to look beyond this conceptualization. For example, while many contemporary Western 
observers described the Bosnian Serbs as fanatics committed to their national cause beyond 
any rational understanding, it has later been noted that one of the most limiting factors for 
their war effort was their army’s low morale and commitment in the face of mutilation and 
death (Cigar 2001: 213). With intimate knowledge and understanding of any actor, one will 
usually find that within their own perceptions of their interests, most decision-makers make 
well-reasoned choices, and that even terrorists and tyrannical state leaders can be highly 
rational (Hovi 2007: 77; Williams 2007: 195). Finally, it is also a sound scientific principle to 
avoid assuming non-rationality until all other possibilities have been exhausted. Therefore, I 
continue my discussion keeping this assumption; all actors are considered fully rational. 
Secondly, the theory perceives all actors as units, i.e. as single and coherent actors. Here, this 
assumption is less likely to be correct; situations involving threats in international politics 
usually involve either states or non-state organizations. In turn, such institutions or 
organizations consist of a set of internal actors, who have differing opinions and preferences. 
Assuming unity can therefore be inaccurate for the coercer, the coerced, or both, producing 
varying consequences. Although this is a rather poor assumption, it is also very common, so 
that breaking it should be a priority. By expanding the set of actors included in the analysis, I 
therefore seek to relax this assumption. For the coercer, unity is still more or less assumed, 
although the restrictions and influences that domestic political opposition causes is sometimes 
account for. However, it has been noted that theories in the literature on coercive diplomacy 
have tended to conceptualize the adversary as a static unit with exogenously given properties 
and preferences at best, or simply an inanimate object to be acted upon at worst (Jentleson and 
Whytock 2005: 53). Such a situation is here sought avoided by including a new set of 
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variables in the analysis, meant to describe the targets domestic reactions and vulnerabilities 
to coercion. 
A third cause for practical threat failure is the possibility of the adversary using evasive 
strategies, i.e. finding ways of mitigating the influence of the threat. This can include granting 
only partial or temporal concessions to the coercer. Evasive strategies can be harmful for the 
coercer’s incentives to carry out the promised punishment, or even challenge the legitimacy of 
doing so. This type of failure is not accounted for by the theoretical framework, meaning that 
the thesis assumes that such strategies are not used. 
Finally, a threat can cause unintended consequences. Such consequences might benefit the 
coerced even while they inflict additional costs. An example can be the politically integrative 
effect an external threat can bring a fragmented society. In addition to improving the domestic 
legitimacy of the coerced government, external pressure can also provide justification for 
further repression of domestic opposition (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 54). Expectations 
often play a part in this argument; if the promised punishment is milder than what might be 
expected, it may work positively for the coerced, and vice versa. Because abilities to counter 
and absorb external pressure can be significant, this thesis seeks to avoid assuming that they 
do not occur. Conversely, most such consequences can be accounted for within the theoretical 
framework presented later. 
2.3 Research Status 
This section will deal with the research status in the subject area of coercive diplomacy. I will 
highlight the area’s main contributors and discuss their various findings. Additionally, I will 
discuss which approach is most appropriate for the research question at hand. In general, 
studies of coercive diplomacy are few in number; there is only a handful of central theoretical 
works available, although much has been done in non-generalizable, historical case-analyses 
of various conflicts (Jakobsen 2007: 230). 
2.3.1 The Pioneers: Schelling, and George and Simons 
It was Thomas Schelling (1976) who pioneered the study of coercion, in his classic study 
Arms and Influence. As noted earlier, this study introduced the term compellence. Schelling 
was concerned with identifying general conditions influencing compellence, and approached 
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this task deductively. In spite of this comprehensive scope, the resulting theory was coherent 
and elegant. Later studies have since then moved more specifically towards coercive 
diplomacy, most notably by Alexander George and William Simons et al. (1994) in The 
Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. In this study, the methodological approach was inductive; they 
used empirical data to induce 14 conditions relevant for the outcome of coercive diplomacy. 
In organizing their findings, they found that the conditions could be subdivided in two groups; 
a set of strategy-enabling, contextual variables, and a second set of strategy-improving 
success variables. Needless to say, both studies have made vast contributions to the subject 
area. However, Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2007: 230) has argued that both studies left areas for 
improvement. His argument is discussed below. 
According to Jakobsen, Schelling’s deductive approach made it simple and elegant, but 
simultaneously rendered it too abstract to draw precise conclusions from. It suffered, in other 
words, from a lack of richness of implications (Underdal 2008). Illustratively, Schelling’s 
logical-deductive approach cannot easily supply concrete policy prescriptions on how to meet 
the theory’s criteria (Jakobsen 2007: 230). When Schelling was asked to use the theory to 
devise a bombing campaign against North Vietnam in 1964, he eventually had to give up. On 
the other hand, Jakobsen (2007: 230) argues, while rich in scope, implications, and realism, 
the most limiting factor of George and Simons’ approach is perhaps a lack of parsimony. It 
induces a very high number of variables, and suffers further from a difficulty in clearly and 
unambiguously operationalizing all of them. Finally, due to the high number of variables, 
theoretical accounts of empirical cases become very complex, making it is hard to distinguish 
critical factors from less significant ones. 
2.3.2 The Ideal Policy: Jakobsen 
This reasoning induced Jakobsen (1998) to develop his ideal policy framework. This approach 
deals with post-Cold War cases of coercive diplomacy, and attempts to include both 
Schelling’s necessary conditions and those factors George and Simons considered especially 
important. The ideal policy is aimed at fulfilling two objectives; an increased simplicity and 
clearly operationalized variables. To achieve this, its scope was reduced from a generic theory 
of coercive diplomacy, to include only liberal democracies’ attempts at countering military 
aggression after the end of the Cold War (Jakobsen 2007: 231). In Western use of Coercive 
Diplomacy after the Cold War, Jakobsen (1998: 130) argues that coercive diplomacy has the 
greatest chance of succeeding when four conditions are met. Firstly, a threat of force must be 
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made to the adversary, promising to quickly and with little cost defeat or deny the opponent 
his objective. Next, a clear deadline by which the adversary must comply should be set. 
Thirdly, the coerced must receive assurances that compliance will not lead to further 
demands. Finally, the coercer should offer the opponent an inducement, a “carrot”, as 
compensation for complying. 
In considering the utility of the ideal policy framework for this thesis, a few remarks can be 
made. Firstly, the validity of the first requirement, a threat of force, should be considered. By 
validity I understand the degree to which a model has internally compatible premises, and 
empirically observable and verifiable implications and conclusions (Underdal 2008). 
Jakobsen (2007: 231) postulates that acts of military aggression indicate the aggressor’s high 
willingness to accept costs, so that only military means are sufficiently potent as 
countermeasures. It is true that military force often will be required when countering military 
aggression, but the ideal policy explicitly excludes most instruments de Wijk (2005: 13, 19) 
identifies as the main tools of coercive diplomacy (see chapter 2.1). Furthermore, studies have 
shown that mixed interventions are significantly more successful than purely military or 
economic ones (de Wijk 2005: 92). Secondly, it should be considered whether the aim of the 
threat of force, i.e. to defeat or deny the adversary his objective, is too narrow. For instance, 
when Milošević surrendered in the final stages of Operation Allied Force, NATO was still far 
from ready to launch a ground invasion, and could therefore not yet militarily defeat nor deny 
Milošević his objective, given that this objective was control over Kosovar territory (Jakobsen 
2007: 239). It might be worth considering an alternative theoretical approach where military 
force is not the only tool accounted for. 
Finally, one of the theory’s most notable properties also requires consideration. According to 
de Wijk (2005: 20), contemporary theorizing and practice of coercion has often tended 
towards neglecting the adversary as a meaningful unit of analysis. Similarly, the ideal policy 
assumes that the outcome of coercive diplomacy can be explained through the properties of 
the coercer’s strategy alone (Jakobsen 2007: 233). While policy-makers are required to know 
the opponent on a case-by-case basis, in order to formulate appropriate threats and 
inducements, it is not required for analytical purposes. Instead, the adversary is analytically 
“black-boxed”, so that knowledge required about the target is minimized. This can perhaps be 
helpful, especially if information about the adversary is scarce. Nevertheless, a generic and 
operationalizeable set of variables describing the adversary’s vulnerability to coercive 
diplomacy could allow for more precise and valid results. 
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2.3.3 Jentleson and Whytock: Knowing your Enemy 
In this thesis I emphasize the importance of understanding the adversary in greater detail. 
Firstly, this implies relaxing the assumption of unitary actors. Arguably, the assumption 
should be avoided for both coercer and the coerced, but this would complicate the study 
beyond what can be included in this thesis. Instead, I content that considering at least the 
target state as a set of multiple actors grants enough benefits as to warrant a slightly more 
complex theoretical approach. Additionally, to the extent that unintended consequences are 
due to the internal conditions of the coerced, also this assumption can be relaxed. In sum, a 
slight increase in model complexity is warranted in light of increased validity, realism, and 
richness of implications. 
To address the challenges identified in the last paragraphs, I will consider an alternative 
theoretical approach. For explaining the outcome of the U.S.-led coercive diplomacy attempt 
against Libya’s former state-sponsored terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
program, Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock (2005) developed a concise model of 
coercive diplomacy. Drawing on established literature, their model keeps the traditional focus 
on the coercer’s strategy. However, they also seek to change the preferences and motivations 
of the adversary from exogenously given to endogenously explained. For this reason, the 
target state’s politics and economy is also considered, explaining the coerced’s domestic 
vulnerability to coercion. The framework offers what de Wijk (2005: 16) has called a dynamic 
approach to coercion, taking into account the adversary’s mix of motivations, interests, and 
expected risks. It offers some significant improvements, including relaxing some assumptions 
often made in other studies. Jentleson and Whytock (2005: 50) approach coercive diplomacy 
by positing two sets of variables, each consisting of three variables. The first set is a 
conventional evaluation of the coercer’s strategy, while the second set is meant to describe the 
target state’s domestic politics and economy. 
The Coercer’s Strategy 
The aim of any coercive strategy is clear in the abstract. It is required, from the coerced’s 
point of view, to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance so that 
they are higher than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance. However, to 
put this into practice is another matter, and is an enterprise which hinges upon the coercer’s 
ability to make the strategy meet three criteria; proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive 
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credibility. According to Jentleson and Whytock (2005: 51-53), all these three requirements 
are more likely to be met when major international actors support the initiative, and when the 
domestic, political opposition is small for the coercer. 
In a coercive diplomatic strategy, proportionality is required between the scope and nature of 
the demands on the one side, and the instruments and tools by which the aims are sought 
secured on the other. Axiomatically, the greater the extent of the demands, the higher the 
costs of compliance for the adversary. This means that as more is being demanded of the 
target, the strategy must proportionally increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits 
of compliance (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 51). The hallmark of coercive diplomacy, 
however, is the threat or use of only limited force. This means that the costs of noncompliance 
can only be increased so much. If, conversely, the benefits of compliance are increased too 
much, the resulting strategy becomes appeasement, not coercive diplomacy. Hence, it can be 
concluded that coercive diplomacy is best suited in pursuit of limited objectives. As noted 
earlier, the meaning of limited can be debated, but in general it is somewhat easier to 
convince an opponent to stop short of his goal (Type A coercive diplomacy) than to reverse 
his fait accompli (Type B), but it is much yet harder to change his behavior through a change 
in his government, i.e. regime change (Type C) (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 51-52). 
Reciprocity is the next requirement of the coercer’s strategy. It entails an explicit link between 
positive inducements offered by the coercer and the concessions made by the target, or at least 
that the link is mutually tacit (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 52). It is imperative that the 
coerced does not believe it possible to gain the inducements without conceding. Furthermore, 
the target should not feel uncertain that these “carrots” will be granted once the concessions 
have been made. The trick, Jentleson and Whytock (2005: 52) say, lies in: “…neither offering 
too little too late or for too much in return, nor offering too much too soon or for too little in 
return”. 
Finally, the last requirement of the coercer’s strategy is coercive credibility. This condition is 
fulfilled when the coercer convincingly conveys to the target that consequences invariably 
will follow noncompliance. Credibility is usually dependent upon the strength of the coercer’s 
incentives for carrying out the punishment (Hovi 2007: 68). If this condition is not satisfied, 
the expected costs of noncompliance will, in the eyes of the coerced, be lowered significantly. 
As history can suggest, however, meeting this condition requires more than just being in a 
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position of greater military and economic power than the target (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 
52-53). 
Target’s Domestic Politics and Economy 
The more innovative part of Jentleson and Whytock’s (2005) theory is the set of variables 
describing the target’s internal political and economic conditions. Also other theories have 
attempted to conceptualize the adversary as something more than an object on which the 
coercer acts, for example by accounting for motivational asymmetries or the balance of 
power. However, the authors argue, such approaches often do not address the underlying 
sources of such asymmetries; they do not theoretically express why different targets have 
different motivations, preferences, and coercive vulnerability (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 
53). This is the challenge that this second set of variables aims to meet. Seen under one, these 
three variables are liable to change, and can interact with other factors concerning the 
regime’s viability. International factors can also play a role, for example in changing the 
geopolitical environment or shifting the global markets. Such changes must be taken into 
account and be controlled for, while nevertheless keeping the analytical focus on the proposed 
variables (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 55). 
A starting point can be identifying the absolute prime interest of all governments; their own 
survival. Regime self-perpetuation is taken to be the main goal of any government, whether it 
entails winning the next election in a democracy or maintaining the grasp on power in non-
democracies (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 54). Consequentially, the first variable asks 
whether the target government can gain more internal political support and regime security by 
either complying with or defying the coercer. Regime security can be defined as the degree to 
which “…the governing elite are secure from the threat of forced removal from office and can 
generally rule without major challenges to their authority” (Collins 2007: 429). When faced 
with external pressure, a regime can, for example, gain benefits like increased legitimacy and 
grounds for domestic repression, even if some costs must be paid for defiance. The result can 
be a politically integrative effect. In fact, for non-developed states, it has been argued that the 
main sources of significant threats are predominantly internal and domestic of nature. Such 
threats can include: “…violent transfers of power, insurgency, secession, rebellion […] and 
ultimately, state collapse and anarchy” (Jackson 2007: 148-150). This suggests that in many 
cases, consideration should and will be given to the domestic situation before a regime 
decides whether to resist or comply with external pressure. On another note, this variable 
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allows relaxing the theoretical assumptions concerning unintended consequences. Effects like 
regime rallying can now be accounted for within the theoretical framework. Furthermore, the 
stronger political support the targeted government enjoys domestically, the less effect should 
be expected from coercive diplomacy, and vice versa (Jentleson and Whytock 2005: 54). 
Ironically, often when oppressive regimes seeks to increase state control, the challenge from 
other powerful groups in society become proportionally greater, increasing their potential for 
acting as “transmission belts” (see below) (Jackson 2007: 148). 
The next variable is the adversary’s economic calculation, including the costs brought by 
military action, economic sanctions, and other coercive instruments, and also the benefits 
brought by trade, aid, cooperation and other economic inducements (Jentleson and Whytock 
2005: 54). This calculation is dependent on both the strength and flexibility of the coerced’s 
domestic economy, and its ability to absorb or counter such costs through abundant budgets, 
import substitution, alternative trading options, and similar measures which reduce economic 
vulnerability. However, as Jentleson and Whytock (2005: 55) point out, even when such 
measures are adequate to make up for the inflicted costs, bypassed trading options will often 
still represent significant opportunity costs. Through this variable, also coercive measures 
short of military force are assumed to have potential coercive effects. 
Finally, the last variable entails that the target state no longer is assumed a single and coherent 
unit. It describes the role of political elites and other key political and societal actors in 
domestic decision-making and policy-formation. Given that no ruler can fully isolate himself 
from at least a small group of dignitaries, the interests and preferences of such actors can play 
a central role in determining the effects of external pressure. When coercive diplomacy 
threatens their interests, such groups can act as buffers, soaking up the external pressure 
directed at the regime, thus acting as “circuit breakers”. When, however, policy changes 
demanded by external coercion serve their own interests, they can become “transmission 
belts”, compounding and multiplying the force brought to bear on the regime (Jentleson and 
Whytock 2005: 55). Such individuals and groups may include rival politicians, local police 
and law enforcement authorities, ethnic and religious groups, criminal gangs, intelligence 
services, paramilitary units, and the armed forces (de Wijk 2005: 15; Jackson 2007: 150).  
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Limitations 
As with all theories, also this one has its strengths and its challenges. Whereas the former 
have been outline above, the latter will be discussed in the following. Firstly, it must be 
considered that while it prescribes theoretical requirements for succeeding in coercive 
diplomacy, in itself the theory cannot move from an abstract model to the specific policy that 
will be required in each empirical case. Ultimately, it remains up to the policy-maker to 
transform these broad requirements into specific policy, suitable to impact an adversary’s 
decision-making calculus. Next, the theory largely assumes that the adversary is a state, 
whereas de Wijk (2005: 86) argues that a full theory should apply for actors in general. 
Thirdly, as the coercer is still assumed a unitary actor, the internal dynamics within the 
coercing state are not accounted for. Domestic politics and restraints are likely to affect when, 
how, and to what effect coercive diplomacy may be used. This remains a challenge for future, 
theoretical development. Finally, the model presupposes a generic set of preferences for the 
adversary. Though more sensitive to the opponent’s unique preferences than earlier theories, 
an unexpected combination of culture, mindset, values, and norms may still offset the 
accuracy of the expected vulnerability and reactions to external coercion. 
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3 Method 
The following chapter will develop the thesis’ methodological approach, in an attempt to 
provide transparency as to how the study was conducted, and to give well-reasoned 
explanations for the choices made. It will cover case selection, comparative strategy, 
operationalization, data collection, replicability, reliability, validity, and generalization. 
3.1 Case Selection 
The research question implies a relatively small universe of potential research objects. At the 
time of designing the study, the only two major cases of NATO governments collectively 
using coercive diplomacy can be said to be the interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. As it is possible to analyze both within this study, chances of case selection bias and 
other issues are minimized. Analyzing both cases would also imply a cross-case comparative 
research strategy. However, chapter two identified a total of six theoretical variables for 
explaining the outcome of coercive diplomacy, and with only two observations, the 
explanation would be over-determined. To secure more robust findings one approach can be 
increasing the number of cases, either geographically or “longitudinally”, i.e. dividing cases 
historically (Knutsen 2009). While the research universe leaves little possibility of a 
geographical expansion, a “longitudinal”, diachronic, within-case component can be added to 
the analysis, by considering that the two main cases consist of a number of subordinate 
coercive diplomacy exchanges. It is a fair objection that such “longitudinal” divisions can be 
artificial, as strategy always has elements of continuity over time (Jentleson 2012 [e-mail 
correspondence]). Nevertheless, the same method was used in both Jakobsen’s (1998) work 
and in part in other studies as well, so that where relevant, I will use the same “sub-case” 
structure. This will both make possible a more structured, comparative evaluation of the two 
theories at a later point in time, and serve as a safeguard by aligning my thesis to more 
established studies. This method increases the total number of sub-cases to twelve.1 This 
implies a mid-N, comparative method with both cross-case and within-case components, an 
approach qualified by “…a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences 
from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparison within a single study…” (George and Bennett 2005: 18). 
                                                 
1 See chapters four and five for a presentation. 
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As for the empirical dimension of the research question, the cases will in part serve in a 
disciplined configurative study, meaning that the theoretical framework will be used to 
explain historically important cases (George and Bennett 2005: 75). In turn, this will allow for 
a better understanding of what characterized NATO’s most successful approaches to coercive 
diplomacy. Additionally, for the theoretical dimension, the case selection in some ways also 
represents a least-likely case-study. The selected cases are located near the limits of what the 
theory can be expected to account for. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, Jentleson and 
Whytock’s theory was originally developed for explaining a single, long-term case of using 
coercive diplomacy to counter the Libyan, state WMD and terrorism programs, as opposed to 
for instance Jakobsen’s theory, which was explicitly formulated to deal with instances of post-
Cold War military aggression. Secondly, at its point of origin, the theory accounted for a case 
of largely unilateral coercive diplomacy, whereas here it will attempt to explain cases of 
coalitional coercive diplomacy, generally acknowledged to be more challenging (c.f. Jakobsen 
1998). Finally, this theory is relatively new and untested, and has not yet had much time to be 
refined. Therefore, any systematic application outside its original scope can be considered as 
new ground for the theory. Given these considerations, should the theory prove able to 
adequately explain and predict the cases at hand, it will have passed what Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennett (2005: 76) have called a “tough test”, adding to its credibility and 
strengthening its research status. 
3.2 Method of Comparison 
Having selected the cases, the next question becomes how best to compare them. George and 
Bennett (2005: 67) suggests a method of structured, focused comparison. This entails that the 
researcher asks the same set of standardized questions for each case, to guide and govern the 
data collection. These questions will be derived from the theoretical variables, which are 
operationalized in the next section. This ensures that the collected data will be comparative 
across the cases. Furthermore, the method prescribes that only relevant aspects are examined 
for each case, as opposed to looking at them holistically. Thus, while the conflicts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo were immensely complex, I will only discuss observations relevant 
for the operationalized variables. Knowledge about the general course of the conflicts is 
assumed on behalf of the reader. 
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For comparison of the data with the theoretical framework, the best approach might be the 
congruence method, an approach offering enough flexibility to be combined with both the 
disciplined-configurative dimension and the theory testing, “tough-test” element (George and 
Bennett 2005: 182). This will mean evaluating how suitable the given theory is for explaining 
and/or predicting the outcomes of the examined cases. A prerequisite is that the theory posits 
a relationship between certain values on its independent variables and a specific outcome or 
value on the dependent variable. In turn, this requires determination of the values for all the 
variables in all the cases, before these are compared with the variance in the dependent 
variable. If the theory is sound, the actual outcome should covariate with the values of the 
independent variable and the expected value of the dependent variable in most of the cases. 
The degree of congruence is measured by comparing how often the theoretically predicted 
outcome concurs with the actual, historical outcome. Finally, if the theory largely predicts the 
outcome correctly, a causal relationship may exist between the specified variables. 
Some studies follow up congruence-based findings with a process-tracing approach, whereby 
the causal mechanisms leading from cause to effect, via intermediary variables, are explored 
(George and Bennett 2005: 200-206). While this probably would be constructive also in this 
study, limitations on time, space, and resources dictate that it at present cannot be included. 
Rather, to reinforce the findings, some process-tracing-like elements are at times integrated in 
the case studies. Taking the step to a full-scaled process-tracing approach can perhaps be one 
of the most notable improvements for the future. 
3.3 Operationalization and Classification 
The purpose of this section is to operationalize the abstract theoretical variables presented in 
chapter two. Standardization secures the “structured” element of the comparative method, as 
it ensures the comparability of the collected data. Because of the limited nature of this thesis, 
it is necessary to construct a robust, but simple methodological framework. Furthermore, as 
the study includes only two case studies with a total of twelve sub-cases, a too complex 
framework can lead to over-determination or incorrect inferences. Therefore, the variables 
will be dichotomized, so each variable can be classified with only one of two possible values; 
either positive, i.e. that the condition is favorable to a successful outcome, or negative, 
meaning that it is not. This may be criticized for being too blunt, but it nevertheless grants a 
significant degree of robustness. 
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The measurement and classification of values for each variable, in each sub-case, will 
ultimately be a subjective, case-by-case activity. Because the issues at hand are so complex, 
there is no way to formulate a generic formula or schema for measuring the value of the 
variables. This does not have to mean that the process will be unscientific, however. Instead, I 
seek to explicitly clarify the considerations that lead to the determination of the values. This 
transparency will help secure a systematic and consistent approach to the data. 
3.3.1 The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, i.e. whether the coercive effort was the dominant cause in bringing 
about the target’s compliance, will be dichotomized. This presents a challenge, because 
Jentleson and Whytock (2005) do not state explicitly whether all the independent variables are 
considered necessary, or whether only a subset of them can be sufficient in some cases. 
Essentially, this questions whether the theory should be understood in deterministic or 
probabilistic terms (Knutsen 2009). While deterministic relationships are extremely rare in the 
social sciences, they are also the easiest to test, and the most conservative assumption. 
Therefore, the initial hypothesis will be that for all variables, positive values are considered 
necessary for a successful outcome. To sum up, the theory will predict success when all 
variables are positive, and failure if one or more are negative. One can probably expect, 
however, that the empirical data will demonstrate a more probabilistic relationship than what I 
have assumed. 
3.3.2 The Coercer’s Strategy 
The first group of independent variables describes the coercer’s strategy, and the first variable 
is proportionality. Proportionality is considered positive if the costs of noncompliance exceed 
and are proportional to the costs of compliance. These costs derive from the extensiveness of 
the coercer’s objectives and the instruments used to pursue them. Therefore, proportionality 
also demands clear and defined objectives. While it essentially is a simple cost-benefit 
analysis of the coerced’s various options, specifically determining the calculus promises a 
challenging endeavor. For this reason, intimate knowledge about the research objects is a 
requirement. Finally, because coercive diplomacy by definition employs only limited means, 
proportionality dictates that also the aims must be sufficiently limited. I therefore postulate 
that Type A (stopping short of the goal) and Type B (reversing an action) coercive diplomacy 
are considered limited, while Type C (regime change) is not. 
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Next, reciprocity will be classified positively when there exists either a tacit or an explicit link 
between the concessions demanded of the coerced and positive inducements offered by the 
coercer. These elements are mutually required for reciprocity to be positive. Finally, in terms 
of costs and benefits, the inducements must be proportionate to the concession, and must be 
offered at roughly the same time. 
The last variable pertaining to the coercer’s strategy is coercive credibility. Of the three, this 
is perhaps the most difficult to define clearly, because it simply requires the adversary to truly 
believe there will be consequences for noncompliance. This will have to be determined by 
evaluating the statements and actions of the coerced, to scan for hints of his expectations. 
3.3.3 Target’s Domestic Politics and Economy 
The last three variables are grouped together, describing the target’s domestic politics and 
economy. The first variable is internal political support and regime security. It will be 
considered positive if the coerced government can gain a larger increase in support from 
relevant individuals and institutions within the coerced’s society by complying with the 
demands, rather than defying them. Should the opposite be true, that defiance and 
noncompliance for example can lead to larger politically integrative effects, then this variable 
is considered negative. Changes in support can be measured by what election results indicate, 
as well as by developments making it more or less likely that the ruling regime will be 
forcibly challenged or removed. Finally, the greater such support is, the less effects can be 
expected of external threats. 
Secondly, the economic costs and benefits of the coerced’s response to threats constitutes the 
next variable. This requires a summation of the coerced’s tangible costs and benefits of 
military action, economic sanctions, trade, aid, and other forms of economic inducements. 
Here, changes in gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product can be central 
measurements (de Wijk 2005: 94). The calculation will be affected by the strength of the 
coerced’s economy, and its ability to negate negative impact, for example through trade 
alternatives and import substitutions. If the threatened punishment causes significant 
economic costs for the adversary, then this variable is considered positive. Significant is 
understood as a level at which it becomes a contributing factor affecting the voluntary 
behavior of the adversary’s decision-makers. 
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Finally, the last variable is the role of elites and key actors. This can be considered positive 
when the consequences of conceding to the coercer’s demands are constructive, in terms of 
the individual preferences of a majority of the key actors and elites in the target society. 
Should this be the case, they become “transmission belts”, multiplying the threat’s pressure 
against the decision-makers. Should, however, the elite’s preferences be threatened by 
conceding, these actors become “circuit breakers”, isolating the decision-makers from 
external pressure. In that case, the variable will be assigned a negative value. 
3.4 Data Collection 
In gathering data for constructing the case studies and measuring the variables, I have as far as 
possible sought a triangulation of primary data sources. Additionally, I have used secondary 
literature as a supplement for organizing the study, ensuring that no significant aspects were 
neglected. The first types of primary sources were the statements and memoirs of involved 
individuals, generally available in the form of published works, like autobiographies. 
Sometimes, such statements were first found in secondary literature. In these cases, I have 
tried to verify the statements, while letting the references also indicate the secondary source, 
so as to give credit to its author. Secondly, official texts, treaties, and press statements by 
relevant institutions were included; these data are often made available electronically on the 
institutions’ web-sites. Finally, George and Bennett (2005: 97) argue that the public context in 
which central decisions and developments take place often matters, so that the last source of 
primary sources should be contemporary media and news reports. These sources are often 
available either as paper copies in well-equipped libraries, or as electronic articles in various 
news agencies’ internet databases. Finally, this thesis does not supply any new empirical data, 
but is instead based on analyzing existing data in new light. 
3.5 Replicability, Validity, and Reliability 
Often, when using the structured, focused comparison, validity and reliability are higher in 
case studies than in large-N approaches. This is because the researcher moves closer to the 
data, and often gains intimate knowledge about the issue at hand. Furthermore, case-studies 
are especially suited for good operationalizations, or construct validity, in addition to internal 
validity, i.e. the ability to determine whether a relationship between variables is causal in 
nature (Bratberg 2009). Although this is a fairly good starting point, further measures have 
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been taken to secure replicability, validity, and reliability. First of all, I have consistently 
sought to describe and explain the research procedure as clearly as possible, in an attempt to 
secure transparency. This, say George and Bennett (2005: 106), is a necessary procedure to 
meet the specified criteria. 
Where possible, general statements on how the variables have been measured are given, 
meanwhile choices taken with respect to measurement and classification are explicitly 
explained. This is positive for the study’s reliability. Reliability was also sought enhanced 
throughout the data collection process. Firstly, I have attempted to use mainly primary data 
sources. Furthermore, the data triangulation helped safeguard against potential errors and 
biases in any one source, while the use of guiding secondary literature rooted the thesis in 
more established research. 
3.6 Generalization 
If case studies often score high on the former three criteria, then they equally often suffer in 
the criteria of generalization, or external validity. Finding generalized causal effects, or the 
relative weight of these, can be very difficult with such research designs. This should be taken 
into consideration when assessing the implications of the findings. Nevertheless, given that 
the thesis’ research units can be said to be part of a clearly defined class of objects, i.e. 
coercive diplomacy, some contingent generalization can be warranted (George and Bennett 
2005: 233). In other words, limited generalizations can be valid for a universe of incidents 
quite similar to the research objects; this grants the cases analytical, not statistical, 
representivity (Yin 2003). That the study includes both within-case and cross-case 
comparison further supports this claim. As both cases characterizing the universe of research 
objects are included, contingent generalizations will mainly be valid for potential future 
incidents of the NATO governments collectively using coercive diplomacy as a crisis 
management strategy in third-party conflicts. This is an even more narrowly defined class 
than general coercive diplomacy, granting the generalizations further validity (George and 
Bennett 2005: 77). Though contingent, the findings can hopefully provide some insight the 
next time NATO decision-makers consider using coercive diplomacy. 
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4 Bosnia-Herzegovina 
This chapter is dedicated to a case-study of NATO’s use of coercive diplomacy during the 
1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The chapter is divided into several sections; I will 
first briefly consider the sources of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This provides some basic 
information, and works as an introduction to the case-study. Next, because some key actors 
are central for several sub-cases, they are discussed before the sub-cases themselves, so as to 
avoid unnecessary repetition. Finally, the third section empirically presents seven sub-cases, 
each of which is then also related analytically to the thesis’ theoretical framework. 
4.1 Sources of Conflict 
This section concerns the sources of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This extremely complex 
issue has had to be somewhat simplified, so that I have limited the discussion to the events 
ultimately leading to the involvement of NATO. The break-up of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was already inevitable by the time Bosnia-Herzegovina, one 
of the SFRY’s six republics, started to draw the attention of Western observers. By the early 
nineties, the Serbs, as Yugoslavia’s dominant ethnic group, had taken dramatic steps to hold 
together their disintegrating country.2 The Serbs had had strong interests in keeping 
Yugoslavia intact; the republic of Serbia and its capital Belgrade had constituted the heartland 
of the SFRY, and the federal system of government had arguably favored the Serbs over other 
ethnic groups. After the death of the SFRY’s charismatic dictator Josep Broz Tito in 1980, 
political paralysis and ethnic tensions came on the rise in a country ravaged by economic 
disaster. In this chaotic environment, a fairly anonymous political figure soon started his 
ascent to power. Slobodan Milošević, a former communist politician, overnight seemingly 
turned nationalist, would leave a lasting impression on all of Yugoslavia. 
Partly alarmed by Serb nationalism, and partly fuelled by their own nationalist ambitions, 
several SFRY republics were quickly drawn towards independence (BBC 1995a). After 
decades under Tito and his “Brotherhood and Unity” maxim however, ethnic diffusion was 
common. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, while over 40% of the inhabitants were Bosnian Muslims, a 
                                                 
2 For practical reasons, the term “Serb” refers to the larger ethnic group, e.g. Croatian Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, or 
the Serbs of Serbia. Meanwhile, the term “Serbian” specifically refers to the nationality of the people and 
institutions of the country of Serbia. 
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significant Serb minority lived in scattered enclaves, constituting one third of the population. 
Likewise, Bosnian Croats were also commonplace. As the power of the federal authorities 
waned, both ethnic minorities insisted upon what they perceived as legitimate, historical 
claims to parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in time, both would turn to violence to secure 
them. In early 1992, by then the third secessionist SFRY republic, the Bosnian bid for 
independence was strongly opposed by most of the Serb minority. Consequently, the 
referendum of independence organized by the Bosnian parliament in February and March was 
largely boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs. When on 5 March Bosnian independence was 
declared regardless, Bosnian Serb nationalists set up roadblocks in response. Soon fighting 
erupted; the fires of nationalism had yet again spurred political violence. As Bosnian militia 
seized downtown Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb paramilitary elements took positions on the capital’s 
surrounding hills (BBC 1995b). 
For a short period an uneasy truce was engineered between Bosnian President Alija 
Izetbegović and Bosnian Serb political leader Dr. Radovan Karadžić. Behind the scenes 
however, 80,000 fully trained and equipped Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) regulars were 
transferred to Bosnian Serbs control, on Serbian President Milošević’s command. Meanwhile, 
paramilitaries equipped by the Serbian secret police approached the city of Bijeljina, near the 
Bosnian-Serbian border (BBC 1995b). Over the first days of April, Bosnian Serb forces began 
attacking civilians in Bijeljina and Sarajevo, triggering Izetbegović to mobilize the National 
Guard and reserve police units (The New York Times 1992a). On 5 April Bosnian Serb 
artillery began sporadic shelling of Sarajevo. The republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had flared 
up in armed conflict, a conflict that would soon rank among the worst in Europe’s post-World 
War II history. 
4.2 Elites and Key Actors 
This section discusses key individuals and institutions; who they were, what their motivations 
were, and what interests they probably had. While it is impossible to sum up the entire 
personality or ethos of a person or institution in only a few paragraphs, seeing available 
empirical evidence in concert with the assumption of rational actors can help understand what 
role they played. 
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Slobodan Milošević and the Serbian Government 
The man widely recognized as the main driver behind the wars and ethnic cleansing in 
Yugoslavia nearly stumbled upon his political fortune. Characterized as aloof and humorless, 
the name Slobodan Milošević raised few eyebrows before April 1987 (The New York Times 
1992b). Ethnic unrest between the Albanian majority and Serb nationalists in the SFRY’s 
poorest region, Kosovo, had prompted federal authorities to send Milošević to calm the 
situation. After unsuccessfully reiterating Yugoslav-communist maxims and “Brotherhood 
and Unity”, Milošević neglected proper communist etiquette, and agreed to meet with 
representatives of the Serb nationalists. During this meeting, on 24 April, a throng of Serb 
extremists provoked the local police force into starting a brawl. Milošević quit the meeting to 
see what the commotion was about, only to find what he perceived as evidence of the alleged 
Albanian abuse of the Serb minority. After a moment of hesitation he proclaimed what 
Serbian television later shrewdly exploited as political propaganda; no Serb should have to be 
beaten ever again (BBC 1995a). The myth of Milošević had been created. 
Amid economic paralysis and societal upheaval, Milošević had discovered how much 
political potential there was in Serb nationalism. He turned, almost overnight, from 
communist to nationalist, gaining power and influence rapidly. He was a politician, according 
to an anonymous source who worked with Milošević, who: “…decides first what is expedient 
for him to believe, then he believes it” (The New York Times 1992b). Using street protests 
and rallies, Milošević fanned the fires of Serb nationalism across all the republics (BBC 
1995a). In particular by supporting the prečani3, he presented himself as the hero and 
protector of “Serbianess”. At first impressions, Milošević could often seem charming and 
hospitable; a smart and likeable man. For those with knowledge of and experience in Balkan 
politics and history however, it has been said one could easily see through this superficial 
image to the ruthless pragmatist underneath (Holbrooke 1998: 4). 
Milošević’s political position was founded on the support of four major institutions, or four 
pillars of power, as some NATO officials later came to name them. These were the political 
system, the media, the Serb security forces, and the economic system (Lambseth 2001: 39). 
Milošević’s most significant political powerbase was in the south of Serbia, where 
geographical proximity to large populations of ethnic Albanians was perceived as a threat to 
                                                 
3 Serbs living west of river Drina, i.e. Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. 
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Serb culture (Owen 1996: 59-60). In de Wijk’s (2005: 61) words: “[t]hey won elections by 
exploiting the ethnic differences within the country”. Milošević’s support in the security 
forces mainly stemmed from the various police departments, as well as from the militia and 
other paramilitary elements (Owen 1995: 174). The JNA, on the other hand, was never quite 
fully under his control. Next, the Serbian government in general, and Milošević especially, 
apprehended the great significance of television in the Balkans. It was to a significant extent 
through this medium that Milošević spread his violence-provoking nationalism, from the top-
down (Holbrooke 1998: 24). The impact of manipulative television-broadcasts was 
demonstrated, and perhaps first learnt by Milošević, by the role it played in his 1987 Kosovo 
Polje appearance. As one protester in the October 2000 riots so bluntly put it: “[i]f State TV 
falls, government falls” (BBC 2003b). Finally, Milošević’s support in the economic system 
depended both on his ability to deliver tangible improvements to the general public, and the 
support of major economic actors ranging from criminal smugglers to oligopolistic 
businessmen. 
According to strategic analyst Dr. Norman Cigar (2001: 201), domestic interests were key in 
determining the behavior of the Serbian government, where domestic political support, power, 
legitimacy, and the consolidation of Milošević’s position were considered the main priorities. 
Milošević had often come under pressure from the latent resistance of the Serbian opposition, 
and he used external conflict as a safety valve, directing such resistance away from his 
regime, enhancing regime security. The United States (U.S.) diplomat Richard Holbrooke 
(1998: 24) has argued that as a substitute for dealing with the numerous, difficult, and serious 
governance issues left by the outgoing Tito-regime, the leaders of Serbia brought their people 
war. An illustration is found in the words of Borisav Jović (cited in Cigar 2001: 201), friend 
and adviser to Milošević: 
What would have happened with the energy of half a century of suppression of 
Serbian nationalist feelings? Would that enormous energy have exploded, and how, 
and would we have had a political war among the Serbs? 
Though not stating so explicitly in public, the ultimate goal of the Serbian government was, 
according to Cigar (2001: 200-201, 208), the establishment of, and addition of territory to, a 
Greater Serbia, in this case through the creation of the Republika Srpska. This was justified by 
insisting on a historical claim in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatian President Stjepan Mesić once 
asked Jović (cited in Cigar 2001: 207) what Serb aims were, and was told that: “66 per cent of 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina is Serb and we shall take that”. Milošević (cited in Cigar 2001: 205) 
himself was known to state his ambitions as “…all Serbs in a single state”. 
To realize these goals, ethnic cleansing was considered an acceptable instrument, suitable for 
consolidating captured territory. By “purifying” the ethnicity of the local population and 
culture, a boost to their “Serbianess” was generated, thus creating a sense of legitimacy for the 
occupation. This cold, hard logic required specific conditions to operate, under which it could 
be justified and sustained. The sine qua non of this practice was therefore the extreme ethno-
nationalism that, albeit to various extent, dominated the political landscapes of the 
belligerents (Switzer 2001: 290). A noteworthy implication is that the center of gravity of 
Serb politics was thus shifted from the set of military forces and/or political nodes, and 
towards the people themselves. Compromise is perhaps the greatest threat to extreme 
fundamentalism, and this was one of the main reasons why the propagation of ethnic hatred, 
all the way down to the individual level, was so central (Switzer 2001: 291). 
The JNA, the VJ, and the VRS 
Western debaters have sometimes argued that the Yugoslav wars represented a new form of 
warfare, a war bereft of strategy, reliant on guerilla tactics and paramilitary forces. In contrast, 
the opposite argument can also be made; that these wars were not fundamentally different 
from other, superficially more traditional wars (c.f. Magaš and Žanić 2001). Keeping with the 
assumption of rational actors, it is reasonable to claim that the Serb leaders fought for 
concrete and tangible political and military objectives. Furthermore, in their pursuit of these 
goals, their overall strategy, tactics, and the type of military units with main impact, were on 
the whole quite traditional and conventional (Cigar 2001: 208). 
The JNA, by then an outdated federal relic, was dissolved in the summer of 1992. 
Subsequently, the Yugoslav Army (VJ) was established, while its units stationed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina were organized as a separate entity, the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), soon 
to become the army of the Bosnian Serbs. For the JNA, and later also for the VRS, the 
operational, military aims included the capture and control of key terrain, including cities, 
especially Sarajevo, transportation and communication nodes, and access points to the sea 
(Cigar 2001: 209). 
The VRS could uphold their war effort only due to rich support from Serbia and the JNA/VJ, 
in personnel, training, planning, medical support, intelligence, logistics, and air defense 
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coverage (Cigar 2001: 209). Whole formations were directly loaned from the JNA to the 
VRS, and VRS officers would receive their pay and promotions from the JNA. According to 
Jović (BBC 1995b): “[w]e provided the Bosnian Serbs with an army, we promised to pay all 
their costs…”. In other words, the Bosnian Serbs were also supported by Belgrade in 
economic terms, whose government at times spent almost one fourth of its budget granting 
such financial aid (Cigar 2001: 209-210). This was crucial to the fighting capacity of the 
VRS. Despite trying to downplay its role, it was in reality Belgrade that was the central point 
of decision-making for the Bosnian Serb war effort and strategy. 
At the outset, the military balance was significantly to the advantage of the VRS, which 
especially enjoyed advantages in ground-based heavy weapons like tanks and artillery (Owen 
1996: 55). The main impact of the paramilitary forces, on the other hand, was not in 
spearhead combat, but in their relative effectiveness at ethnic cleansing. This has often been 
overlooked by Western analysts placing too much emphasis on their impact on combat 
operations (Cigar 2001: 212). 
The VRS was never a very well-run machinery. Despite the substantive support, it did not 
perform up to par, its weaknesses including a relative lack of internal cohesion, morale, and 
commitment (Owen 1995: 291). Additionally, it suffered from problems with command and 
control capacities, mobility, the use of integrated forces, and extended logistics. Most 
critically however, it was the support of the Bosnian Serb people which often was lacking. 
This is illustrated by the many Bosnian Serbs who sought to avoid military service, because 
they saw the military’s goals as simple and illegitimate territorial expansion (Cigar 2001: 212-
213). The numbers of deserters and draft dodgers are thought to be as high as 120,000-
150,000 from Bosnia alone, entailing that the VRS was unable to fully exploit their advantage 
in equipment and arms. The VRS could simply not afford to be strong everywhere, but was 
compelled to prioritize their grip around key areas, of which the loss of any one could have 
spelled the end of Republika Srpska (Switzer 2001: 298). In Bosnia, such areas included 
Brčko, Banja Luka, and Goražde. The call-up crisis also affected those already enrolled, and 
as morale was plummeting, extensive war weariness was a significant problem already by 
1994 (Cigar 2001: 214). This further escalated with time, as few Serbs had considered in 
advance that the war could become so protracted. Illustratively, Milošević (cited in Cigar 
2001: 217) later stated that: “I never thought it would go on so long”. 
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Ratko Mladić 
General Ratko Mladić was a Bosnian Serb military leader, made commander of the Serb 
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina by Milošević (Owen 1996: 166). Born in 1943 at Božanovići, 
Mladić attended the Military Academy before he joined the League of Communists. A 
ruthless character, he enjoyed a rapidly developing military career in the JNA, avoiding strong 
political beliefs. He soon gained widespread support within the JNA; to many common 
soldiers he represented a true Serb hero, taking part in their hardships and victories. His 
support in the JNA was so strong that he did not seem to worry about indictments by the 
International Criminal Tribunal (ICTY), as any government would be hard-pressed to 
extradite him (Owen 1996: 165). 
His position ultimately hinged upon bravery, military honor, and achievements, not political 
support. Mladić could often better secure his position by being confrontational rather than 
cooperative, because his “…bravado statements [were] calculated to boost the morale of his 
peasant soldiers” (Owen 1996: 166). Consequently, Mladić often sought to agitate and 
confront those he disagreed with, including Western negotiators and representatives. 
According to the British politician Lord David Owen (1996: 82), who met the general several 
times, Mladić seemed to relish getting a real fight on his hands by combating NATO forces 
rather than harassing civilian Muslims, a task he almost found beneath himself. 
Nevertheless, following the turn of the fortunes of war, rising Serb casualty levels, and the 
suicide of his own daughter, he increasingly avoided his earlier bravado stance, becoming 
quieter, more absorbing and reflected (Owen 1995: 280). Mladić was confident in his 
knowledge of NATO weapon-systems and tactics, and, calculating and rational in nature, 
always weighed the chance of UN or NATO airstrikes or other military action in contrast to 
alternative options, before deciding what to do. His vision for Serbia was an extensive and 
continuous territory, including Trebinje, Pale, Bijeljina, Banja Luka, and Knin (Owen 1996: 
167). 
Radovan Karadžić 
Originally from Montenegro, the Bosnian Serb political leader Dr. Radovan Karadžić lived in 
Sarajevo from adolescence. Educated a psychiatrist, he formed early bonds with Momčilo 
Krajišnik (see below), especially following inconclusive accusations of embezzlement against 
the two (Owen 1995: 186). In 1989 Karadžić became president of the Serbian Democratic 
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Party, and after the self-proclaimed independence of Republika Srpska he acted as its first 
president. Explicitly skeptical of NATO, he considered any such presence in Bosnia a foreign 
occupation. On the other hand, UN peace-keepers were more acceptable to Karadžić, perhaps 
because of the implied security guarantee that would come with Russian participation (The 
New York Times 1992c). In his vision for Sarajevo, Karadžić saw a green line running down 
the middle of the city, dividing Bosnians from Serbs; a forced ethnic separation in the same 
city which, until the war, had had the strongest tradition of ethnic tolerance and the most 
mixed marriages in all of the SFRY (BBC 1995b; Jakobsen 1998: 82). 
According to Lord Owen (1995: 186-187; 1996: 52) who met also Karadžić, the latter was 
easily underestimated by his theatrical appearance and conduct, and his ability to deflect 
direct questions with deliberate lies and an innocent facial expression. Nevertheless, Karadžić 
was much less confident and more nervous than he at first appeared. He also attempted to 
distance himself from the old communist system by emphasizing himself as religious and 
market-economy oriented. Although initially cooperating with Serbian leadership, in time he 
would increasingly separate himself from Milošević (Owen 1996: 52). 
Momčilo Krajišnik 
Yet another important figure in Bosnian Serb politics was Momčilo Krajišnik, the President of 
the Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale. A rich and religious man, Krajišnik could at times be 
very single-minded, but nevertheless commanded more respect from Bosnian Muslims than 
most other Serb leaders (Owen 1996: 53). That he owned real estate in the Sarajevo region 
made him extremely rigid in negotiations over this area, demanding Serb ownership over 
unproportionally large parts. The personality of Krajišnik sums up what General Mladić 
detested in politicians, the latter claiming Krajišnik a corrupt and egocentric business man 
(Owen 1995: 50). 
4.3 NATO Coercive Diplomacy 
The context for NATO’s first post-Cold War mission was extremely demanding. Firstly, 
NATO was not responsible for carrying out most of the actual negotiations, which instead 
were organized by a variety of international actors (Burg 2003: 62). As these other actors had 
their own agendas and preferences, a simple one-to-one relationship between the negotiator 
and the coercer was missing. Furthermore, the geopolitical environment was demanding, with 
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not only differing crisis management paradigms across the Atlantic, but often also significant 
Russian opposition. 
I will in the following present and discuss the NATO governments’ attempts at coercive 
diplomacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is organized through seven sections, each detailing 
one sub-case. For each sub-case, relevant, empirical data is first sought presented objectively. 
Based on this data, each section then analyzes the data to determine values for the 
operationalized variables. For each group of variables, all determined values are stated first, 
before the justification follows. Furthermore, because of limitations on space, additional 
historical detail may be blended into the analytical write-up. This mode of organization has 
been recommended by George and Bennett (2005: 94). Finally, because the first sections 
include some information relevant for all the cases, they will be slightly longer than the 
others. The seven sub-cases of NATO coercive diplomacy are the NATO-WEU Naval 
Blockade, Operation Deny Flight, the Siege of Sarajevo, the Markale Marketplace Massacre, 
Assault at Goražde, the Tuzla Shelling, and Operation Deliberate Force. 
4.3.1 The NATO-WEU Naval Blockade 
NATO’s first steps towards involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred in the summer of 
1992, following the outbreak of hostilities in the wake of the Bosnian declaration of 
independence. The task at hand was implementing United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 713, establishing a “…general and complete embargo on all deliveries 
of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia…” for securing peace and stability 
(UNSCR 713 1991). Also UNSCR 757 was on the agenda, including economic sanctions 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), to back up a United Nation’s (UN) 
demand for an immediate cease-fire, the disbandment of irregular forces, and the withdrawal 
of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
In many ways, the arms embargo was a result of a primarily European determination to avoid 
conflict escalation. In the U.S., on the other hand, many felt that the overwhelming military 
advantage enjoyed by the JNA and the VRS would only sustain the momentum of the 
conflict. Splits within the Alliance became visible as U.S. policy-makers felt compelled to 
comply with its West-European allies, meanwhile Turkey sought backchannels to funnel 
weapons to its Muslim brothers (Switzer 2001: 297). On 10 July the foreign ministers of 
NATO and the West European Union decided, however, to dispatch naval forces to the 
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international waters of the Adriatic, to “…monitor compliance with UN Security Council 
Resolutions 713 and 757” (NATO.int 1992). Initially, these had no stop and search rights, and 
could only question ship crews. They reported suspicions back to their governments, who 
could then attempt to deal with the matter in the UN (Owen 1996: 49). Following UNSCR 
787 in November however, Operation Maritime Guard, and later Operation Sharp Guard, 
were commenced, authorizing the use of force to enforce stop and search rights. Once 
implemented, these measures increased the effectiveness of the embargo significantly. 
Meanwhile, the economic sanctions imposed on the FRY from 30 May introduced significant 
limitations to the Serbian economy (Henriksen 2007: 110). Already in steady decline for a 
decade, the Yugoslav economy was devastated at the outset of 1991; inflation was 
skyrocketing, major companies had been compelled to halt production, and wages were 
halved over a period of three years (The New York Times 1992d). Compounding this 
development, the sanctions, according to Holbrooke (1998: 4), had a great effect on further 
disrupting and damaging the FRY economy. This is evident in table 4.1 below, detailing the 
rapid decline of Serbia’s GDP per capita in the first half of the nineties. Initially, the sanctions 
rallied the population around its government, but the mood later changed, especially as the 
Serbian Presidency elections were coming up in late 1992 (Owen 1996: 59). In time, the 
continued poor economic performance, hyperinflation, and sinking living standards caused 
domestic friction that ate away at the social fabric, and rights and securities of individuals and 
families (Henriksen 2007: 110-112). 
Table 4.1: Serbian economy’s performance in the early nineties (UN.org) 
Year Annual Change in GDP (%) GDP per Capita (USD) 
1990 N/A 4,098 
1991 -11.7 3,898 
1992 -28.1 2,864 
1993 -30.4 2,034 
1994 2.6 2,128 
1995 5.7 2,294 
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In the run for the Serbian presidency, Milošević was the main contender. However, he was 
challenged by two other notable political figures; the Serbian-American millionaire and FRY 
Prime Minister, Milan Panić, and the more senior Serbian writer and FRY President, Dobrica 
Ćosić. On the one hand, Panić was gaining popularity, especially with the intelligentsia and 
the young, although his popularity was not so much due to his political prowess as to the 
possibility he represented for ending the war and lifting the sanctions (Owen 1996: 59). On 
the other hand, Ćosić was perceived, especially by Lord Owen and his American colleague 
UN representative Cyrus Vance, as the more likely candidate to defeat Milošević. To avoid 
splitting the opposition, Panić was persuaded to forego his ambitions, thus improving Ćosić’s 
chances. However, Ćosić became severely ill in the final run-up, and when he ultimately 
decided not to continue his candidacy, Panić became free to try. 
Both Panić and Ćosić had in part run their political platforms on accommodation of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) demands. When the election results were settled 
however, it became clear that Panić had lost the elections to the nationalist-oriented 
Milošević. Lord Owen (1996: 60) has argued that given the relatively good results obtained 
by Panić, it is likely that Ćosić could have won, had he participated. Regardless, Panić’s main 
loss of popular support ensued when the international community failed to take account of the 
political developments in Serbia by not promising tangible “carrots” to Milošević’s political 
opponents, as a reward for their wish to comply (Owen 1996: 61). For many Serbs, this 
justified Milošević’s hardline position. Over the next few months, the VRS, with the support 
of a nationalist Serbian government, launched offensives against Sarajevo and the Bosnian 
Muslims, demonstrating the NATO-WEU naval blockade’s failure to coerce the Serbs into 
peace. 
Analysis 
The outcome of the first sub-case should be considered negative, as the fighting in Bosnia did 
not subside. As for the coercive strategy, in light of the following analysis, both 
proportionality and reciprocity are classified as negative, while credibility is considered 
positive. NATO’s decision to establish an Adriatic naval presence was meant to back up 
demands for an immediate cease-fire and the disbandment and/or withdrawal of Serb security 
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These objectives were moderately limited type B coercive 
diplomacy. Given the Alliance’s unstable political situation however, the weapons embargo 
was in practice riddled with holes, allowing a number of actors to bring in war supplies for the 
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continuation of hostilities (Owen 1996: 49; Switzer 2001: 297). Nevertheless, after UNSCR 
787, operations Maritime and Sharp Guard were both credible and sufficiently well executed 
that the belligerents’ balance of force was not liable to change significantly. Thus the embargo 
unintentionally functioned as a strengthening of the Bosnian Serb position, already enjoying 
advantages in equipment and arms (Cigar 2001: 217). The embargo therefore contributed low, 
almost negative, costs of noncompliance. On the other hand, and while initially insufficient, 
the economic sanctions became in the long run a paramount factor for coercing a Serbian 
change of behavior. In fact, it has been argued that they constituted the main bargaining chip 
in negotiations with Milošević (Holbrooke 1998: 4). In a longer perspective, they generated 
significant economic costs and internal friction, eroding Milošević’s grasp on power. 
Next, tangible inducements were generally not promised; the benefit-side of Panić’s and 
Ćosić’s wish to comply was illustratively neglected. Furthermore, this caused them a loss of 
popular support, and further weakened potential political opposition to Milošević. Finally, as 
early as 1991, Milošević (cited in Cigar 2001: 207) had calculated that a Western intervention 
in the Balkans was unlikely: “I believe and assess, and those are not only my assessments, 
that the great powers will not intervene in Yugoslavia”. Hence from the outset of the conflict, 
NATO’s credibility was low. Dispatching a naval force could have moderated this perception, 
inducing some Serb uncertainty about NATO’s intentions, but the initial lack of stop and 
search rights only reinforced the Serb perception. After UNSCR 787 however, the credibility 
of the blockade threat was increased, and both the weapons embargo and the economic 
sanctions generated significant disruptive effects. 
Milošević and his government had strong domestic incentives for most of their actions. This is 
reflected by considering regime support and security negative, although the economic 
calculus was positive for the coercer. Finally, the role of elites was negative. Milošević’s 
position was not only based on political nationalism, but also on the support of the security 
forces, who through engagement in Bosnia directed latent internal opposition outwards. 
Compliance with the UNSCR demands would entail compromise, abandoning their inflexible 
nationalism, and would likely have lost Milošević the support of the Serb radicals. That the 
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) won almost one fourth of the seats in the national assembly 
speaks volumes about the importance of this support (IPU.org). Furthermore, disbandment of 
the security forces in Bosnia would have meant the loss of yet another power base. On the 
other hand, both the initial, politically integrative effect of the economic sanctions, and 
Milošević’s continued defiance of the UNSC, gained him political supporters in the short 
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term, in spite of the long-term, changing public mood. This, respectively, contributed to 
moderate increases in the costs of compliance and the benefits of noncompliance. As evident 
in table 4.1, the costs of the Serb military effort in concert with international sanctions made 
the country’s GDP drop dramatically, which generated a costly result for the Serbian 
economic calculus. Additionally, the foreign demands not only threatened both the interests 
and the existence of a key institution, i.e. the Serb security forces in Bosnia, but also opposed 
the interests of the SRS, Milošević’s indispensable political allies. Finally, the lack of 
Western accommodation for the political platforms of Panić and Ćosić also denied gaining 
alternative “transmission belts” against the Serbian government. 
4.3.2 Operation Deny Flight 
Western television broadcasts of the atrocities committed in Bosnia soon made the “CNN-
factor” pressure the NATO governments, especially against the unacceptability of 
contemporary U.S. foreign policy. It has been argued that the U.S. agenda had so far been 
simply “doing something” about Bosnia-Herzegovina (Williams 2001: 279). Consequentially, 
1993 began with U.S. President Bill Clinton attempting a more determined course of action, 
eventually producing the “lift and strike” policy. This policy entailed lifting the arms embargo 
to let the Bosnian Muslims defend themselves, while striking the Serbs by air (Clark 2001: 
37). In Europe the policy met with resistance, largely because several countries had deployed 
UN peacekeepers (UNPROFOR) to Bosnia, exposed to Serb retaliations for airstrikes 
(Henriksen 2007: 94; Holbrooke 1998: 54-55). The Clinton administration, new in office and 
preoccupied by other international crises, failed to provide strong leadership, and instead 
turned to support a European plan, involving the defense of six UN safe areas. In a 
culmination of international passiveness, it was expected that deploying UN peacekeepers 
with limited air support somehow would deter further Serb attacks (Henriksen 2007: 96-97). 
Meanwhile, UNSCR 781 of 9 October 1992 had opened for a no-fly zone (NFZ) over Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting of 18 October, Secretary-
General Manfred Wörner reported that Hungary and Austria would provide airborne early 
warning systems (AWACS) for the NFZ (Owen 1996: 59, 63). While this realized a system 
for reporting NFZ violations, enforcement by regular combat patrols was still missing as the 
situation worsened in Bosnia, over the course of spring 1993. The VRS launched new attacks 
against Sarajevo and Srebrenica, and amidst Western condemnations, NATO was propelled 
towards a larger commitment. When the UN authorized military enforcement of the NFZ in 
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late March, NATO launched Operation Deny Flight (NATO.int 1993a). This commitment, in 
various forms, would last for the remainder of the conflict. 
The Clinton administration continued to ask for more military pressure throughout the 
summer of 1993, including expanding the NATO air effort to direct military strikes 
(Henriksen 2007: 97). Their determination secured British cooperation, but France remained 
hesitant to NATO military action. Thus, in a 2 August NAC meeting, a “dual key” system was 
engineered, wherein both the U.S.-dominated NATO, and the UN with its European-
dominated UNPROFOR, had to approve incoming requests for close air support (CAS) and 
airstrikes (Henriksen 2007: 98). Reluctant towards lasting commitment, using airpower 
seemed the best option for the NATO governments. Despite their often limited and context-
dependent effectiveness, air forces are also easily suspended and withdrawn, and with a 
scarcity of Serb anti-air defenses, it was a relatively safe option. Furthermore, the Serbs could 
not retaliate directly, as NATO airfields were located far from the theater of operations 
(Switzer 2001: 302). Hence chances of allied casualties were low, the operation could be 
executed quickly, and high-level political and military control was possible. On the other 
hand, the operation’s limitations included covering its economic expenses, problems with 
targeting, and potential collateral damage. Furthermore, the “dual key” system often meant 
that UNPROFOR commanders were either denied CAS in critical situations, or that the 
authorization process would take so long that by the time it was approved, the request was no 
longer valid (Switzer 2001: 302). Finally, potential or actual hostage-taking of UN or national 
personnel often deterred NATO airstrikes; 350 peacekeepers were for example held hostage 
in May 1995, while 55 Dutch personnel were taken in July (Switzer 2001: 294). 
The diplomatic initiative so far had mainly been the UN-European Community (EC) 
International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY), established by the London 
Conference on 26-27 August 1992 (Owen 1996: 2). Attempting to find a negotiated 
settlement, the ICFY resulted in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), which entailed that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organized as a decentralized state with significant functions 
delegated to a number of ethnically divided regions, meanwhile Sarajevo would be 
demilitarized (Owen 1996: 65-68). Consistent with their new approach, the U.S. threatened 
the Bosnian Serbs to accept the VOPP; implicitly suggesting that NATO airstrikes might 
commence otherwise, meanwhile economic sanctions would be tightened. It was generally 
perceived that the threat of tightening the sanctions worked well to make Serbian leadership 
both inclined to accept the VOPP, and to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to do the same (George 
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1994: 1-2). The attempt was also explicitly supported by the UN, and even Russia. Milošević, 
under heavy pressure from the international sanctions, thus came to favor the VOPP, and laid 
further pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership to follow suit (Jakobsen 1998: 86-87). 
Consequently, on 2 May Karadžić signed the VOPP in Athens, with a prerequisite for further 
ratification by the Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale. 
This ratification session began on 5 May. Karadžić hesitantly argued that the primary interest 
of the Bosnian Serbs had been security, and that this had been guaranteed by the VOPP, as 
only UNPROFOR troops could enter Serb majority enclaves. Simultaneously, the plan would 
consolidate some, if not all, of the newfound Serb landgains. According to Ćosić however, 
Karadžić had done the utmost to take a neutral stand, aiming to preserve his political position 
(Owen 1996: 163-164). The response was lukewarm, and Mladić had, to great effect, voiced 
strong opposition. Although he earlier had supposedly been warned by VJ officers that failure 
to ratify would cause interruption in the flow of supplies, given that these officers, not fully 
under Milošević’s control, remained supportive of Mladić, it is doubtful whether he ever got 
this warning (Owen 1996: 165). The VJ, like Mladić, was unhappy with the VOPP’s 
proposals. Krajišnik, also strongly opposed, had then stopped the public debate before a vote 
could be held. Later that night, discussions continued in a closed session, where Milošević 
frankly expressed his frustration over the Bosnian Serb resistance (Owen 1996: 163). 
Soon after, splits appeared between Bosnian Serb leadership on the one hand, and Milošević 
on the other (Owen 1995: 292). The Serbian president’s waning influence in Pale became 
clear as it was decided that ratification would be settled by a referendum on 15-16 May. As a 
recipe for failure, an overwhelming majority then favored rejecting the VOPP. The U.S. failed 
to follow up this decision with the promised punitive measures,  perhaps due to opposition to 
the plan from U.S. official circles, including President Clinton, Warren Christopher, and 
Chairman Colin Powell and his Joint Chiefs of Staff (Holbrooke 1998: 52; Jakobsen 1998: 
90). The VOPP and its hopes for peace began to disintegrate. 
Analysis 
In the second sub-case, while the outcome is considered another failure, proportionality is 
classified positively. Further, reciprocity must be coded negative, as must credibility. The 
central objective had been making the Pale Assembly accept the VOPP. The peace-plan 
entailed moderately limited type B requirements, demanding that the Bosnian Serbs give up 
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some territory already under VRS control (Owen 1995: 133). As for the coercive tools, 
although the NFZ largely caused the VRS to abandon fixed-wing aircraft, these had never 
been critical to its ground-based, heavy weapons strategy (Jakobsen 1998: 84). The latter 
could likely easily have been targeted after the expansion of Deliberate Force, which would 
have struck at the heart of the VRS’ operational center of gravity. Some have therefore argued 
that had the “lift and strike” been implemented effectively, war termination would have 
occurred sooner, because while the VRS could sustain limited CAS, wider airstrikes would 
have caused the Bosnian Serbs significant damage (Cigar 2001; Owen 1995: 291-292). In 
conclusion, had the threats been realized, the costs of noncompliance would probably have 
been critically unbearable, despite the lack of reciprocal benefits. 
The low risks associated with airpower are often argued to enhance the West’s credibility, and 
this was also the case in Bosnia (de Wijk 2005: 20). However, UN resistance and the “dual 
key” system made NATO CAS and airstrikes less credible to significantly hurt the VRS. 
Furthermore, the vulnerability of UNPROFOR significantly undermined the credibility of the 
“lift and strike” threat, as UN and European opposition was guaranteed. The Clinton 
administration’s faltering behavior, including its weak support for the VOPP, further 
compounded this development (Jakobsen 1998: 88). Finally, difficulties in covering the 
expenses of the operation lowered the perceived chance that NATO would actually carry out 
the wider strikes. 
For the Bosnian Serb domestic factors, all the variables are considered negative. For the Pale 
Assembly, supporting the VOPP would entail strong domestic ramifications, as was clear 
from the people’s wholesale rejection of the plan. Conversely, continuing their hugely 
successful war effort could make the benefits of noncompliance significant. For Milošević, 
supporting the VOPP would expose him to criticism from the radicals, and loose him support 
in the militia and the paramilitaries (Owen 1995: 174). Nevertheless, tighter sanctions could 
have been even worse, as his support in the economic system might have failed. As shown in 
table 4.1, of the entire conflict, 1993 brought Serbia the worst economic recession. A further 
deterioration could easily have threatened Milošević’s grip on power. The sanctions were 
therefore critical in gaining his support for the peace-plan (Owen 1995: 144). In turn, 
Milošević’s opposition to the Bosnian Serb leadership could have caused large economic 
costs for the latter, which was reliant on Belgrade’s financial support. Nevertheless, following 
the VOPP’s failure and Milošević’s ensuing need for political support, he was compelled to 
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acquiesce to the radicals’ demand of supporting the prečani. Hence there were eventually few 
economic costs for Pale in this sub-case. 
The VOPP’s use of only UN peacekeepers probably satisfied Karadžić’s security needs, who 
therefore did not resist significantly. Nevertheless, his need for political survival ultimately 
triumphed, preventing his direct support. Furthermore, Mladić’s opposition was unsurprising, 
as compliance would have entailed peace at a time when the VRS, implicitly backed by the 
VJ, could advance with virtual impunity. Compromising would have weakened his position in 
the military, and it also countered his personal vision of a Greater Serbia. Furthermore, a 
demilitarization of Sarajevo was unacceptable to both the former two, and especially to 
Krajišnik, who ultimately blocked the public vote. Unfortunately, even though Milošević now 
opposed the Bosnian Serb decision, his influence in Pale was no longer significant enough to 
sway the outcome. 
4.3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo 
In August 1993 NATO was faced with yet another mounting crisis, as the VRS tightened their 
grip on Sarajevo. Though having long been under pressure, the city’s lines of supplies and 
utilities had been severed in late July, when the VRS took control of two peaks surrounding 
the city, Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelašnica (The New York Times 1993a). According to Lord 
Owen (1995: 205), the VRS operation was not directed against the city itself, which could 
have been forcibly taken at any point over the past 18 months, but was meant to pressure 
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) elements in the area. 
Nevertheless, in response to a perceived imminent crisis, on 2 August NATO warned of: 
“…immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo 
[…] continues[,] stronger measures including air strikes against those responsible…” 
(NATO.int 1993b). This threat of wider airstrikes met strong opposition both from certain UN 
commanders and some NATO member states, concerned for the security of their 
UNPROFOR personnel (Owen 1995: 210-211). 
Despite Alliance disagreements, Karadžić offered to have the VRS withdraw, given that UN 
forces would move in and take control of the area. Milošević, no longer holding much 
influence with the Bosnian Serbs, suggested that both Karadžić and Krajišnik would be 
needed to persuade the ever more headstrong Mladić to give up Mt. Igman (Owen 1995: 208-
209). At first, NATO disregarded the suggestion by reiterating its threat on 9 August, 
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although now not making the threat directly conditional on withdrawal. Additionally, it 
underlined the need for UN approval, because their threat was meant as support for UNSCR 
770, 776, and 836 (NATO.int 1993c). These resolutions entailed demands for an immediate 
cease-fire, the respect of the safe areas and humanitarian efforts, the withdrawal of Serb 
security forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and progress towards a negotiated settlement 
(UNSCR 836 1993). The renewed threat triggered Karadžić to issue a counter-threat, warning 
of full-scale war should airstrikes be executed. Regardless, the growing importance of the two 
politicians was demonstrated as Karadžić and Krajišnik soon after persuaded Mladić to pull 
back, while UN forces replaced the VRS, to safeguard against ARBiH counter-offensives 
(The New York Times 1993a). Unwilling to escalate the matter further, the NATO 
governments accepted UN demilitarization of Mt. Igman, and meanwhile some relief convoys 
were allowed into to the besieged city, a new process of negotiation begun to put Sarajevo 
under UN administration (The New York Times 1993a, 1993c). 
Analysis 
The high degree of accommodation of the Bosnian Serbs makes it difficult to determine the 
outcome of this incident. However, the aim had been to relieve Sarajevo’s suffering, and to 
some degree this was achieved, even though the VRS retained a tight grip on the city and 
incoming humanitarian assistance. Lord Owen (1995: 259) has argued that the sine qua non of 
the Serb withdrawal, including abandoning their positions and heavy weapons, was the UN 
safeguard deployment, preventing potential ARBiH counter-offensives. I will therefore 
consider this coercive effort a qualified success. 
The coercive strategy warrants classifying both proportionality and reciprocity as positive, 
while credibility as negative. The central objective of ending the siege was a limited demand 
in-between type A and type B coercive diplomacy, and while it initially was conveyed with 
more clarity, NATO’s aim remained the same throughout the incident. Had they been 
implemented effectively, wider airstrikes could, as earlier, have inferred great costs of 
noncompliance for the Bosnian Serbs, at least significant enough to compel the VRS off Mt. 
Igman. Next, the eventual acceptance of UN deployment worked as a “carrot”, freeing VRS 
forces for other, potentially more harmful tasks, thus playing into the wishes of the Bosnian 
Serbs (Owen 1995: 208). This contributed to the benefits of compliance. Nevertheless, 
NATO’s underlining of the need for UN approval was detrimental to the threat’s credibility, 
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since several UN commanders had signaled their disapproval (The New York Times 1993b). 
This was further cemented by internal Alliance opposition. 
As for the domestic factors, regime support and security is considered positive, as is also the 
economic calculus and the role of key actors. The fact that, according to Lord Owen, it was a 
Bosnian Serb political decision not to take Sarajevo, even though this could have been done 
relatively easily, suggests that Pale felt it had little to gain by taking the city forcibly. Instead, 
withdrawing from Mt. Igman probably resonated well with the Bosnian Serb public. Also the 
economic aspect was served well by complying, as it secured a UN substitute for its operation 
against the ARBiH. The termination of this operation, both cutting costs and freeing up the 
forces for other tasks, improved their economic situation. Finally, Milošević again acted as a 
“transmission belt” against Pale, but still to no significant effect. Regardless, Karadžić seemed 
to support the limited withdrawal, as long as his UN security guarantee was granted, and at 
this point even Krajišnik showed flexibility that he could accept a Muslim Sarajevo, should 
secession remain possible for the Republika Srpska (Owen 1995: 215-216). On a final note, 
the VRS’ preferences were also met, as their objective of preventing ARBiH counter-
offensives was achieved. 
4.3.4 The Markale Marketplace Massacre 
A psychological shift swept the NATO countries in February and March 1994, following the 
impact of a presumably Serb bombshell in the Sarajevo Markale marketplace on 5 February, 
killing 68 (Henriksen 2007: 100). Western public opinion soared in favor of military action, 
effecting the first proper agreement between NATO and the UN on using airpower (NATO.int 
1994e). On 9 February, to end the siege of Sarajevo, the NAC: 
…call[ed] for the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR 
control, within ten days, of heavy weapons […] of the Bosnian Serb forces located 
in an area within 20 kilometres of the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding an area 
within two kilometres of the centre of Pale (NATO.int 1994a) 
Furthermore, additional aircraft and warships were dispatched to the region, giving the threat 
extra momentum (Jakobsen 1998: 94). Karadžić refused to yield, and once again issued 
counter-threats, including shooting down incoming NATO aircraft. Mladić seemingly wanted 
limited airstrikes, which could unite the now divided Serbs, and give him more freedom to 
act. He knew that as long as UNPROFOR remained, they were his safeguard against NATO 
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airpower escalating to the point where the military balance could turn against him (Owen 
1995: 267, 292). Given the Alliance’s newfound resolution, the stalemate situation became 
increasingly tense. 
There had supposedly been made unsuccessful attempts to consult Russia before issuing the 
NATO ultimatum, but Russian representatives nevertheless showed frustration over the 
incident. In a last-minute rescue, aiming to gain a central role in handling the crisis, Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin on 16 February offered to place Russian peacekeepers in Sarajevo 
(Owen 1995: 267). This would prevent the ARBiH from launching future counter-offensives, 
and offered the VRS a chance to back down while saving face. Determined to avoid fighting 
the Russians, fellow VJ officers successfully pressured Mladić to concede, and a Sarajevo 
heavy weapons exclusion zone was engineered (Burg 2003: 60). In several ways, this incident 
proved a success for NATO, something the Alliance itself was quick to point out. 
Analysis 
Following the Markale incident, coercive diplomacy proved successful. NATO’s choice of 
strategy entail that all associated variables are considered positive. The demands were limited 
and clear type B objectives; not for an immediate and comprehensive peace settlement, but for 
Mladić to withdraw from Sarajevo. It has been argued (c.f. Burg 2003) that NATO’s repeated 
demands for a withdrawal from Sarajevo were insufficient, as they did not relate to ending the 
overall conflict. This is likely inaccurate. According to Lord Owen (1995: 256), negotiations 
with the Serbs were most constructive when developing an already agreed upon line of policy, 
and the “Sarajevo first” initiative was precisely this. On another note, the central and indeed 
unexpected, role played by Russia in this incident has often been neglected by Western 
observers (Jakobsen 1998: 95). 
Given the unprecedented support for using airpower, the strikes threatened would probably 
have been so severe as to compel the VRS away from Sarajevo, increasing its costs of 
noncompliance. For the Bosnian Serbs however, removing their heavy weapons was highly 
difficult seen as an isolated concession, because they prevented potential advances by the 
more numerous ARBiH infantry divisions (Owen 1995: 256). The subsequent deployment of 
Russian peacekeepers reduced this cost and provided benefits of compliance, both by 
substituting for the counter-infantry safeguard, and by reducing the likelihood that NATO 
could later use full-scale airpower. Finally, the Bosnian Serbs were convinced of the 
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credibility of the threats due to the support of both the UN and the general public in NATO 
countries, the urgent deadline, and the additional forces dispatched (Jakobsen 1998: 94-95). 
Also domestically all variables are considered positive, and also here the Russian intervention 
was central. After its peacekeepers had been deployed, Serb noncompliance would have 
meant making the Russian peacekeepers their enemies, which doubtlessly was a political 
impossibility in Pale. Instead, being able to publicly claim that they were working with the 
Russians would certainly secure support from most Bosnian Serbs. Next, while their 
economic calculation was not directly affected by this incident, it can be reasonable to 
consider that as even the VJ now opposed noncompliance, refusal could have lost the VRS the 
critical support still flowing from the former to the latter. Finally, while Mladić himself 
seemed inclined towards noncompliance, Lord Owen (1995: 255) explains how Karadžić was 
interested in serious negotiations over UN demilitarization of Sarajevo. Additionally, when 
also the VJ increased pressure against Mladić, it became difficult for him to resist any longer. 
4.3.5 Assault at Goražde 
By late March hostilities had reached the eastern Muslim enclave and UN safe area of 
Goražde. The ARBiH had used the city for launching new offensives, until the VRS counter-
attacked on 29 March. After halting the Muslim offensives, the Serbs pushed the ARBiH 
back, all the way to Goražde itself (Jakobsen 1998: 97). As it seemed that the safe area was on 
the verge of falling to the VRS, NATO once more resorted to coercive diplomacy. On 10 and 
11 April, two aircraft carried out three precision airstrikes, so-called “pinpricks”, against the 
assaulting Serb forces (NATO.int 1994d). In subsequent talks, the Bosnian Serbs were told to 
withdraw or face limited escalation of military measures (Burg 2003: 60). Krajišnik voiced 
strong opposition, now arguing that even the VRS’ withdrawal from Mt. Igman had been a 
mistake. He believed that in both cases, withdrawal damaged the Bosnian Serb negotiating 
position by not once and for all eliminating the ARBiH counter-offensive threat (Owen 1995: 
273). 
The promised escalation soon proved difficult however, as UN representatives blocked 
renewed NATO actions through the “dual key” system. Meanwhile, Bosnian Serb political 
authorities were making repeated promises to cease fighting, only to break these promises 
very quickly. In mid-April they followed up the NATO threat with a significant escalation of 
their own, taking 150 UN personnel hostage, seizing heavy weapons from a Sarajevo UN 
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collection-point, shelling the UN-administered Tuzla airport, and downing one British jet 
while damaging another (Jakobsen 1998: 97-98). The NATO governments, faced with 
dramatically increased costs, and lacking popular support at home, felt compelled to back 
down. 
By 16 April the ARBiH offensives had been almost fully neutralized, and it seemed the VRS 
could overrun the town in a matter of days, had it so desired. Nevertheless, Pale ordered the 
withdrawal of the VRS from Goražde by 17 April. When this failed to happen, it was mainly 
due to recurring ARBiH skirmishes against VRS positions (Owen 1995: 273). Additionally, 
Bosnian Serb political leadership did not have full control over the army. By 18 April, U.S. 
diplomats had pressured UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali into requesting further 
NATO airstrikes, although NATO internal disagreements delayed its response a few days 
(NATO.int 1994c). When a compromise was reached on 22 April, NATO issued yet another 
ultimatum. It demanded that the VRS should immediately cease attacks against Goražde, and 
“…pull back three kilometres from the centre […] of the city by 0001 GMT on 24th April…” 
(NATO.int 1994f). Additionally, in case of further attacks against any safe area, or “…after 
0001 GMT on 27th April 1994, if any Bosnian Serb heavy weapons are within any designated 
military exclusion zone… [then] these weapons and other Bosnian Serb Military assets […] 
will be subject to NATO air strikes” (NATO.int 1994b). The VRS complied with NATO’s 
demands (Jakobsen 1998: 98). 
Meanwhile, the political mood was changing in Serbia. According to UN statistics, during 
1992-1994 alone, Serbia received upwards of 1 million refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Cigar 2001: 230-231). Living conditions were deteriorating both as a result of 
this influx, and due to the economic recession. Hence, Serbia’s premier Mirko Marjanović 
(cited in Cigar 2001: 230-231) asserted in an August 1994 speech to the Serbian parliament 
that: 
A great number of those refugees have been successful in Serbia, [achieving] a 
higher material standard and status than they had in the former Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and many of them have profiteered from their emigration. The 
citizens of Serbia have seen that, and were often unhappy about it, and justifiably 
so. 
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On 4 August, the Serbian government broke most political and economic relations with 
Republika Srpska, and closed the border to all traffic except humanitarian aid (Owen 1995: 
297). 
Analysis 
During the assault on Goražde, NATO’s coercive diplomacy initially failed, before ultimately 
ending with success. The strategy of the coercer was marked by positive proportionality, 
while reciprocity was negative. However, also the credibility of the threat ultimately became 
positive. The main objective was a VRS pullback from Goražde; in itself a limited and clear 
type B demand. For the VRS however, the area surrounding Goražde was of key strategic 
priority (see section 4.2). Thus they strongly resisted the repeated ARBiH offensives in the 
region, as Bosnian Muslim control would infer very high costs. It was in this context that 
NATO executed the three “pinprick” strikes. Merely meant to signify resolve, they did not 
affect the military balance of the belligerents, leaving the VRS free to act as it wanted 
(Jakobsen 1998: 97). 
Following the Serb escalation, and after some hesitation, NATO reiterated its threats, again in 
a clear and limited fashion. Empowered by Alliance resolve, it is likely that such wide-scale 
airstrikes could have caused the VRS the loss of their positions around Goražde; a dramatic 
increase in the costs of noncompliance (Jakobsen 1998: 98). Furthermore, despite practically 
no attempts at reciprocity in this exchange, the costs of withdrawing were relatively limited 
for the Serbs, seeing as the VRS aim to defeat the ARBiH offensives had largely been reached 
(Jakobsen 1998: 98). Lastly, the credibility of the strikes was demonstrated through NATO’s 
willingness to specify exact conditions and deadlines, and eventually also by the request made 
by the UN Secretary-General. 
With respect to the domestic variables, all are again classified as positive. The changing 
political situation in Serbia was no doubt reflected in the Republika Srpska. While the need to 
satisfy his radical political allies so far had guaranteed some acquiescence to the prečani 
ambitions, the new situation in Serbia allowed Milošević to bring renewed pressure against 
Pale. That Bosnian Serb leadership consequently became concerned for their political 
viability is illustrated in their decision to withdraw from Goražde. The critical, Serbian, 
economic support had been under threat, which further induced Pale towards a more 
accommodating line of policy. That this concern had been justified was demonstrated on 4 
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August, with the termination of the Serbia-Republika Srpska cooperation. Finally, the 
changing political environment in Pale caused key politicians to support the NATO demands, 
all the while Mladić and the VRS continued their attacks. However, following the very clear 
reiteration of the NATO threat, it is likely that also Mladić realized he could not hold out 
against wide-scale Alliance airstrikes, prompting him to withdraw voluntarily rather than 
being compelled to do so. In sum, as Krajišnik had stated, their aim had been to prevent 
Muslim counter-offensives, and once this objective was secured, the political mood changed 
to a more accommodating posture. 
4.3.6 The Tuzla Shelling 
Following the trans-Atlantic relationship-crisis in the autumn of 1994, the U.S. made a series 
of policy changes. In pursuit of an overall, negotiated settlement, they put more emphasis on 
positive inducements, and more closely coupling the “sticks” and the “carrots”. Renewed 
negotiations with both Milošević and the Bosnian Serbs ensued, while a larger degree of 
Russian cooperation was secured by shifting the diplomatic effort from the ICFY to the 
Contact Group (Burg 2003: 63-64). Nevertheless, in May 1995 Bosnian Serb forces took 
control of some heavy artillery from a depot inside the Sarajevo exclusion zone. It had now 
become evident that Mladić remained free to act as he saw fit; it was the politicians in Pale 
who had become dependent on him for leadership, not vice versa (Owen 1995: 320). In 
response, NATO struck a VRS ammunition dump near Pale on 25 and 26 May, reinforcing 
the demand that the VRS had to withdraw their heavy weapons from Sarajevo and observe an 
immediate cease-fire (Clark 2001: 49). The Bosnian Serbs again responded with escalation, 
with a retaliatory shelling of the city and safe area of Tuzla, killing a total of 75 people. 
NATO, determined not to back down, executed new airstrikes, and again the Bosnian Serbs 
retaliated, taking over 350 UN personnel hostage (Holbrooke 1998: 63). This effectively put a 
stop to NATO’s attacks and punctured the UN effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least until the 
arrival of the UN Rapid Reaction Force. With UN collapse also at the heavy weapons 
collection points, the VRS soon reclaimed hundreds of heavy weapons. Furthermore, the 
Bosnian Serbs now considered the UN hostile, triggering Karadžić to declare a state of war, 
formally handing over control of the government to the army. Such policy not only received 
support from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the VJ, but also generated significant inter-
party unity between Bosnian Serb political parties (The New York Times 1995a, 1995b). 
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Eventually, the UN hostages were released unharmed, as rumors of a secret deal between 
local UN commanders and Bosnian Serbs representatives spread (Holbrooke 1998: 64-65). 
The latter received a number of concessions for freeing the captives, and NATO refrained 
from military action for weeks to come, even as the VRS violently stepped up its efforts. Soon 
after, negotiations failed between Milošević and U.S. Ambassador Robert Frasure, as 
Washington had refused to lift sanctions in return for Serbian recognition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In sum, the incident amounted to nothing less than a “…fiasco and […] 
humiliation for the UN following the NATO airstrikes on Pale…” (Owen 1995: 326). 
Analysis 
In this subcase, as no significant Serb concessions followed, the outcome was a failure. The 
coercer’s strategy is marked by negative proportionality, but positive reciprocity. Credibility 
is difficult to classify, but is ultimately considered negative. Firstly, the demands made were 
the same as earlier; both specifically to withdraw from Sarajevo, and more generally to cease 
hostilities. While this constituted moderately limited type B objectives, the instruments 
employed were even more limited, as destroying an ammunition dump brought no immediate 
consequences for the VRS, only minimal long term effects. While the costs of noncompliance 
were limited significantly, surrendering their heavy weapons would entail large costs of 
compliance for the Serbs. Next, NATO’s ensuing reluctance towards using force helped 
secure reciprocity, as did the new, general policy of equitable agreements. However, 
Milošević was not met with the same degree of reciprocity. Finally, credibility was secured by 
the actual strikes taking place with UN approval, but this changed when NATO failed to 
specify further consequences for continued noncompliance, meanwhile the UN hostages were 
held as human shields. 
The internal politics and economy were characterized by classifying all variables negatively. 
Regime support and security was improved by noncompliance, as evident in the broad support 
the confrontational policies received. Furthermore, as Mladić remained a strong and popular 
leadership figure, increased army involvement in the Bosnian Serb government strengthened 
its viability. The refusal also benefitted them economically, considering both the VRS 
reclamation of heavy weapons, and the “carrots” secured by returning the hostages. Finally, 
although there remained visible disunity in-between Bosnian Serb leadership, the interests of 
most key actors pointed in the same direction; consolidating the current hold on Bosnian 
territory through a confrontational stance. This attitude characterized Krajišnik, Karadžić, 
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Mladić, the VJ, and the Church. The only alternative “transmission belt” could have been 
Milošević’s potential recognition of Bosnia, but the reserved U.S. attitude prevented this. 
With an ineffective Contact Group, and an absence of positive inducements, Milošević 
probably rather perceived his interests best served by a Serb force of arms. 
4.3.7 Operation Deliberate Force 
After the atrocities in Srebrenica and Žepa in July 1995, President Clinton realized it was 
better for U.S. forces to be involved proactively, rather than reactively, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Burg 2003: 64). With the U.S. presidential elections coming up, the “endgame 
strategy” was engineered. It assumed that both U.S. and NATO credibility was linked to 
Bosnia’s future and that while the European UNPROFOR forces were either withdrawing or 
regrouping, the U.S. should deploy its own forces, on its own terms (Henriksen 2007: 103). 
Finally, the new approach would also grant the Bosnian Serbs a significant concession; a de 
facto recognition of the Republika Srpska (Owen 1995: 330). 
Thus a far more conducive context and alliance coherence soon emerged. In late July and 
early August NATO threatened with “substantial and decisive air power” to halt attacks on 
Sarajevo and deter further attacks against Goražde, Bihać, and Tuzla (Jakobsen 1998: 101). 
Furthermore, the U.S. supported Croatian army, and the newly formed federation army, 
executed offensives against the VRS, capturing the Krajina region impressively effectively. 
Even though he had previously urged the secession of Krajina, Milošević refrained from 
intervening. Apathy was widespread in the Serbian public, and in a poll of its usually loyalist 
police force, 92% expressed opposition to serving outside Serbia (Cigar 2001: 228-229). The 
situation was even changing in Pale, where Karadžić’s recent loss of power gained Milošević 
newfound influence, while even Krajišnik became more flexible (Owen 1995: 330). Since 
August, Milošević had laid heavy pressure against Bosnian Serb leadership to transfer their 
rights of negotiation, so that he could seek an end to the conflict himself. In fact, this process 
was accomplished before NATO bombing commenced, as Milošević formally received these 
rights on 29 August (Cigar 2001: 210). Regardless, only one day earlier another mortar shell 
had landed in a Sarajevo market, producing 122 casualties. As Holbrooke on 27 August had 
threatened with a yearlong air campaign should hostilities not cease, NATO felt compelled to 
realize their threats (Henriksen 2007: 105). With UN support, and initially even Russian 
acquiescence, NATO initiated Operation Deliberate Force on 30 August. 
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The bombing campaign proved short, but effective; the total number of sorties roughly 
equaled one busy day of the Gulf War (Burg 2003: 67). Deliberate Force involved 220 
fighter- and 70 support-aircraft, in addition to naval air assets based on the U.S. aircraft 
carrier Theodore Roosevelt. 3,535 sorties were executed, expending some 1,026 high-
explosive munitions against 338 aim points on 48 Bosnian Serb targets (Henriksen 2007: 
117). Primarily military assets were targeted, including a few artillery positions, a barracks, 
command and control nodes, logistical systems, some lines and centers of communication, 
and even some bridges. The attacks caused only limited damage to the VRS however, which 
was quite easily repaired. Although VRS capacities for maneuver and command and control 
were somewhat degraded, the main effect of the bombing seems to have been psychological; a 
further reduction in the already poor Serb morale (Owen 1995: 340). Significant political 
restrictions ensured that major VRS troop concentrations were not targeted, in order to keep 
Serb casualties as low as possible. Bosnian Serb leadership was also ruled out as legitimate 
targets. As most of the initially approved targets soon had been hit, extending the target list 
proved strenuous with considerable European opposition (Cigar 2001: 221). 
On 1 September NATO halted its attacks, giving the Bosnian Serbs time to comply with the 
UN demands (NATO.int 1995d). The following day, NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes 
(NATO.int 1995c) underlined that especially, NATO demanded: 
[N]o Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas; Bosnian Serb 
withdrawal of heavy weapons from the 20 km total exclusion zone around Sarajevo 
without delay; [and] complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel 
and NGOs and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport 
Furthermore, he stated that so far, “[t]he reply of General Mladić is not sufficient and does 
not constitute a basis for terminating air strikes”. As further Serb concessions were not 
forthcoming, the attacks resumed on 5 September (NATO.int 1995b). Meanwhile, U.S. 
diplomats offered Milošević a comprehensive peace-deal, including lifting the sanctions 
against Serbia. Their military effort was concertedly stepped up when 13 Tomahawk cruise-
missiles impacted in Banja Luka on 10 September, and the new, so-called “Option 3” target 
list was being considered (Owen 1995: 334). Finally, as federation ground forces became 
increasingly organized, further offensives routed whole VRS units, allowing the federation 
quick and significant landgains (Cigar 2001: 220-223). On the other hand, it should be noted 
that these advances did not yet constitute a Bosnian Serb defeat. Lord Owen (1995: 336-339) 
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argues that the VRS withdrawals were less costly than at first believed, and that as the Serbs 
were falling back to more defensible lines, the withdrawal may have been engineered to 
secure the Serb negotiating position. Additionally, by selectively offering or restricting the 
federation forces air support, NATO prevented unproportional exploitations of the Serb 
fallbacks. Four days after the Banja Luka attack, the UN and NATO demands were met as 
“Bosnian Serb military and political leaders sign[ed] an agreement to withdraw… ” 
(NATO.int 1995a). 
Holbrooke secured a cease-fire by 5 October, and on 31 October Milošević, Izetbegović, and 
Tuđman met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio, where they 
ultimately signed the Dayton Accords (Henriksen 2007: 105). It has been argued that the 
wording of the agreement was deliberately left ambiguous, so that each party could claim 
success domestically, securing the current leadership’s power (Switzer 2001: 296). Dayton 
established Bosnia-Herzegovina as an indivisible and decentralized state with two separate, 
internal entities; the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, and both 
were granted significant autonomous powers. The talks hence granted significant concessions 
to the Bosnian Serbs, who remained in control over a controversial 49% of Bosnia (Williams 
2001: 279). 
Analysis 
The outcome of Operation Deliberate Force was ultimately a success; the war ended and 
negotiations took place. The coercer’s strategy can be considered with positive values for all 
variables. First of all, the demand that Milošević accept cease-fire and negotiations were 
moderately limited type B objectives. Though entailing some VRS withdrawals, the proposals 
would also consolidate much Serb control of Bosnian territory. While the coercive means 
remained relatively limited, they were strong enough to incur considerable costs of 
noncompliance. Although Milošević had been ready to negotiate for some time, Pale had on 
repeated occasions shown that it was not. So far, Milošević had not had enough influence with 
the Bosnian Serbs to affect their stance, but this changed with the professionalization of the 
Croat and federation armies, which made the costs of continued noncompliance much higher 
for the Bosnian Serbs. As Jović noted (cited in Cigar 2001: 218): 
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…with the unavoidable military strengthening of the adversary, the Serbs of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina may reach the point where they are defeated, and where they 
lose that which they have conquered… 
The sudden capture of Krajina probably suggested to the Bosnian Serbs that this fear could 
become reality. When they turned to Milošević for support, they found little; his interests 
were cooperation with the international community, ending the war, and ultimately lifting the 
sanctions. Milošević considered that the role of Balkan peacemaker would increase legitimacy 
domestically, fortify his position and hedge against ICTY indictments (Cigar 2001: 230). For 
these reasons, when the marketplace shelling triggered strong NATO reactions, the costs of 
noncompliance soared for the Bosnian Serbs. Pale realized the urgent need for negotiations, 
and conceded to Milošević’s demands for negotiating powers. 
When Deliberate Force launched, the Serb negotiating position was significantly weakened, 
and instead of retaliating, they took shelter and waited. In all probability, they judged the 
credibility of a protracted NATO engagement as low, rather expecting the international 
community to make a favorable offer to quickly end the conflict (Owen 1995: 331). 
Furthermore, the costs of noncompliance were initially limited, as most of NATO’s targets 
would cause only long-term effects, no direct, tactical consequences. Finally, because Clinton 
needed a free agenda before the upcoming elections, the Serbs reinforced their perception 
(Cigar 2001: 221; Switzer 2001: 302). 
When several factors then convened, the Serb perception of both the costs of noncompliance 
and NATO’s credibility began to change. Firstly, the relative extensiveness of NATO’s 
campaign proved beyond the typical international military response, countering Serb 
expectations and analytical paradigms (Cigar 2001: 221). Next, the federation ground 
offensive successfully blocked and interrupted VRS maneuverability. It forced the Bosnian 
Serb forces into concentrated formations designed to halt the federation advances, but which 
simultaneously exposed them to the full effect of the NATO airstrikes (Henriksen 2007:113-
114). Soon the Serb forces became tired and on the defensive, increasingly outnumbered, and 
struggling with low morale and discipline (Switzer 2001: 302). Meanwhile, NATO escalation 
was suggested by the potential “Option 3” list, both horizontally to include key areas like 
Banja Luka, as signaled by the Tomahawk strikes, and vertically to systematically include 
fielded forces and/or main supply routes (Cigar 2001: 222). 
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As the NATO countries began linking their own credibility to the success of their mission, 
their resolve became apparent for the Serbs. Furthermore, because the UN had approved the 
campaign and reconfigured its forces in more defensible positions, the costs of executing the 
threat were lowered, improving NATO’s credibility. Despite political restrictions on the 
airstrikes, evidence suggests that the Serbs felt faced with significant uncertainty, and that the 
future costs of continued bombing could become even greater than the current ones. This was 
evident when Serbian media reported that Milošević, having met with Holbrooke, both 
personally believed, and persuaded Pale likewise, that the bombing would continue 
relentlessly until a cease-fire was signed (Cigar 2001: 222). When Milošević later 
congratulated then U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff member General Clark with NATO’s victory, 
Clark objected that it had been the federation who had secured the victory. Responding, 
Milošević famously remarked: “No. It was your NATO, your bombs and missiles, your high 
technology that defeated us. We Serbs never had a chance against you” (Clark 2001: 68). 
Finally, reciprocity was secured both towards Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Milošević was 
offered a loosening of the crippling sanctions, and could play the peacemaker card 
domestically. Meanwhile, Mladić had avoided withdrawing his heavy weapons because this 
would expose the VRS to ARBiH counter-offensives. When NATO made clear, however, that 
it would not allow an unproportional Muslim counter-offensive, Mladić complied with the 
demand to withdraw (Owen 1995: 334-337). Additionally, another significant “carrot” was 
the de facto partition of Bosnia, securing the ultimate Bosnian Serb goal; their own, semi-
autonomous political entity, the Republika Srpska (Cigar 2001: 231-232). 
Turning to the domestic factors of Serbia, who now held the powers of negotiation, all factors 
are also classified positively. While the preceding discussion answered why the Bosnian Serb 
operational center of gravity collapsed, this is only half the answer to how coercive diplomacy 
succeeded. The other half must address why also the strategic center of gravity, i.e. the 
support of Milošević and Belgrade, failed. In other words, why did Milošević not try to even 
out the military balance prior to negotiations? Contrary to U.S. expectations, Milošević did 
little or nothing while the Bosnian Serbs were heading for defeat (Cigar 2001: 227). 
One explanation is that the required escalation would have had to be major. Rather than just 
providing limited assistance, Serbia would have been required to call upon the full force of 
the VJ in a quagmire war it might not have won. The army was already troubled by low 
support and mobilization response. Dramatically increasing the military effort would have had 
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a high price, both in casualties and in economic and political terms. Had the fragile Serbian 
society been subjected to such burdens, the pillars upholding it could have collapsed (Cigar 
2001: 227-228).  In sum, to quote Dr. Cigar (2001: 229): “…Milošević assessed the cost of a 
full-scale war might be so high as to potentially destabilize his government”. Continuing 
supporting the prečani involved costs Milošević was unable to take, costs which would have 
fuelled Serbia’s internal political opposition. The Serbian public had generally turned against 
the foreign Serbs, who were considered warmongering extremists, exploiting Serbia’s support 
to accomplish their own goals. On the other hand, a quick peace could be considered a 
Serbian victory; it could be claimed that Greater Serbia’s borders had been secured, and that 
the country’s economic future was brightened (Cigar 2001: 230). 
Next, the economic calculus also favored conceding. Defiance and escalation would entail 
high costs for the military operations themselves, and would cause further disruption of the 
Serbian economy through continued international sanctions. On the other hand, complying 
brought a loosening of the sanctions, and cut the auxiliary costs for the ongoing war. 
Finally, as Serbia was becoming increasingly isolated politically and strategically, key 
Serbian actors began to realize Moscow’s unwillingness and inability to support the Serb 
cause (Cigar 2001: 229). Simultaneously, the VRS was unable to hold captured territory, and 
began falling back to more defensible lines. Cut off from direct Serbian support, it no longer 
enjoyed clear military superiority. Finally, when the priority area of Banja Luka came under 
attack, the VRS accepted it no longer held the initiative. It thus became a “transmission belt”, 
demanding a cease-fire consolidating the remainder of its territory. Also Mladić, now more 
quiet and reflected, accepted the need to back down; his support in the army was undermined 
as his soldiers dreaded serving in Bosnia, and draft dodging and deserting became an issue. 
Finally, even the most radical politicians in Pale realized that the semi-autonomous Republika 
Srpska was the best offer they would get. Thus the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina came to an 
end, bringing an uneasy peace that nevertheless remains today. 
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5 Kosovo 
This chapter presents and analyzes NATO’s use of coercive diplomacy in the 1998-1999 
Kosovo conflict. It includes a total of five sub-cases, organized as in the preceding chapter. 
Firstly, however, the sources of conflict and the key actors and elites are discussed. Because 
this case in many ways is connected to the former, some repetition is unavoidable. 
Nevertheless, I will here try to focus on that which changed since the Bosnian war. 
5.1 Sources of Conflict 
To the south of Serbia lies the region of Kosovo, a small area with a predominantly Albanian 
population. Under Tito, Kosovo had been granted status as an autonomous province within 
Serbia, a status since revoked by Belgrade in 1989, as the Serbian government introduced a 
strict police regime with extensive cultural oppression and harassment of ethnic Albanians 
(Clark 2001: 110). Much enmity between the Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs 
stemmed from both groups’ overlapping historical and territorial claims. Both trace important 
historical developments and events to the area, and a large population of ethnic Albanians 
have long considered Kosovo their home (Burg 2003: 71). On the other hand, Serbs often 
argue that the Serbian nation originated within Kosovo itself, and that its capital city of 
Pristina is the very cradle of the Serb civilization (Owen 1996: 63). Kosovo was also the 
scene for some of their most important historical-mythological events, including the Turkish 
victory over the Serbs on Kosovo Field in 1389 (Holbrooke 1998: 23). 
It is fair to say these developments were given relatively little attention in early international 
efforts at dealing with the SFRY break-up. When Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, avoided war in the 
immediately following years, it was largely due to the peaceful methods of the Albanian 
leadership, including Ibrahim Rugova and his newly established Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK) (Henriksen 2007: 123). Their view was like that of most Kosovar Albanians; 
that Kosovo should be independent. The drawback to their peaceful approach was that it 
failed to grab the attention of the international community, who instead were drawn to Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As their bid for independence failed, Kosovo’s young population turned to increasingly 
radical measures, and following the Dayton Accords, many estimated that violence was the 
only way to protect group interests in Yugoslavia. Soon, a Kosovar Albanian grouping known 
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as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) carried out its first acts of violence, killing five Serbs 
on 22 April 1996 (BBC 2003a). With an unrestricted flow of weapons from the neighboring, 
chaos-stricken Albania, many Kosovars quickly gave the organization their support, thus 
undermining Rugova and the LDK (Burg 2003: 70). This was but the beginning of a series of 
attacks and counter-attacks between the KLA on the one hand, and Serb police forces, Serbian 
Interior Ministry Police (MUP), and other Serb security elements on the other (Henriksen 
2007: 125-129). 
5.2 Elites and Key Actors 
In the same manner as in the previous chapter, this section will deal with the key political and 
societal actors of the coerced. As noted earlier, I will here focus on the changes since the war 
in Bosnia. 
Slobodan Milošević and the Serbian Government 
Unfortunately, there is relatively little information available on the concrete calculations 
underpinning Milošević’s decision-making during the Kosovo crisis, but some inferences can 
be made by assuming him a rational actor (Burg 2003: 70). Since the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Milošević’s political position had become increasingly vulnerable. In December 
1996, after Milošević’s party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), was caught in apparent 
election fraud, hundreds of thousands of protesters took to Belgrade’s streets, demanding 
more democracy (Holbrooke 1998: 345). Additionally, having served two consecutive 
periods, Milošević was no longer eligible as President of Serbia, instead taking the role as 
President of the FRY. Given their weakened situation, the SPS and Milošević were yet again 
forced to play the nationalist card, and on 24 March 1998 they formed a coalition government 
with Milošević’s wife’s political party, Yugoslav Left (JUL), and the extreme nationalist 
Vojislav Šešelj’s party, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). This strengthened Milošević’s 
position in the Serbian parliament and gave him useful, radical political allies, an important 
source of support as the Kosovo crisis was growing (Henriksen 2007: 133). Nevertheless, and 
perhaps especially due to his newfound alliances, Milošević remained the de facto Serbian 
decision-maker (Henriksen 2007: 168). 
Arguably, Milošević had at least some incentive to find a negotiated settlement over Kosovo, 
since Dayton had only partially lifted the international economic sanctions against the FRY. If 
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he could demonstrate a commitment to democracy, and yet again play the peaceful negotiator 
in Kosovo, perhaps also the remaining sanctions could be lifted (BBC 2003a). This would 
further his progress towards an international recognition of the integrity and legitimacy of the 
remaining territory of the FRY, i.e. the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. 
Having said that however, the special relevance and emotional importance that Kosovo held 
for Milošević is difficult to overstate. According to Cyrus Vance (Owen 1996: 59), 
willingness to negotiate over Kosovo was at the very edge of Milošević’s flexibility. After all, 
Kosovo had been the vehicle of Milošević’s rise to power (see section 4.2), and the radical 
hardliners in Serbia were well aware of this. Giving up Serbia’s claim to Kosovo would be for 
Milošević to butcher his own sacred cow, which would fuel domestic opposition. Those 
Western observers who considered Kosovo a “second Bosnia” failed to grasp the area’s great 
significance for Serb history. It is sometimes said that in the Balkans, a grief can be held for 
centuries. Though the saying is clearly meant proverbially, the Serb defeat on Kosovo Field in 
1389 is nevertheless a case in point. For the Serbs, once more handing over Kosovo to its 
Muslim population would have entailed a repeat and renewal of this perceived humiliation. 
While this is no justification for the Serb aggression, it is an account of how many Serbs felt 
at the time of the Kosovo crisis. 
Serbian Radicals – Vojislav Šešelj and the SRS 
The radicals’ relevance in Serbian politics had somewhat decreased since the conflict in 
Bosnia. From controlling almost a fourth of the seats in the national assembly, the SRS now 
held little more than a tenth (IPU.org). Nevertheless, this also meant a concentration of the 
true hardliners, and made the SRS a blackmailing fringe-party with relatively little political 
responsibility. Thus, obtaining their acquiescence remained important to Milošević, lest his 
vulnerable position be exposed to the radicals’ ordnance. 
Albanian Political Actors – The LDK and the KLA 
Ibrahim Rugova had in 1989 been one of the founding members of the LDK, a right-wing 
political party that championed a peaceful struggle for Kosovo’s independence. In the mid-
nineties, with the LDK having failed to secure this goal, the KLA began to gain in popularity. 
As the crisis unfolded, Rugova and the LDK became increasingly unpopular with most 
Kosovars, spawning mass demonstrations in the streets of Kosovo. To secure his political 
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survival, Rugova was compelled to quit opposing the KLA and its actions (Burg 2003: 76). 
The KLA, on the other hand, was a Kosovar Albanian nationalist organization. It demanded 
full independence, and did not shy away from any methods considered constructive, carrying 
out executions and raids against Serb security elements and civilians alike. For this reason, the 
NATO governments largely recognized the KLA as a terrorist group until spring 1998. For a 
long time, the number of actual KLA hardliners was quite low, despite substantial indirect 
support from a significant portion of the Kosovar population (Henriksen 2007: 125). As the 
peaceful policies of the LDK failed however, the ever more radicalized youth increasingly 
turned to the KLA (BBC 2003a). 
The organization’s strategy for Kosovar independence soon became evident. According to a 
political adviser to the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) head, the KLA deliberately 
sought to provoke the Serbs into aggressive counter-measures by attacking their personnel. In 
turn, this could make Western opinion more sympathetic to the Kosovar cause. According to 
KLA commander RRustem “Remi” Mustafa, his organization “…didn’t have the fire power to 
carry out any major actions. But it was easy to provoke the Serbs. We did it by just using 
snipers. Our aim was to get NATO to intervene as soon as possible” (BBC 2003a). 
Their strategy soon succeeded. In spring 1998, a change was noticeable in U.S. and NATO 
attitudes towards the KLA. Not only did Western diplomats actively seek contact with KLA 
representatives, but U.S. diplomats even implicitly hinted at NATO support (Henriksen 2007: 
142). This boost of confidence induced the KLA towards an ever more confrontational 
approach, renewing their offensive efforts. Some evidence even suggests direct cooperation 
between the West and NATO on the one side, and the KLA on the other. Following the 1998 
October Agreements, the KVM supposedly supplied the KLA with maps and even left behind 
communications equipment (BBC 2003a). Thus KLA would supply NATO with military 
intelligence, targeting information, and damage assessment reports. In effect, said then 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Sir Rupert Smith, NATO effectively 
allied itself with the KLA (Henriksen 2007: 157-158). 
5.3 NATO Coercive Diplomacy 
By February 1998, the KLA had mounted significant resistance to Serbian control over 
Kosovo. Resultantly, Serb police unleashed a wave of violence, triggering U.S. Special 
Representative Robert Gelbard to condemn both the police violence and, in a soon-to-become 
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controversy, the KLA terrorist acts (Burg 2003: 75-76). The Western members of the Contact 
Group stressed the need to re-impose economic sanctions against Serbia, but Russia resisted., 
New sanctions were nevertheless enacted in March, adding further strain to the already 
pressured Serbian economy (BBC 2003a). Frustrated by the slow progress of the international 
community, the U.S. and its allies within the Contact Group were convinced quick, decisive, 
and even forceful action was needed against Milošević, and therefore sought to make NATO 
the primary crisis management engine for Kosovo (Henriksen 2007: 131). Furthermore, given 
the relatively quick settlement after only a few days of bombing in Bosnia, it was widely 
believed that also this time Milošević would fold quickly under credible military threats or 
actual bombing (Henriksen 2007: 109-119). Already by May 1998 the White House had 
considered NATO airstrikes, meanwhile other Alliance political leaders drafted a UNSCR 
calling for all necessary means to resolve the growing crisis (Burg 2003: 77; The New York 
Times 1999b). 
In the following five sub-cases, I will as before first present relevant empirical data, before 
these are analyzed in terms of the theoretical variables. The five sub-cases discussed are 
Operation Determined Falcon, the October Agreements, the Rambouillet Conference, and 
Operation Allied Force, which for analytical purposes is split in two parts. 
5.3.1 Operation Determined Falcon 
On 28-29 May 1998 NATO foreign ministers met in Luxembourg to discuss the situation in 
Kosovo. A statement was issued expressing concern for the developments, encouraging 
dialogue between the parties. The document stated that NATO’s major goal in the region was 
“a peaceful resolution of the crisis…”, as “[t]he status quo is unsustainable” (NATO.int 
1998). Importantly, Secretary-General Javier Solana (cited in Henriksen 2007: 136) expressed 
that NATO “will consider further deterrent measures, if the violence continues. Let me stress, 
nothing is excluded”. Although Solana used the word deterrent, this still constitutes coercive 
diplomacy as defined in the thesis’ framework, because the aim was to change the status quo, 
rather than to preserve it. 
As violence continued unabated in early June, NATO issued another warning, preparing for 
“a full range of options […] [for] halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent 
repression and expulsion in Kosovo” (cited in Henriksen 2007: 138). They sought to support a 
cessation of violence, while generating negotiations for a lasting political settlement. 
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Meanwhile, in the UNSC, Russia had openly opposed using force, thus denying NATO a UN 
mandate. There were also internal disagreements in the Alliance on the desirability of using 
force (Jakobsen 2007: 239). Nevertheless, on 16 June Operation Determined Falcon was 
initiated; a NATO air exercise over Albania and Macedonia, it was meant as a demonstration 
of NATO’s potential in projecting airpower (Clark 2001: 123). While the exercise served to 
cement the contemporary axiom that airpower was the superior instrument of force projection, 
its relative lack of potency has been pointed out by amongst others Chairman of the NATO 
Military Committee General Klaus Naumann. He admitted that the exercise proved nothing to 
Milošević except that NATO needed more than 48 hours to prepare for any serious projection 
of airpower (Henriksen 2007: 139). 
According to now NATO SACEUR General Clark (2001:123-124), further diplomatic 
initiatives were taken in mid-June, when the U.S. dispatched Richard Holbrooke, Christopher 
Hill, and Robert Gelbard to meet with both Serb and KLA representatives, after realizing that 
a political settlement excluding the KLA would be meaningless. Following the subsequent, 
secret talks, Holbrooke was quoted by KLA international spokesman Bardhyl Mahmuti to 
have said that the U.S. would “…impose constitutional changes on Milošević which in 3 to 5 
years will bring independence to Kosovo”, something Holbrooke later partly verified (BBC 
2003a). On the other hand, airpower analyst Dag Henriksen (2007: 146) claims, finding 
support in other academics, that most other NATO members at this point agreed that Kosovo 
was an integral part of Serbia. For this group, both the independence and partition options 
were considered too volatile, considering the fragile peace in Bosnia. Thus the only 
acceptable alternative left was an arrangement with Kosovar autonomy, as a province within 
Serbia. 
Milošević, meanwhile, was facing problems on the domestic front. The VJ, still not entirely 
under presidential control, was resisting the dirty work in Milošević’s plan for Kosovo (Clark 
2001: 114).  Therefore, and also due to the NATO warnings, in the first half of June 
Milošević stepped down the Serb security efforts in the contested Drenica Valley (Henriksen 
2007: 143). Their confidence raised by the perceived Western support, the KLA soon 
escalated the level of conflict. With the Serbs on the defensive, the KLA quickly seized the 
opportunity and captured what territory the Serbs had withdrawn from. At the apex of this 
early summer offensive, the KLA held around 40% of the province. In late summer this 
ignited another round of Serb counter-offensives, bringing excessive aggression and 
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repression against both the KLA and the civilian population amongst which it hid. Ultimately, 
some 200,000 Kosovars were internally displaced by early August (BBC 2003a). 
Analysis 
The first coercive diplomacy attempt in Kosovo should be considered a failure; NATO did not 
secure a peaceful resolution, and instead the crisis escalated. Initially, the main reason for the 
escalation was not Serbian noncompliance, but NATO’s lack of leverage over the KLA, 
which would have prevented the latter from exploiting the favorable situation. Considering 
the coercer’s strategy, proportionality is ultimately considered negative, as is also reciprocity 
and credibility. Ending the Serb campaign was limited, type A coercive diplomacy, and as the 
costs of compliance were low, Milošević initially conceded. As the KLA was strengthened by 
its summer offensive however, a peaceful resolution became an extensive and costly demand 
for Milošević and the Serbs. Exactly what a “resolution” entailed remained unclear, as did the 
instruments NATO might use (Henriksen 2007: 147). Considering that the West had signaled 
at least limited support for Kosovo’s independence, Milošević probably perceived very high 
costs of compliance. On the other hand, Determined Falcon brought only weak threatening 
signals and no consequences of noncompliance. Next, no attempts were made at promising 
the Serbs positive inducements, meaning that the lack of benefits of compliance further 
compounded the Serb decision to resist (Jakobsen 2007: 242). Finally, credibility was 
undermined as the Alliance remained divided over the general desirability of using force, let 
alone with Russian opposition and without a UN mandate (Henriksen 2007: 136). 
Concerning the internal factors of the coerced, internal support and security is classified 
negatively, although both the economic variable and the role of elites are considered positive. 
Conceding to the initial demand of halting the repressive campaign would probably only 
affect Milošević’s immediate political support and regime security marginally. However, once 
the KLA was threatening to overrun the entire province, the stakes changed. Loosing Kosovo 
would have had major repercussions for Milošević, and would likely have lost him most of 
his political support. Thus regime security was better served by defiance and renewed 
aggression. On the other hand, although some sanctions had been lifted and foreign petroleum 
shipments were incoming, other sanctions remained in place (Jakobsen 2007: 242). The poor 
growth in Serbian economy in 1998 is evident in table 5.1. By complying with the demands, 
Milošević might hope to lift the remaining sanctions and provide better growth in the future. 
Finally, the VJ’s opposition to Milošević’s dirty work entails that in this sub-case, compliance 
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might have better served the interests of the military elites than defiance. This probably 
induced the initial agreement to withdraw, although they later saw it necessary to counter the 
KLA offensive. 
Table 5.1: Serbian economy’s performance in the late nineties (UN.org)4 
Year Annual Change in GDP (%) GDP per Capita (USD) 
1998 0.6 2,242 
1999 -11.2 1,440 
 
5.3.2 The October Agreements 
While more and more refugees were flowing into Western European countries, the situation 
was worsened within Kosovo itself. Hence UNSCR 1199 was successfully passed on 23 
September, calling for all available means to secure an immediate ceasefire in Kosovo, the 
withdrawal of FRY security elements, a rapid improvement of the humanitarian situation, the 
safe return of refugees, international monitoring of the situation, and further dialogue between 
the belligerents. The next day NATO followed up the demands by issuing an “activation 
warning” (ACTWARN); a non-binding, formal step in preparing the use of force. A range of 
alternatives was considered, from a limited air option to a sustained, phased air campaign 
(BBC 2003a). At the subsequent FRY Supreme Defense Council meeting, Milošević met his 
top aides and political partners. Reportedly, Serbian President Milan Milutinović urged him to 
accept the UNSCR demands, with VJ Chief of Staff Momčilo Perišić joining in; “[o]r the 
West would bomb us”. Snapping back, Milošević argued “[s]o what! The bombing will only 
last a few days then there will be peace. Once world opinion is mobilized, NATO will have to 
stop bombing…” (BBC 2003a). According to General Clark (2001: 128), it is possible that 
Russian diplomats had assured Milošević that there would be no further UN mandates for the 
use of force, and thus no major NATO intervention. 
On 26 September Gornje Obrinje became the scene of a horrible event as 21 civilians were 
found massacred, apparently by the Serb Special Police as retaliation for recent guerilla 
activity in the area. Nearby, another 13 men were executed after hours of abuse at the hands 
                                                 
4 The two years’ GDP cannot be compared directly, due to changes in the method of calculation. 
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of their Serb captors (Henriksen 2007: 151). Repulsed by these atrocities, NATO took a step 
further towards realizing the airstrikes threat, issuing an activation request (ACTREQ) on 1 
October. Furthermore, the plan for the phased air campaign was approved, while Holbrooke 
was dispatched to meet with both Milošević and Kosovar Albanian representatives. On behalf 
of the Contact Group, he demanded that Milošević had to observe UNSCR 1199 immediately, 
or face a NATO air campaign (Clark 2001: 139). During these negotiations, Holbrooke 
requested the NAC to make further progress towards the air campaign, and an activation order 
(ACTORD) was issued on 13 October. While forward deployment of Alliance aircraft and 
warships commenced, the ACTORD gave Milošević 96 hours to comply or automatically 
trigger airstrikes (BBC 2003a). A few hours later, an accord was consequentially struck with 
the October Agreements, entailing Serbian compliance with UNSCR 1199 and the Contact 
Group demands, in addition to the creation of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), ground-based Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) with 2,000 unarmed 
observers and a NATO air surveillance component (Burg 2003: 80). Even Russian foreign 
minister Igor Ivanov had indicated that Russia could support an OSCE-based solution (Clark 
2001: 144). Milošević then issued a statement outlining the foundations for a potential 
political settlement, including autonomy, elections, and a local police force in Kosovo. 
Remembering the hostage-situations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a NATO extraction force was 
deployed in neighboring Macedonia. As the KVM found adequate levels of Serb compliance, 
the impending airstrikes were suspended on 27 October (Henriksen 2007: 154-155). 
In the October Agreements, NATO had threatened with the use of force in support of a 
concrete diplomatic initiative with limited, political goals. It allowed hundreds of thousands 
of internally displaced to return home, and gave Milošević measurable obligations to adhere 
to (Henriksen 2007: 155). However, to secure Serbian compliance, several significant 
“carrots” were granted; the deadline was extended twice, meanwhile more than 20,000 
Serbian personnel were allowed to remain in Kosovo (Jakobsen 2007: 239). Furthermore, 
Serbian leadership made it clear they would only accept superficial changes to the way 
Kosovo was being governed (Burg 2003: 80). Therefore, some have argued that the October 
Agreements postponed, rather than proposed, a lasting political settlement. Perhaps its most 
serious weakness however, was that it did not formally include the KLA, despite earlier 
realizations that this would be necessary. Isolated from both formal obligations and NATO 
pressure, the KLA once again exploited the vacuum following a Serb withdrawal. It 
regrouped and rearmed, before continuing its attacks against Serb police forces and civilians, 
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rapidly gaining control over large areas previously held by the VJ (BBC 2003a). According to 
several sources, Milošević had believed that Holbrooke had promised to seal the border to 
Albania, thus stopping the KLA’s supply of arms, as well as to freeze KLA assets and take 
other measures to reduce its influence. When this never happened, Milošević not only felt 
betrayed and cheated, but also realized that he would have to deal with the KLA himself, and 
this was something he estimated could be done within two weeks (Clark 2001: 150). 
Another development also aggravated Milošević in this period. As early as September, U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had suggested that Milošević be removed from office 
altogether. Soon after, the U.S. began issuing support to Milošević’s political opponents. 
Robert Gelbard (cited in Henriksen 2007: 157) secretly contacted members of the Serbian 
opposition, even attempting to convince a high-level, Serb general to “start a coup or 
something”. Not only did the general refuse, but in the aftermath of the October Agreements, 
these meetings were publicly disclosed in Serbian media. This probably cemented Milošević’s 
fear that the U.S. were planning to replace him. Unsurprisingly, rather than welcoming the 
offer of an international force deployment to prevent further violence, in November and 
December Serbian authorities responded with Operation Horseshoe, aiming to cleanse 
Kosovo by force themselves. Repression and expulsion of the Kosovar Albanian population 
thus began anew (Burg 2003: 83). 
Analysis 
The outcome of this attempt is not easily assessed. On the one hand, Milošević and Serbian 
authorities agreed to the initial demands, but on the other, unintended consequences brought a 
renewal of the violence in the aftermath of the agreement. Nevertheless, given that coercive 
success, strictly speaking, is achieved when a threat is the dominant cause in changing the 
behavior of the coerced, it is clear that some degree of success was achieved. Therefore, the 
outcome of this sub-case is considered a qualified success. 
The coercer’s strategy was marked by positive values for all three variables; proportionality, 
reciprocity, and credibility. The demands of UNSCR 1199 entailed moderately limited type B 
demands, and although they required significant Serb withdrawals, they were clear and 
concise. As such, Milošević was assured that independence was no longer an option for 
Kosovo, limiting the potential costs of compliance. On the other hand, also given that KLA 
remained a significant force, NATO airstrikes could have had severe adverse effects on 
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Milošević’s regime. Such attacks could have blocked the VJ’s ability to neutralize the KLA, 
so that the latter might even have threatened Serb control over the province, and thus 
Milošević’s very political survivability. Next, the degree of reciprocity is disputable. While 
both refraining from pressuring the KLA and allowing the Albanian border to remain open 
point to a lack of reciprocity, these factors arose only in the agreement’s aftermath. Prior to 
and during the negotiations reciprocity should be considered positive, because the deadlines 
were postponed while more Serbian personnel were allowed to remain in Kosovo. Finally, 
also credibility was ambiguous for some time. As demonstrated in the FRY Supreme Defense 
Council, NATO’s initial credibility was low, with Russian opposition, the lack of a clear UN 
mandate, and Alliance internal disagreement. However, the negative side-effects of the 
conflict galvanized NATO’s political leaders to approve the ACTORD, thus cementing their 
resolve and credibility. When Russian acquiescence was secured with an OSCE-based ground 
mission, NATO’s credibility was no longer in doubt. 
Also all the internal factors can probably be considered positive. Milošević had played the 
nationalist card and begun Kosovo crackdown operations as a way to stay in power, and this 
remained a major consideration. Nevertheless, once the ACTORD was approved, the 
airstrikes guarantee would in likelihood have meant the immediate end of Milošević’s regime. 
Compliance was therefore the only reasonable option, in terms of regime security and support. 
Next, following the renewal of the economic sanctions, it became ever more important for 
Serbian authorities to demonstrate flexibility. By complying, progress could be made towards 
reintegrating the FRY into the world economy. Finally, it seems both top Serbian political and 
military leaders like Milutinović and Perišić were eager to see Milošević concede. However, 
given that the KLA can be considered a key actor, it constitutes a serious challenge to the 
otherwise positive role of the key actors. That the KLA seized the opportunity to expand is 
hardly surprising; the escalation was a rational choice because their morale was improved by 
quick land-gains, the KVM was indirectly supplying and equipping them, and they still 
perceived U.S. support (BBC 2003a). 
5.3.3 The Rambouillet Conference 
Following the October Agreements, the series of provocations and retaliations continued 
between the KLA and Serb security forces, ultimately producing a devastating outburst of 
fighting in early 1999. On 15 January KVM observers reported Serb MUP and VJ forces 
assaulting the small village of Račak. In the aftermath, a total of 45 people were found killed. 
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Despite some controversy over the KVM’s quick condemnation of the Serbs, for many the 
incident induced strong associations to Srebrenica. Determined to avoid another moral failure, 
the Račak massacre spawned an enormous momentum across the NATO countries (BBC 
2003a). Secretary Albright and the U.S. State Department then refined this momentum into 
political action, and in producing a final negotiations strategy, linked the threat of airstrikes to 
a political settlement (Henriksen 2007: 164). The European response was that this time, also 
the KLA had to be included. Additionally, though Russia initially opposed the forceful U.S. 
policy, Moscow later agreed to cooperate should the negotiations be organized by the Contact 
Group (BBC 2003a). In a 30 January statement, the NAC gave the Contact Group their 
support, and set out the following demands: 
…[T]he completion of the negotiations on an interim political settlement within the 
specified timeframe; full and immediate observance by both parties of the cease-
fire and by the FRY authorities of their commitments to NATO, including by 
bringing VJ and Police/Special Police force levels, force posture and activities into 
strict compliance with the NATO/FRY agreement of 25 October 1998; and the 
ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force… (NATO.int 1999) 
Furthermore, the statement warned that “[i]f these steps are not taken, NATO is ready to take 
whatever measures are necessary […] the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes 
against targets on FRY territory”. However, SACEUR Clark (2001: 166) later pointed out 
that the potential targets lacked in potency, as too few high-value, top level command and 
control assets had been approved. Serb leadership was probably well aware of this. 
Nevertheless, the foundations had been laid for a last effort at peaceful negotiations. 
The Rambouillet conference begun on 6 February, involving Contact Group representatives, a 
Kosovar Albanian delegation representing the Kosovar people, and a Serb delegation 
characterized by the lack of Milošević. While KLA leadership had been invited to the 
Kosovar delegation, the most hardline leaders had refused to attend. Thus only a small 
number of moderate KLA representatives eventually participated (The New York Times 
1999c). From the start of the talks, it was conveyed to the Serbs that failure to sign would 
cause NATO airstrikes against the FRY, and to the Albanians that if they caused failure, they 
would be abandoned to subsequent Serb reprisals (Henriksen 2007: 168). Initially, the Serb 
delegation remained quiet and stalling, apparently believing that the Russians would save 
them from Western punishment. Milošević had probably calculated that the Albanians would 
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refuse any deal without independence, and that NATO therefore was unlikely to bomb. 
Instead aiming at collapsing the negotiations, he hoped for a return to the more favorable 
status quo (Henriksen 2007: 168-173). 
While a draft treaty eventually was produced, it entailed more extensive demands than the 30 
January NAC statement, and especially the treaty’s military annex proved difficult. The text 
of the annex had simply been copied from the Dayton Accords, where it had related to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina only. In the Rambouillet version however, a large NATO peacekeeping 
force would be deployed to Kosovo, which also would enjoy unrestricted access to all of 
Serbia (Lambseth 2001: 8). On this basis, the Serb delegation argued that the military annex 
was nothing less than a thinly veiled military occupation, and refused to sign. As the Serb 
delegation stalled for time, VJ forces were building up in Kosovo, approximately doubling in 
numbers. Not only indicative of a new offensive, the reinforcements would likely also reduce 
the potential impact of future NATO airstrikes (Clark 2001: 167). 
The Serbian refusal made the Albanian delegation worry that without a significant NATO 
ground presence, the security of their people could not be guaranteed, and thus also they 
refused to sign. To resolve the situation, Western diplomats met with the Albanians, 
reassuring them of NATO’s protection, and offered other inducements, including training 
KLA officers in police activities in the U.S. (The New York Times 1999d). The 
representatives continued to resist however, because they had received threats from the KLA 
members who had boycotted the negotiations. “Remi” explains: ”[We] warned them: ‘Don’t 
you dare sign! […] We will not use all our anti-aircraft rockets on the Serbs. If you sign, we 
will save one to bring down your plane’” (BBC 2003a). The situation was finally resolved in a 
last-minute rescue by certain members of the Kosovar delegation, who feigned an Albanian 
agreement. This secured an almost three-week long suspension, so the delegates could return 
to Kosovo for consultation with the differing factions (The New York Times 1999d). 
Additionally, U.S. politician Robert Dole was sent to Kosovo, to reiterate that failure to sign 
would cause international abandonment (Henriksen 2007: 173). 
When the conference reconvened, the Serbs presented a revised treaty text, provocatively 
favorable to Serbia. Nevertheless, and to the Serbs’ great surprise, the Albanians signed the 
treaty on 18 March (Clark 2001: 175). Having expected an Albanian refusal, Milošević was 
forced to improvise, and consequentially refused to sign the treaty his own government had 
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drafted. During the next days the KVM was withdrawn, while NATO began final preparations 
for the phased air campaign. 
Analysis 
The outcome of the Rambouillet coercive diplomacy can be classified as a failure as no treaty 
was agreed upon. The coercive strategy was negative in proportionality and reciprocity, while 
positive in credibility. Although the demands of the draft treaty constituted type B coercive 
diplomacy, they were not limited. Firstly, it demanded not only wide scale Serb withdrawals, 
but even NATO access to large parts of Serbia, which was not required to police Kosovo 
(Henriksen 2007: 171). Hence, and especially following the October Agreements, Milošević 
probably speculated that NATO in truth aimed for type C coercive diplomacy; regime change. 
In contrast, while the coercive instruments would entail NATO airstrikes against Serb targets, 
these were expected to last only a few days. One U.S. Air Force Major noted that: 
“[e]verybody was talking three days” (BBC 2003c). Thus hardly three days’ worth of targets 
had been approved, mainly including enemy integrated air defense systems (IADS), and few 
or none top-level command and control assets (Henriksen 2007: 19). Next, reciprocity was 
largely lacking from the proposed settlement. Although the Albanian acceptance of the Serbs’ 
revised treaty provided some benefits, these were hardly reciprocal inducements. It was the 
Serbs themselves who had proposed them, in a treaty they never meant to accept. Credibility, 
on the other hand, became positive, even if the threats were lacking in potency. Not only had 
Russian acquiescence been obtained, but NATO had staked its own reputation on success, 
making its governments extremely likely to find ways of cooperating. Meanwhile, air assets 
had already been deployed to the theater, and the Račak incident had secured public support 
across Western countries. 
As for the domestic conditions, internal political support and regime security, together with 
the role of elites, are classified as negative, as should probably also the economic calculus. 
Firstly, accepting the treaty’s military annex assumedly seemed like political suicide to 
Milošević. He feared it not only could lead to the forced detachment of Kosovo, but perhaps 
to his own elimination also (Henriksen 2007: 171; Lambseth 2001: 78). Furthermore, 
accepting what was perceived as a proposed NATO “occupation” of Serbia would have lost 
him virtually all political support. Secondly, the economic calculus is difficult to determine; 
compliance could still have brought Serbia closer to lifting the sanctions, but such a provision 
was not stated explicitly in the draft treaty. Instead it entailed hosting a large NATO force 
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with rights of bivouac, which probably would have induced its own set of costs. Furthermore, 
while the destruction of Serb IADS could have inflicted costs in terms of millions of U.S. 
dollars, Serb officials have later explained how they had become proficient at building 
effective decoys, worth less than 50 dollars each (BBC 2003c). These factors contributed to 
minimizing the costs of noncompliance, meanwhile the costs of compliance remained high, 
and the benefits of compliance uncertain. Finally, the limited data on the role of key actors 
suggests that also this condition was unconducive. The hostile attitude of radical KLA 
members no doubt made Milošević assume the Albanians would not sign, and hence that 
NATO could not bomb. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine that VJ leadership would have been 
critical towards allowing NATO to use its infrastructure and facilities. Additionally, with their 
buildup in Kosovo, the VJ was less vulnerable to airstrikes than before, further reducing its 
incentive to comply. 
5.3.4 Operation Allied Force 
The first combat operations of NATO’s Operation Allied Force (OAF) occurred on 24 March 
1999, as U.S. B-52 bombers fired cruise missiles against hardened FRY structures (Lambseth 
2001: 20). Two days earlier Holbrooke had visited Belgrade, delivering the Alliance’s last 
ultimatum prior to bombing, which Milošević had refused outright. As noted earlier, most 
Western policy-makers assumed Milošević would concede after only few days of bombing. 
Nevertheless, formally approving air power had been difficult, as several European 
governments faced strong domestic opposition (Henriksen 2007: 11, 61). Thus NATO settled 
for a three-part, phased air campaign, based on the 1998 ACTWARN. Phase One would 
establish a NFZ over Kosovo, suppress FRY IADS, and target Serb forces fielded in Kosovo, 
with the aim to create a more permissive operating environment (Lambseth 2001: 19). 
General Clark (2001: 185) notes: “[w]e had to attack and disrupt – destroy if possible – the 
actual elements doing the ethnic cleansing”. This objective soon became a priority, because 
Clark assessed that Milošević needed only five more days to permanently vanquish the KLA. 
Next, Phase Two would expand the bombing to additional FRY military targets south of 
latitude 44 degrees north, including lines of supply and communication. Finally Phase Three, 
as the most controversial, would entail a wide range of high-value, strategic, security, and 
military targets in all of the FRY, including downtown Belgrade. Authorization for shifting 
from one phase to the next, i.e. escalating the campaign, became a political, not military, 
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responsibility. Thus it is fair to say that this gradually escalating air campaign was dictated by 
political necessities rather than military principles of war (Henriksen 2007: 11, 13). 
Intended to last only a few days, resting on fragile Alliance cohesion, and lacking a UN 
mandate, the campaign faced severe political restrictions. The main concern was minimizing 
both NATO casualties and collateral damage, while at all times maintaining cohesion (Clark 
2001: 185-186). Initially, and even to some extent throughout the campaign, there were no 
clear, elaborated, or coherent grand strategy, objectives, or desired end-state, rendering the 
targeting process a restricted, sometimes random activity with day-by-day approval (Clark 
2001: 203). Targets were often picked for their political acceptability rather than their 
estimated impact on Milošević’s decision-making calculus. As so bluntly put by U.S. Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Ralston (cited in Henriksen 2007: 19): 
“[b]ombing surface-to-air missile sites – why the hell would Milošević care about something 
like that? […] [A]nd that was basically what was on the target list for the first three days”. 
The Serbs soon proved resilient, as not only Milošević remained largely unaffected, but also 
the suppression of FRY IADS was difficult. The combination of partly modernized, high-
grade IADS and the general robustness of burrowed, Serb installations contributed to this 
(Clark 2001: 196). Furthermore, VJ morale remained adequate; a VJ commander stated that: 
“[w]e had to neutralize the Albanian terrorist forces quickly to prevent a massive armed 
rebellion” (BBC 2003c). Meanwhile, Russia had signaled strong disapproval of NATO’s 
campaign, and even begun repositioning their own armed forces. NATO’s poor results 
allowed the Serbs to escalate the ongoing ethnic cleansing, racing to complete them before 
negotiating with NATO became inevitable (BBC 2003c). After this first week with a “try-
and-see” approach, NATO’s first agreement in principle on war aims was secured. They 
demanded that the Serb security forces had to withdraw from Kosovo, to be replaced by a 
NATO-led, international peacekeeping force, and that refugees were allowed to return to their 
homes. Also the targeting process was facilitated, as General Ralston developed guidelines for 
what could not be bombed without prior political consultations. The guidelines prohibited 
targets in downtown Belgrade and in Montenegro, in addition to those where significant 
civilian casualties were probable. Furthermore, the electrical power grid could only be 
targeted for military purposes, e.g. interrupting the electrical supply to Serb IADS (Henriksen 
2007: 21-22). 
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Without having fully achieved its Phase One objectives, OAF formally moved into Phase 
Two on 28 March, and into an intermediary step often called Phase Two Plus already on 30 
March. The reasons for this rapid development were several. Firstly, because of the severe 
target restrictions, Phase Two introduced no significant new targets except eight bridges. 
Also, there were increasing concerns for the expenditure rates of a drawn-out campaign. 
Finally, it was recognized that the air threat’s potency needed strengthening to correspond 
with the inflating war aims, as a return to the Rambouillet terms was considered unacceptable 
following the escalation of the ethnic cleansing (Clark 2001: 218-219). In sum, realizing that 
Phase Three was never likely to get authorized, NATO military communities suggested Phase 
Two Plus, wherein the Secretary-General could authorize Phase Three targets in Phase Two, 
on a case-by-case basis. It allowed targeting more infrastructure elements, including bridges 
and other lines of transportation. 
At the turn of the month, Kosovo’s situation remained poor. While more targets were being 
approved than before, truly decisive targets were still too controversial. Such targets could 
include top-level headquarters, presidential residences, communications and TV stations, and 
the electric infrastructure (Clark 2001: 238). Some evidence even suggests the initial effect of 
the bombing was to rally the Serbian population around its government (Lambseth 2001: 82). 
Disagreements yet again surfaced within the Alliance, especially between the more aggressive 
and strategic-minded Americans and the restrictive and tactical-minded Europeans. As 
perhaps the most telling sign of disunity, several NATO countries legally continued petroleum 
shipments to the FRY, all the while their own aircraft were trying to disrupt this same 
segment of Serbian economy (Clark 2001: 268-269). 
Seizing the moment, the Serbs commenced yet another offensive, forcing Kosovar Albanians 
from their homes with mass expulsions. The number of internally displaced and refuges soon 
reached some 540,000. Before long, major KLA resistance had been neutralized, allowing the 
Serb security forces to terminate their operations and disperse from NATO airstrikes. The 
benefit of the renewed offensive was nevertheless a galvanizing of the Alliance’s 
determination. Having temporarily achieved his goals in Kosovo, Milošević declared a 
unilateral cease-fire on 6 April. However, the severe atrocities that had been committed had 
caused such fury within the Western public that the declaration was largely ignored (Clark 
2001: 236, 253-254). Instead, NATO escalated by introducing USS Theodore Roosevelt to the 
theater, and by striking Pristina’s main telecommunications building (Lambseth 2001: 31). 
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Shortly after OAF had reached one month, a NATO attack against one of Milošević’s 
residences marked a shift in the Alliance’s approach. Not only did a potential NATO ground 
deployment become increasingly considered, but at the 23-25 April summit in Washington, 
NATO political leaders demonstrated greater resolve than before. They agreed to target more 
high-value strategic assets, and further authorized SACEUR to inspect and divert petroleum 
shipments bound for the FRY. Additionally, the campaign’s objectives were finally 
formalized; cementing the de facto objectives and determining a path forwards (Clark 2001: 
260-273). According to air power analyst Benjamin Lambseth (2001: 38-39), the new aims 
included directly pressuring Belgrade’s political and military elite, challenging Milošević’s 
domestic powerbase, and demonstrating that the Serbian government would no longer find 
any obligingness. Russian President Boris Yeltsin offered a final improvement when he called 
President Clinton, offering to dispatch Viktor Chernomyrdin to Belgrade (BBC 2003c). 
Following the summit, more petroleum facilities, factories, lines of transportation, and high-
level military sites were targeted, including the Belgrade offices of the Serbian state radio and 
TV channels. The headquarters of both the MUP and certain paramilitary forces were 
attacked, as was the electrical infrastructure, temporarily shutting down large parts of Serbia’s 
electrical supply. Meanwhile, General Clark (2001: 291-292) reiterated the need for granting 
the KLA a post-conflict role, suggesting it could be transformed into a civilianized police 
force. The new strategy soon proved its virtue; on 6 May Milošević initiated a “peace 
offensive”, stepping down the military efforts in Kosovo. Furthermore, ongoing Group of 
Eight (G-8) negotiations drafted a peace-proposal which was submitted to the UN, demanding 
full withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, replacing them with an international 
peacekeeping force. Finally, according to U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
(Lambseth 2001: 70), when airstrikes against Belgrade became regular, senior VJ officials 
begun sending their families out of the FRY. The same officers would later openly oppose 
Milošević, pressuring him to concede to the international demands (The New York Times 
1999a). 
Despite the promising development however, a series of events in mid-May broke the 
campaign’s momentum. On 8 May, the Belgrade Chinese embassy was attacked by NATO 
aircraft, meanwhile other severe incidents of misfire and collateral damage soon followed. 
Airstrikes against the capital desisted for a time, allowing the Serbs time to adapt to the 
changing situation. In Kosovo, for example, there were reports of civilians being held as 
human shields, held under bridges and at other strategic targets. Furthermore, most of the 
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obvious and easy targets had been struck, and expanding the target list would entail greater 
risks to both NATO assets and the FRY civilian population (Clark 2001: 298-300, 307). 
As the immediate pressure subsided a new set of targets was identified and approved, 
allowing for further escalation while minimizing risk. Firstly, the electrical infrastructure was 
struck again, damaging not only Serbian IADS, but also the civilian banking system and other 
important, electrical infrastructures. Simultaneously, as the number of factories being bombed 
increased, unemployment began to rise, and national productivity was undercut. Later, even 
the civilian telephone and computer networks became approved targets (Lambseth 2001: 41-
43). These targets were largely owned and operated by Serbia’s oligarchical businessmen, 
who so far had been served well by Milošević’s regime, but now were brought to the brink of 
bankruptcy (Lambseth 2001: 71). Consequently, renowned Serbian economist Mlađan Dinkić 
(cited in Lambseth 2001: 42) noted, while the population would not starve, the country’s 
“…industrial base [was] destroyed and the size of the economy cut in half”. It wasn’t long 
before the initial defiance was traded for popular weariness and anger with the Serbian 
government (Clark 2001: 277, 295-297, 317; Lambseth 2001: 42). 
As the campaign progressed, planning for a ground option continued despite the lack of 
consensual support. On the one hand, General Clark (2001: 284) argued that just this planning 
and preparations generated leverage over Milošević, even while a deployment remained 
months away. On the other hand, the VJ were still heavily entrenched in Kosovo, and a 
ground invasion could have encountered between 50,000 and 100,000 VJ troops and heavy 
weapons (Clark 2001: 286). The strength of this force could not be underestimated, as became 
clear on 26 May, when 4,000 regrouped KLA guerillas launched Operation Arrow against the 
VJ forces. NATO refused in principle extensive cooperation with these KLA forces, and thus 
it took the VJ no more than three days to defeat the KLA offensive. According to Lambseth 
(2001: 53-54), while there was some cooperation between the KLA and NATO, they mostly 
fought separate, but parallel wars against the Serbs. The benefit of this parallel effort 
however, was that KLA operations would sometimes force VJ and MUP forces out from 
hiding, thus exposing them to NATO airstrikes. 
OAF was finally brought closer to its conclusion when, on 2 June, special envoy 
Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari visited Belgrade to convince Milošević 
to concede. They presented an ultimatum engineered by the U.S., the European Union, and 
Russia, entailing full Serbian acquiescence to NATO’s demands. This included Serb 
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withdrawal, the autonomy of Kosovo as an integral part of the FRY, and limited bombing 
until implementation was secured. Milošević agreed to the terms, and the Serbian national 
assembly ratified his decision already the next day. Nevertheless, Serbian heel-dragging 
delayed the peace-process for a few days, meanwhile VJ forces were ordered to a final 
offensive against the KLA. In response, NATO airstrikes resumed at full strength, further 
chastening the VJ, who now perceived Milošević to have put them in a position of jeopardy 
(BBC 2003c). Thus on 9 June, facing immense national and international pressure, the 
Serbian government began withdrawing the VJ from Kosovo (Lambseth 2001: 59-60). Based 
on the G-8 proposal, a final settlement was hammered out. To secure agreement however, the 
Serbs required a four days extension of the withdrawal deadline, as well as a guarantee of 
Russian participation in the peacekeeping force (KFOR). Additionally, references to NATO 
command and control of KFOR had to be moderated, while the peacekeeping forces also had 
to commit to police the Albanian border, sealing off the KLA’s main source of support (Clark 
2001: 366-370). On 10 June SACEUR suspended OAF, and a few hours later UNSCR 1244 
authorized KFOR’s entry into Kosovo, bringing yet another Balkan conflict to its end. 
Analysis 
In this final sub-case the outcome ultimately became a success, as Milošević and the VJ 
accepted the NATO and G-8 demands. Nevertheless, OAF required 78 days of escalating 
bombing to produce this result. Given the operation’s changing character over its duration, it 
could be warranted to analytically divide it in two. Although its latter part in no way was 
independent from its first part, the approaches made were so different that a division probably 
is fruitful. Thus the first part of OAF lasts from its launch on 24 March and until, but not 
including, the 21 April strike on Milošević’s residence. It is disputable whether this part 
should be considered as coercive diplomacy or military coercion, but for the sake of 
completeness I have chosen to include it. The second part begins on 21 April and lasts until 
the operation’s suspension on 10 June. 
The coercer’s strategy in the first part can be considered as negative proportionality and 
reciprocity, while credibility was marginally positive. The second part, on the other hand, 
entails a positive classification for all variables. Proportionality was initially negative, as the 
demands were not only unclear, but also entailed moderately limited type B objectives that 
soon inflated further. Neither were the instruments used proportionally potent, as striking 
IADS would hardly harm Milošević’s center of gravity (Henriksen 2007: 19). Although the 
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IADS would have had to be targeted regardless, in order to secure the operating environment, 
the fact that these initially were the only approved targets reduced potency. Additionally, 
when disrupting the elements carrying out ethnic cleansing proved difficult, significant 
friction was generated in the operation’s chain of command, undermining its efficiency 
(Henriksen 2007: 12). Even after the target list was expanded in Phase Two Plus, high-value 
targets remained absent. Finally, without an imminent ground threat, Milošević was assured 
Kosovo could not be forcibly detached from Serbia (Clark 2001: 262). In the second part 
however, the Washington summit formalized and clarified the objectives, while strikes against 
leadership residences and headquarters brought consequences to the leaders themselves. Also 
the increased infrastructure attacks caused the costs of noncompliance to rise. These strategic 
targets often proved less troublesome than the tactical ones, in terms of weather, available 
aircraft, and Serb IADS capacity (Clark 2001: 247). Finally, while a credible ground threat 
was still distant, it would have hit so heavily at Milošević’s centers of gravity that the fall of 
his regime would have been likely (Lambseth 2001: 46). On the other hand, Chernomyrdin 
later stated that Milošević had actually hoped for a NATO ground offensive, which would 
have enabled the use of partisan tactics to inflict greater numbers of casualties (de Wijk 2005: 
199-200). 
Reciprocity was initially negative, before it became positive in the latter part. In the first 
period, no proper “carrots” were offered to Milošević’s regime, thus depriving it of a face-
saving way to concede. In the second part however, several concessions were made to the 
Serbs. Firstly, the choice of negotiators, a Russian and a non-NATO representative, meant the 
Serbs would not have to negotiate with NATO directly. Furthermore, the deadline for 
withdrawal was extended, Russian participation in KFOR was secured, NATO command and 
control was moderated, and the Albanian border was sealed off. 
Finally, credibility is considered positive for both parts, but more clearly so in the latter 
period. Uneasy alliance cohesion, the lack of a UN mandate, Russian opposition, high costs of 
a prolonged air campaign, and Western public opposition all contributed to undermining it 
initially. However, while the way the campaign was executed often has drawn criticism, it 
was also its restrictive nature that ultimately lent it some degree of credibility (Lambseth 
2001: 78-81). Additionally, it would have had severe repercussions for NATO, should it have 
failed in Kosovo, giving it a further improvement of credibility. In the latter period, Russian 
opposition was moderated, a UNSCR draft was in the making, and Western opinion was 
galvanized by the continued atrocities. All these factors contributed to a solid credibility in 
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OAF’s final stage, making it seem to Milošević that NATO could continue with virtually 
indefinite and unhindered punishment (Lambseth 2001: 69). 
The initial domestic factors can be classified as negative for internal support and security, a 
marginally positive economic calculus, and probably a negative role of key actors. In its latter 
part however, all factor turned positive. In the first period, internal support and security was 
dominated by the spontaneous defiance of the Serbian population. This contributed to 
strengthening Milošević’s regime, while continued repression in Kosovo gained him influence 
with the Serbian radicals. This changed in the latter part, when NATO showed willingness 
and ability to destroy assets central to Milošević’s control over Serbian society. As winter was 
approaching, living with continuous bombing even damaging the country’s utilities was 
becoming very difficult. Due to public weariness, Milošević’s political survival became 
dependent on securing peace with NATO (Lambseth 2001: 80-85). 
It is difficult to determine the Serbian economic calculus for OAF’s first part. On the one 
hand, the costs inflicted by NATO were extremely limited; the initial bombing produced poor 
results, infrastructure targets were not systematically struck, the FRY continued trade in 
petroleum, and even the successful use of targeting decoys all contributed to mitigating the 
costs. On the other hand, the costs of continuing VJ operations also have to be considered, in 
addition to the limited damage caused by NATO. It is likely that the economic outcome was 
almost balanced between defiance and compliance, but since at least some extra costs were 
incurred, a positive value can perhaps be assigned. This changed radically in OAF’s latter part 
however. Better bombing results, more infrastructure and manufacturing targets, and the 
disruption in trade and petroleum flows caused large-scale devastation to the Serbian 
economy. 
Finally, there is relatively little information available on the role of key actors and elites in the 
first part of OAF. Certainly, while the morale of the VJ remained sufficient, the KLA were 
also taking a very hostile attitude, making the Serbs less likely to concede. This gives some 
reason to classify this value as slightly negative. The situation became clearer in the final 
stages however, when central VJ elements openly opposed Milošević, fatigued by their 
Kosovo campaign. Furthermore, after Operation Arrow the KLA realized that NATO would 
not undoubtedly come to their rescue, and were further induced towards a settlement by being 
offered a post-conflict role. Thirdly, the attacks on state media and Serbian manufacturing 
brought the war directly to the business and security interests of Milošević, his family, and his 
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associates. Thus, according to Lambseth (2001: 70), it is likely that elite pressure was 
mounting behind the façade in Belgrade. The Serbian loss of Russian support, Lambseth 
(2001: 69) says, was a contributing, but not crucial factor. 
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6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to summarize, and compare and discuss the findings of the 
foregoing chapters. Furthermore, some considerations are made on causality, key variables, 
and mismatching objectives and strategies, before the research question is answered. 
Ultimately, some final remarks on the thesis’ strengths and limitations are made. 
6.1 Results 
This section will sum up the main findings of the preceding case studies. As explained in 
chapter three, for each sub-case I will consider the values assigned to each variable, so that 
the theoretical framework can generate predictions of the outcomes. This can then be 
compared with the actual, historical outcome, to see whether or not the prediction was correct. 
Ultimately, I will summarize how well the theory’s predictions were congruent with the actual 
outcomes across all sub-cases. 
The first task will be summarizing the findings of chapters four and five. While the chapters 
hold more detail than can be summed up here, a simplification is warranted as long as it aids 
in answering the research question (Everett and Furseth 2004: 143). Furthermore, a more 
detailed discussion on key factors can be found later in this chapter. The main findings of the 
case studies have therefore been presented in table 6.1, below. It lists each sub-case5, both 
variable groups with three variables each, and the values these were assigned. Next, as 
operationalized in section 3.3.1, the theoretically expected outcome is given. Finally, the 
actual outcome is also noted. 
At first impressions, the level of congruence is satisfactory; in the most conservative 
estimation, of a total of 12 sub-cases, the theory correctly predicted nine outcomes. In other 
words, the theory can account for at least 75% of the variance in the dependent variable. Of 
the three remaining cases, only one was predicted outright wrong; Assault at Goražde. In the 
other two incidents, the Siege of Sarajevo and the October Agreements, some form of 
qualification modified the actual outcome, rendering the lack of congruence a matter of 
gradation. As the current operationalization includes absolutes, not gradations, the fact that 
                                                 
5 Bosnian sub-cases are above the horizontal line, Kosovar below. 
 86 
 
Table 6.1: Main findings of chapters four and five, with expected and actual outcomes 
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these qualifications were not accounted for probably stems from methodological choices, and 
not the theory itself. Thus a more optimistic interpretation of the results might count only one 
outright failure, entailing that the theory holds upwards of 90% explanatory power. It is most 
likely however, that the true number of explainable variance in the dependent variable lies 
somewhere between 75% and 90%. 
It is also positive that the theory predicted fewer successes than actually occurred, as it is 
preferable for the theory to be too conservative rather than too liberal. Interestingly, by 
including the qualified successes, NATO succeeded in using the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy as a crisis management tool in six out of twelve sub-cases, indicating a 50% 
success rate. This is a higher rate than found in other, more general studies of the 
successfulness of coercive diplomacy (c.f. Jakobsen 2007). Within the limitations of this 
study, it is difficult to say exactly why NATO should be more successful than other 
constellations of states or organizations. One factor can perhaps be that due to the Alliance’s 
inter-governmental nature, only crises where the members perceive high enough levels of 
cohesion and possibilities of resolution are dealt with through the NATO platform. In other 
words, perhaps NATO has better possibilities for “picking its battles” than other organizations 
or individual states. 6 Furthermore, NATO could also have a more developed strategic culture 
than other actors, and perhaps even more credibility, once it commits to a cause. 
Relative Difficulty of the Conditions 
Looking at how often each condition was positive or not gives an indication of how difficult it 
was for NATO to meet that requirement, relative to the other conditions. While a fairly even 
spread is observable, some conditions were satisfied more often than others. The condition 
that was most often present was the economic costs and benefits. That it was positive for 
almost all the sub-cases is evidential of the West’s partiality for using economic sanctions as 
coercive tools. Not only are these widely used, but they are probably also the form of coercion 
that the West knows best. The two that were met the fewest times were reciprocity and 
internal political support. This can indicate the political difficulties associated with aiding or 
reciprocating a regime that, in the process of generating legitimacy and public support, has 
been demonized in Western media and politics. Professor Flynt Leverett (2004) has noted it 
has often been typical neoconservative policy to deny rogue states “carrots” for concessions, 
                                                 
6 Unlike the UN for example, which will always have some obligation to intervene in international conflict. 
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even when such inducements almost certainly would bring about a change of behavior. 
Certain contemporary trends are furthermore bringing such policies into mainstream politics, 
as a public demand for distribution of responsibility has made international indictment of 
misbehaving state leaders a common practice. Ironically, this development has reduced 
NATO’s potential for influencing international politics by dealing with such leaders. It is thus 
becoming ever harder to supply the “carrot” in “carrot and stick” approaches. 
Finally, by comparing values across the two general cases, some further observations can be 
made. Firstly, proportionality was significantly more often present in Bosnia than in Kosovo. 
This can be supportive of the thesis’ claim that the great importance of Kosovo to the Serbs 
was generally misunderstood in NATO countries. Secondly, credibility was more often 
secured in Kosovo than in Bosnia, reflecting NATO’s relatively strong determination in the 
Kosovo case. It is likely also a testimony of how coordination with the UN and its “dual key” 
system frustrated NATO’s coercive efforts. 
6.1.1 The Diverging Sub-Cases 
Because only three sub-cases diverged from the rest by incorrect predictions, a short 
inspection of these can be interesting. This could identify omitted variables, measurement 
errors, or other theoretical or methodological issues. 
The Siege of Sarajevo 
As the VRS closed Sarajevo’s supply lines in late summer 1993, the consensus in NATO 
countries was that a humanitarian crisis was imminent. However, Sarajevo was not in more 
imminent danger than it had been for 18 months (Owen 1995: 205). To some extent, NATO 
therefore misinterpreted the intentions behind the VRS offensive, and was unable to device a 
relevant threat with clear and suitable objectives. Conversely, the Bosnian Serb offensive and 
its withdrawal were both primarily dictated by internal political and military necessities. It 
was intended to hedge against ARBiH counter-offensives, and this was something NATO 
should have considered from the outset. Instead, the UN safeguard became the sine qua non 
of the VRS withdrawal, and perhaps, as Jakobsen (1998: 92) has suggested, appeasement is a 
more accurate term for what happened. This can either mean that the sub-case was never a 
proper incident of coercive diplomacy, and should not have been analyzed as one, or that the 
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measurement of the outcome as a qualified success was incorrect, because coercive diplomacy 
failed while appeasement succeeded. 
Assault at Goražde 
In perhaps the most baffling of all the incidents, the NATO governments, internally disunited 
and vulnerable to counter-coercion, overcame the difficulties to produce a successful 
outcome. In terms of the theoretical framework, only reciprocity was considered negative. 
This could suggest that in a strict sense, reciprocity is not a necessary condition; a conclusion 
with some support in other studies (c.f. Jakobsen 1998: 134). An alternative explanation is 
that again the withdrawal was predicated on domestic interests, not external pressure. Pale had 
no intent of overrunning the enclave, but to counter repeated ARBiH offensives. Finally, the 
deteriorating relationship with Serbia can perhaps temporarily have induced the Bosnian 
Serbs towards a more cooperative stance. 
The October Agreements 
The last divergent sub-case turned out less successful than theoretically expected. What 
initially resembled a flawless execution of coercive diplomacy was moderated when NATO’s 
lack of leverage over the KLA allowed the latter to exploit the Serb concessions. It is nearly 
for this reason alone that the October Agreements were not a full success. The theoretical 
framework, however, reflects this observation in the unclear coding of the role of key actors. 
The coding was unclear because while key Serbian elites were positive towards compliance, 
the KLA, another key actor, was quite negative. It is likely this diversion in the set of key 
actors that explains the moderation of an otherwise successful attempt at coercive diplomacy. 
6.2 Causality 
The degree of congruence between the expected and actual outcomes has been shown to be 
between 75% and 90%. In itself, this is strongly supportive of the theoretical framework. 
Nevertheless, a mere covariation between certain values on the independent variables and the 
variance in the dependent variable is not sufficient to determine that there exists a causal 
mechanism or relationship. The observed pattern could, for instance, also be the product of 
randomness, spuriousity, or inverted causality. 
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Questions of spuriousity and causal priority ask whether there could be other, underlying 
variables that affect both the independent and dependent variables (George and Bennett 2005: 
185). Such factors could include the degree of willingness with which the NATO 
governments involved themselves, the urgency of the incident at hand, or the presence of 
international leadership within the group of coercers. Unlike more quantitative methods, case 
study approaches have few means of formally controlling for such errors. Nevertheless, some 
measures have been taken to reduce the chance of spuriousity. First of all, through intimate 
knowledge of both the subject-matter and other, relevant works of literature, case study 
approaches are generally unlikely to overlook variables of major significance. Next, the 
elements of process-tracing that have been incorporated have helped illustrate, if not prove, 
not only that positive values on the independent variables contributed to successful outcomes, 
but also how they did so. Finally, although introducing certain new, innovative elements, this 
study has been designed and executed in the context of more established works of research. 
That some of its methods, variables, and findings are analogous to other studies helps 
determine that there in fact exists a causal relationship between the specified variables 
(George and Bennett 2005: 185-187). On this note, it should be considered that it is the more 
innovative elements of the approach that most require further study and testing. 
Another topic to be addressed is the possibility of inverted causality. Could the observed 
consistency indicate that the outcome of the dependent variable somehow brought about the 
conditions specified by the independent variables? Could, for instance, key actors and elites 
have observed the decision-maker’s decision to comply with the external demands, and then 
decided to support the decision, in order to preserve their political and social positions? It is 
hard to deny this possibility, and this remains a serious challenge to a claim of causality. 
However, again the elements of process-tracing, as well as the chronology of the historical 
narratives presented, help insure a correct conceptualization of cause and effect. 
In light of the considerations made in this section, I will not claim that there absolutely exists 
a causal mechanism between the specified variables. There are always caveats, and some of 
them are hard to control for within the current research design. Nevertheless, given close 
study of the subject-matter, elements of process-tracing, and some support in earlier research, 
it is warranted to claim that it is likely that the variables are part of a causal mechanism as 
specified in this thesis. If we assume that the specified relationship is of a causal nature, then 
the next question might be how much weight should be attached to the various variables. This 
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is also difficult to answer definitively within the limits of the current research design. Some 
reflections are nevertheless made in the following section. 
6.3 Key Variables 
This section considers the role and importance of the various variables and variable groups. I 
discuss this topic in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, as well as in more general 
terms for the variable groups as a whole. 
6.3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 
Traditionally, case studies have often been concerned with identifying necessary and 
sufficient conditions for given outcomes. While using exclusively this approach for evaluation 
of results has come under some critique, a short evaluation of what this study has found can 
be constructive. As noted earlier, a conservative starting point is preferable, entailing that all 
variables are assumed necessary for a successful outcome, and none are sufficient. This 
hypothesis makes testing and falsification more straight forward. 
In this thesis no single variable could explain the variance in the dependent variable, meaning 
that the hypothesis was correct in assuming no sufficient conditions. Instead, the first 
challenge to the hypothesis is the Siege of Sarajevo, where a qualified success was achieved 
without sufficient credibility. Does this imply that credibility is not a necessary condition? I 
would argue that it does not. Not only should the framework probably be understood in more 
probabilistic than deterministic terms, but other studies have also demonstrated the critical 
role of credibility axiomatically, logically, theoretically, and empirically, and it is one of the 
most robust findings in coercive diplomacy literature. Furthermore, the observation stems 
from a sub-case with potential measurement errors; meanwhile all other sub-cases with an 
outcome other than failure included positive credibility. Therefore I do not find this single 
observation as grounds for dismissing the necessity of credibility in coercive diplomacy. 
Next, Assault at Goražde proved successful without a reciprocal element. Although this runs 
counter to the expectations of the conservative formulation of the theoretical framework, it is 
not without support in other studies. Neither Schelling (1976), Jakobsen (1998: 134), nor 
George and Simons (1994) found this variable to be more than a facilitating factor, in a strict 
sense. The observation made here, although in just a single sub-case, can support the idea that 
 92 
 
reciprocity is not a necessary condition. Given the many successful cases in which it was 
included however, it is not advisable for policy-makers to neglect this factor altogether. 
Summing up, it is worth noting that the variables are likely connected by more of a 
probabilistic than a deterministic relationship, and hence that a single, diverging sub-case is 
insufficient to disqualify a trend visible in many other cases (George and Bennett 2005: 116). 
Additionally, considering necessity and sufficiency in strict terms assumes that the 
independent variables are completely independent of each other, but this is unlikely. The past 
two chapters demonstrated several times how the different independent variables could affect 
each other. Additionally, there are two pairs of variables wherein their values covariate in all 
sub-cases but one; proportionality versus internal political support, and internal political 
support versus the role of elites. The first pair can indicate the close connection between the 
proportionality of a threat and the threatened regime’s survivability, thereby supporting the 
assumption made about the differences of extensiveness between types A, B, and C coercive 
diplomacy. The second pair underlines the importance of elites for the ruling regime’s 
survivability, lending credence to the idea presented in section 2.3.3; that no ruling regime can 
isolate itself from at least a small group of elites. This approach to variable interdependence is 
related to what George and Bennett (2005: 26) has called conjunctural causation, i.e. that 
certain conjunctions of variables can produce a given outcome, that the sum is greater than all 
the parts, in a sense. 
6.3.2 External Pressure versus Domestic Politics 
Given that not all variables can be considered completely independent of each other, it may be 
fruitful to discuss the key factors in more broad, conjunctural terms, like the two variable 
groups. As shown in table 6.1, for most sub-cases with an outcome other than failure, all 
variables were considered positive. In general, this is a strong argument in favor of the 
theoretical framework. Furthermore, for non-failures where all variables were not positive, at 
most one variable was marked negatively, and this variable was always in the coercer’s 
strategy group. In other words, for all non-failures, the domestic variables were always 
classified positively, while no sub-case where all domestic variables were considered positive 
ended in failure. This can indicate a certain primacy of the domestic factors over the external 
coercer’s strategy. If so, it would imply that the most important factors for determining the 
outcome of coercive diplomacy lies outside the coercer’s control; a somewhat controversial 
implication, as Western decision-makers use limited military means precisely to influence 
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international security developments. In the following section, this possibility is considered in 
more detail. 
In determining the relative importance of the two groups, comparing the Siege of Sarajevo 
and the October Agreements with the Markale Massacre is especially interesting, not least 
because the former two were the only incidents where a modification qualified an otherwise 
successful outcome. In the first of these sub-cases, success was achieved only once the UN 
promised the Serbs significant concessions, most notably a safeguard deployment of 
peacekeepers. This strategy was later criticized for being too appeasing (c.f. Jakobsen 1998: 
92). While appeasement likely was required to make up for a lack of credibility, it can also be 
considered the sine qua non of Serb compliance. When a similar safeguard was neglected 
following the October Agreements the KLA exploited the vacuum, frustrating an otherwise 
text-book example of coercive diplomacy. In this incident, U.S. representatives had virtually 
no leverage over the Kosovar organization, and according to Steven Burg (2003: 78, 104), it 
was mainly this lack of leverage that hollowed out the success. Finally, these partly 
contrasting sub-cases should be considered in light of the third incident, the Markale 
Massacre. The successful outcome of the latter case is usually not problematized, and 
although it was secured by last-minute Russian involvement, it too involved deploying 
peacekeepers as safeguards. Rather than being criticized, this deployment was considered 
appropriate to ensure compliance without bloodshed. Comparing these three incidents 
highlights the central role of such safeguards, and how the domestic purposes they served 
were crucial in determining the outcomes. These dilemmas are probably worth further 
investigation in later studies. 
Next, it is perhaps the concurrence of Operation Deliberate Force with the federation ground 
offensive that most immediately suggests itself as the crucial factor for final conflict 
termination in Bosnia. Indeed, this has often been the opinion of central decision-makers in 
the NATO countries (Henriksen 2007: 117). After the launch of the ground offensive it 
became clear to Bosnian Serb decision-makers that the longer the conflict dragged out, the 
worse the balance of force was going to get. Besides making significant land gains, one major 
effect of the offensive was to block and interrupt VRS maneuverability, forcing it to choose 
between dispersing from the NATO airstrikes or enduring them as it tried to halt the 
federation advance. Thus the NATO coercive attempt was dramatically strengthened by 
developments on the ground, without which the air campaign would have been far less 
effective (Henriksen 2007: 113-115). This distinguishes the Bosnian conflict termination from 
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that in Kosovo, where there was no counterpart to the ground campaign (Clark 2001: 119). As 
long as Milošević was assured that ground forces were not being considered seriously, he was 
sure he could not loose Kosovo forcibly, and that he could hold onto it until he agreed to give 
it up (Jakobsen 2007: 239). The lack of a ground campaign also helps explain why the two 
bombing campaigns experienced so different effectiveness against fielded forces. 
It can, however, be argued that conflict resolution was not primarily brought about so quickly 
after Deliberate Force due to the operation itself. Following the escalating power struggles 
between Milošević and Karadžić, the former had had plans for replacing the latter since spring 
1994. Thus, even though he had earlier supported the region’s secession, Milošević did 
nothing as Krajina was overrun during Operation Storm. Furthermore, Milošević had accepted 
negotiations over preliminary peace plans as early as in summer 1995, before neither 
Deliberate Force nor the federation offensive had begun (Henriksen 2007: 111). Caught in a 
pincer movement between the international community and Milošević, the Bosnian Serbs 
came under extreme pressure soon forcing them to yield. 
The latter explanation assigns significant weight to the role of Milošević. What, therefore, 
secured his cooperation in Bosnia, and prevented it in Kosovo? First of all, it has been argued 
that the 1992 economic sanctions actually helped Milošević stay in power, because while 
widespread nationalism enabled the population to endure the costs in the name of national 
interest, the regime’s legitimacy was strengthened domestically by the external pressure (de 
Wijk 2005: 96-97). Nevertheless, Holbrooke (1998: 4) has claimed that for ending the 
Bosnian conflict, the greatest piece of leverage over Milošević had been tightening and/or 
loosening these same sanctions. How could the same set of sanctions have so different 
consequences against the same regime? To disperse some of the massive, domestic pressure 
following the disintegration of the SFRY, Serb authorities promoted latent nationalist 
sentiments, using ethnic hatred to organize and sustain political support. Such “politics of 
identity” are often manipulated by threatened regimes as a way of managing their own 
survival (Jackson 2007: 154). Initially, this strong ethno-nationalism formed the core of the 
Serbs’ strategic center of gravity, leaving little room for negotiation or compromise. As the 
conflict progressed however, with continued poor economic development, general war 
exhaustion, and increasing refugee flows from the conflict areas into Serbia itself, the 
drawbacks of nationalism were becoming clear (Henriksen 2007: 112). This exhausted the 
nationalist sentiment and weakened Milošević’s regime, so that the impact of the external 
pressure multiplied. The sanctions thus became central in coercing the Serbs into accepting 
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peace. This interpretation supports the claim made in section 2.3.3; that the stronger political 
support the target regime enjoys, the less effect can be expected from external pressure, and 
vice versa. 
In general, these conditions were different in Kosovo. First of all, the Rambouillet 
negotiations differed from Dayton in that they took place without any major war exhaustion, 
whereas the parties at Dayton had been through years of tough fighting and three failed peace 
plans (Henriksen 2007: 168, 173). Next, the dramatic recession of the Serbian economy 
during the Bosnian war was not mirrored in the Kosovo conflict, at least not until the latter 
part of OAF. Finally, the Serbs’ perception of Kosovo’s relative importance was widely 
overlooked. Often, the Kosovo war both was, and to some extent still is, considered a 
continuation of the Bosnian conflict. Thus, the coercive strategy for Kosovo was modeled 
after the successful end-game strategy of the Bosnian crisis. Initially, the coercive instruments 
were kept roughly equal in scale, although the extensiveness of what was demanded grew 
exponentially. While the Republika Srpska was of less strategic and political importance to 
Milošević, Kosovo was so crucial that losing it would have significantly undermined his 
power base (Henriksen 2007: 116). Therefore, the extensive objectives could not be matched 
with proportional coercive measures until NATO, having issued a total of 25 warnings to the 
Serbs, had invested so much in resolving the crisis that its own stakes grew beyond mere 
normative interests (de Wijk 2005: 34). 
Summing up, while it is important not to underestimate the impact of the coercer’s strategy, 
some evidence points to the target’s domestic political and economic situation as the most 
critical in shaping both war effort and termination. The domestic factors often proved 
governing for any given sub-case, while the coercer’s strategy had to be adapted to the 
situation to be effective. Illustratively, Lambseth (2001: 78) has noted that in the Kosovo 
conflict, Milošević’s surrender was the product of a number of factors that ultimately took 
time to develop and come into effect. As for Bosnia, it should be noted that the coercive 
strategy’s sometimes poor results also could be because coercion was not explicitly 
formulated as an integrated part of the diplomatic effort. When UN General Sir Rupert Smith 
approved Deliberate Force there existed no larger, political or strategic master-plan. Similarly, 
Holbrooke later stated that at the time, bombing was seen as a separate measure from the 
diplomatic negotiations (Henriksen 2007: 118). Instead, it is likely that the most important 
contribution of Deliberate Force was to prove the extent of NATO’s determination and 
resolve. 
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6.4 Mismatching Objectives and Strategies 
As explained in chapter two, one can generally distinguish between the two strategies of 
coercive diplomacy and military coercion. While closely related, they nevertheless require 
different approaches, something de Wijk (2005: 84) argues most theories do not sufficiently 
account for. While it has not been the main analytical focus of this thesis, a short reflection on 
the consequences of this lack of distinction is constructive towards answering the research 
question. 
Coercive diplomacy is meant to influence a voluntary actor’s decision-making calculus at its 
margins. By modifying and changing the payoffs of the target’s options, the aim is to induce 
the adversary into making certain choices. For this purpose, the threat or limited use of force 
is appropriate. Conversely, military coercion, while still short of brute force, encompasses 
more compelling approaches. It involves restricting the adversary’s choices, rather than just 
inducing them. This has consequences for whether the coercer’s strategy should be formulated 
in terms of punishment, risk, denial, decapitation, or incapacitation. 
Theoretically, coercive diplomacy is often associated with punishment and risk approaches. 
Escalation dominance and massive force, on the other hand, is of less importance for coercive 
diplomacy than for military coercion, because the use of force is meant to demonstrate, not 
overpower or deny (de Wijk 2005: 258). Nevertheless, empirically, denial approaches have 
been among the most common in Western attempts at coercive diplomacy (de Wijk 2005: 
116). This is especially true of NATO’s engagements in the Balkans, where the targeting of 
fielded forces constituted a central feature of Alliance strategy. To most observers it was clear 
that the conflict in Bosnia had no military solution, and would rather have to be settled 
politically. Although the military situation often dictates the possibilities and execution of 
political negotiations, it nevertheless seems artificial that most of the threatened or actual 
NATO airstrikes were designed to provide tactical support on the battlefield. This is more 
typical of military coercion and denial, and since it was used to support a coercive diplomatic 
initiative, the strategy was poorly matched with its objectives. Thus it can be argued that the 
strikes should not have been designed to win militarily, but rather to generate political 
conditions conducive to negotiations (Henriksen 2007: 56). This situation was somewhat 
bettered with the federation ground campaign. Now the possibility of losing militarily 
probably suggested itself to Bosnian Serb leadership, finally making NATO’s strategy pay 
off. 
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To some extent, a similar argument holds true also for the Kosovo conflict. This time 
NATO’s airstrikes had been explicitly designed for coercive diplomatic purposes, and OAF, 
having learnt from the Bosnian experience, better reflected the requirements of punishment 
and risk approaches, with incremental, serial bombing. The problem however, was that as 
OAF commenced, negotiations were discontinued for a time. NATO’s air campaign thus 
remained designed for coercive diplomacy, meanwhile the Alliance simultaneously moved 
away from coercive diplomacy and towards military coercion. With such a mismatch in 
NATO’s objectives and strategies, the Serbian government retained the initiative and was able 
to find effective ways of negating the damage caused by the bombing (de Wijk 2005: 103; 
Henriksen 2007: 44). Additionally, while coercive diplomacy could rely on the limited use of 
air power, military coercion would require a significant ground presence which could 
overpower Serbia militarily (Burg 2003: 107-108). Because such a deployment remained 
problematic, the conflict could only be resolved once NATO moved back towards coercive 
diplomacy, by both reintroducing negotiations and redirecting their airstrikes towards more 
strategic targets. 
In general, these observations are illustrative of a tendency among Western policy-makers and 
military planners; that once military force is required, its primary measure of merit is its 
ability to deny the adversary his objectives. This view can derive from typical Western 
military doctrines, which revolve around fighting conventional wars, with standoff weaponry, 
to win decisive battles with shock and awe. Apart from denial, such strategies might also 
work well with decapitation or incapacitation approaches. But when this mindset has been 
brought into post-modern limited, warfare, the results have often been detrimental, not least 
because a limited use of force can rarely produce more than limited denial (de Wijk 2005: 21). 
Another reason for mismatching objectives and strategies can perhaps be that while the aims 
and objectives of NATO governments often correspond to coercive diplomacy, the 
approaches associated with the strategy are both politically and inherently difficult (Art 2003: 
363). First of all, punishment strategies are often quite controversial, as they involve inflicting 
pain on the civilian population. In contrast, targeting fielded military forces for denial 
purposes is considered more legitimate. Another problem is the limited nature of coercive 
diplomacy; the threatened, future punishment can simply not be significant enough as to cause 
a change in behavior. Next, also in risk approaches the challenges are significant. Firstly, the 
strategy loses efficiency because pain suffered today often counts for more than threatened 
pain tomorrow; this is known as hyperbolic discounting. Furthermore, by escalating over 
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time, the adversary has more time to adapt to the situation, or create a buffer of domestic 
support. Summing up, Robert Art (2003: 364-365) has concluded that given the many 
challenges associated with coercive diplomatic strategies, risk approaches hold the highest 
chances of success. Although also these have weaknesses, they are the easiest to achieve with 
limited means. This is especially true because gradualism, often a political requirement in 
NATO countries, is not as harmful for this type of approach. Risk approaches are based on the 
threat of future loss, and gradualism ensures that the adversary will still have valuable targets 
to hold at ransom in the future. 
It is a strategic paradox that certain contemporary developments in politics and military 
doctrines induce NATO governments towards gradualism and denial. This combination can 
be detrimental for exerting influence through limited military means, as limited force brings 
only limited, and thus ineffective, denial. Conversely, denial, as well as decapitation and 
probably incapacitation, should be sought in concert with traditional strategies of military 
coercion and shock and awe. Coercive diplomacy however, works best with gradual risk-
approaches, perhaps also with elements of punishment where this is feasible and politically 
acceptable. 
6.5 Explaining Coercive Diplomacy 
The aim of this thesis has been to explain the variance in the outcomes of NATO and its 
member governments’ attempts at using the strategy of coercive diplomacy as a crisis 
management tool. With the advent of risk management, “optional” wars, and coalitional 
warfare, the NATO countries have been in need of improved ways to use its military strength 
to exert influence in the post-modern security environment. They are required, in General 
Clark’s (2001) terminology, to wage “modern war”. Coercion has thus come to be one of the 
primary ways in which contemporary, liberal democracies use force today, and using coercion 
to attempt returning to the status quo by ending and/or reversing the actions of a voluntary 
actor is what is known as coercive diplomacy. 
As opposed to strategies primarily linked to the Cold War era, like deterrence, coercive 
diplomacy has not attracted much scientific attention. As a result, several notable researchers 
have identified a lacuna in the theorizing of the subject. As identified in this thesis, perhaps 
one of the most urgent challenges has been a relative under-theorization of the adversary. The 
subject-area has been in need of a dynamic theory, which sees the adversary as a meaningful 
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unit of analysis, and accounts for its motivations and interests. In this respect, the theoretical 
framework developed by Jentleson and Whytock is a significant step in the right direction. To 
test their framework’s feasibility for explaining NATO’s attempts at coercive diplomacy, the 
thesis identified two major cases as the range of potential research objects, namely the 1992-
1995 NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 1998-1999 intervention in Kosovo. 
Including both cases helped secure the study’s robustness, representivity, and potential for 
generalization. The theoretical variables were then operationalized and dichotomized, in order 
to be congruence tested against twelve sub-cases derived from the two main cases. 
Having concluded this test, I can now answer the study’s two-part research question. To begin 
with its theoretical dimension, because the degree of congruence has been shown to be 
between 75% and 90%, it is fair to say that the variance in the outcomes of NATO’s attempts 
at coercive diplomacy can, to a significant degree, be explained by the theoretical framework 
presented here. First of all, this means that positive outcomes can be expected when the 
coercer’s strategy implements coercive measures proportional to a set of clear and limited 
demands made against the coerced. Typically, this means that regime change, or demands that 
dramatically threaten a ruling regime’s safety, are not advisable. Furthermore, there should be 
an explicit or tacit link between the adversary’s concession and a set of limited, positive 
inducements offered by the coercer. Such inducements must also be proportionate, and cannot 
be offered too soon or too late. Finally, the threats made have to be credible, meaning that the 
coerced must believe that the threatened, negative consequences will follow noncompliance. 
Secondly, a coercive diplomatic attempt must also satisfy a set of domestic conditions. The 
threat should be designed so that it at least does not significantly threaten the target regime’s 
political support or safety. Next, the threat must promise the coerced a more beneficial 
economic result for compliance than for noncompliance. Finally, the threat should be 
designed so that it does not encroach on the interests of the target state’s key actors and elites. 
Conversely, should their interests be best served by complying with the external demands, this 
increases the threat’s chances of success. 
In light of the study’s research design, I have concluded that it is likely that the variables 
outlined above are part of a causal mechanism. To some extent, this claim finds support in 
other studies of coercive diplomacy. Next, having largely succeeded in adequately explaining 
the two examined cases, it can be argued that the framework developed by Jentleson and 
Whytock has passed a least-likely “tough test”. As the two cases in some ways were at the 
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margins of what this relatively new theory could be expected to account for, its research status 
has been clearly strengthened. 
The empirical, disciplined configurative dimension of the research question asked for 
heuristic knowledge about the examined cases. Firstly, such insight should generally be 
reflected throughout chapters three and four. Secondly, in these two cases, NATO 
demonstrated up to a 50% coercive diplomacy success rate. This is a higher degree of success 
than found in other, more general studies of coercive diplomacy. Although it is not entirely 
clear why this should be the case, it is an optimistic observation in terms of NATO’s future 
capability for dealing with breaches to the international order. 
Next, some correlation was observed between two variable dyads. In practice, this means that 
policy-makers can expect mutual dependencies within these pairs. Firstly, proportionality 
seems linked with internal political support and security, implying that an important factor in 
determining appropriate proportions between coercive instruments and objectives is the effect 
the threat has on the target regime’s survivability. Next, internal political support is connected 
to the role of elites and key actors. This illustrates how the ruling regime’s survivability to a 
large degree is dependent on the actions of the key actors surrounding it. Seen together, these 
observations can indicate it is better to threaten a foreign government not directly, but 
indirectly, through influencing key actors. 
As a fourth point, the study found no sufficient conditions for a positive outcome, but found 
that all but one of the variables were necessary. Reciprocity, as the final variable, was not 
found necessary in a strict sense; a conclusion with some support in other studies as well. 
Nevertheless, its often greatly facilitating role means policy-makers should reconsider before 
excluding it from future coercive diplomatic attempts. As for the relative difficulty of 
satisfying the various conditions, reciprocity and internal political support were secured the 
fewest times. The difficulties with the first of these need not be problematic, as it probably is 
not necessary in a strict sense. The second however, underlines the significant challenges of 
designing a threat that both exerts pressure while it does not threaten the ruling regime’s 
survivability. On this point, it should be noted that the contemporary trend towards indicting 
leaders of the target state is likely to reduce NATO’s ability to influence the coerced’s 
policies. A final observation was unsurprisingly that coercive economic instruments proved 
the easiest for the NATO governments to master. 
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On a related note, a certain primacy of the domestic variables over the coercer’s strategy has 
been observed. This can imply that using coercive diplomacy as a “default” response to 
international crises is especially unfortunate, because the most important factors in 
determining its successfulness lies outside the policy-makers control. Instead, when to use the 
strategy should be a situational decision, as the strategy is likely to succeed only in situations 
with conducive domestic conditions in the target state. Hence it can be argued that NATO’s 
successes in Bosnia and Kosovo was in part the result of a number of predominantly domestic 
conditions, which took time to mature and come into effect. 
Finally, it was concluded that to some extent, contemporary political and military 
developments draw NATO towards gradually escalating coercive means, often to the purpose 
of denying the adversary his objective. The paradox is that gradualism and denial is a 
potentially harmful combination, as limited and gradual use of force can only produce limited, 
and thus ineffective, denial. Instead, coercive diplomacy should be based on risk approaches, 
with elements of punishment where feasible. These approaches are easier to achieve with only 
limited military means, while gradualism is not problematic. Conversely, the typical doctrine 
of shock and awe is better suited for military coercion. Taking this into account, it can be 
argued that NATO’s choice of objectives and strategies in the two conflicts were not perfectly 
aligned. 
The findings for both the theoretical and the empirical questions should be generalizable to 
the population from whence the examined cases were drawn. Although there were no other 
historical cases available when this thesis was designed, the results can be expected to be 
valid for a hypothetical universe of potential, similar research objects. In other words, the 
inferences made will likely be correct also for future incidents that closely resemble those 
examined here. Such incidents include NATO and its member governments’ attempts at using 
coercive diplomacy as a crisis management tool in third-party conflicts. 
6.6 Final Remarks 
Having answered the research question, only some final remarks remain to be made. This 
thesis has presented and tested an alternative approach, rethinking the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy. Emphasis has been put on its dynamic nature, in order to address a gap in the 
subject area’s research literature. This section will attempt to tie up loose ends, summarize the 
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study’s strengths and challenges, and shortly compare and contrast the study to the area’s 
broader research. 
Firstly, some strengths of the research design should be noted. The theoretical framework, as 
developed by Jentleson and Whytock, represents a model of coercive diplomacy which allows 
for more realistic theorizing about not only the coercer’s strategy, but the adversary’s 
motivations and interests as well. As such, some assumptions commonly made about the 
coerced were no longer required, entailing that the theory could adequately explain the 
subject-matter with fewer assumptions than other, concurrent theories. Furthermore, with an 
explanatory power between 75% and 90%, it can be said to explain at least as much as other 
models of coercive diplomacy. This implies that future research on coercive diplomacy should 
continue the work into understanding the adversary. 
Next, it has been argued that denial is not the best approach for coercive diplomacy, whereas 
risk and punishment are more appropriate. Nevertheless, even the formulation of a theoretical 
model can emphasize certain approaches over others. For example, Jakobsen’s (2007: 231) 
theory identifies “…defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives…” as a central 
requirement of coercive diplomacy. This indicates a certain bias towards denial, and rules out 
a number of non-military, coercive means. On the other hand, Jentleson and Whytock’s model 
explicitly accounts for risk instruments like economic sanctions, as well as punishment factors 
such as regime survivability. 
This study has attempted to provide transparency in its methodological decisions for 
improving replicability. Additionally, as a comparative case-study with both within-case and 
cross-case components, it is also fair to say that the thesis enjoys high levels of validity, 
meanwhile a triangulation of primary sources, guided by secondary literature, secured 
adequate reliability. On the other hand, the study’s potential for generalization is low, 
especially as at the time of designing the thesis, there were no other historical cases in the 
universe of research objects. Nevertheless, some contingent generalization to a hypothetical 
universe of potential, future research objects is warranted. The findings are externally valid 
not through statistical representation, but through an increased theoretical understanding 
provided by an interaction between the theoretical model and the examined cases (Bratberg 
2009). This allowed for drawing some conclusions which should be considered the next time 
NATO decision-makers consider using coercive diplomacy. 
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While this thesis mainly focused on congruence testing the specified theory, a more elaborate 
process-tracing approach would have helped ensure the findings’ robustness, as well as aided 
in determining whether the observed covariation is due to an actual causal mechanism 
(George and Bennett 2005: 183). The need for such improvements is especially acute as the 
theory is relatively new and untested, and some of its elements have less support in existing 
literature. Furthermore, a single congruence test is not enough to validate the theory, entailing 
that more testing is required. This can be done in other studies, perhaps with other cases, 
should they become available. Finally, the theory should be more systematically tested and 
evaluated against competing theories and models. These challenges should be considered in 
later studies. 
In conclusion, it is clear that in order to maximize its chances of success, coercive diplomacy 
should be integrated as a part of a larger, long-term, political and military strategy (de Wijk 
2005: 15). The greatest mistake policy-makers can commit is thinking that coercive 
diplomacy is a suitable “default” option for managing low-interest conflicts in the post-
modern world. The strategy is by no means a “quick fix” for international security issues, but 
requires careful planning and coordination. A common source of critique against Operation 
Allied Force has been the 78 days it took to coerce the Serbs into compliance, and in contrast 
to the only three week long Deliberate Force, this is understandable. Nevertheless, this 
argument overlooks the importance of the coerced’s dramatically different domestic 
conditions, to which the outcome of coercive diplomacy remains intimately connected. To the 
extent it will come to be considered as coercive diplomacy, this is evident in NATO’s recently 
concluded Operation Unified Protector. The idea that limited military force is an easy and 
quick solution to third-party conflicts is discredited as NATO sums up its 222 day long 
engagement in Libya as a success. 
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